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prologue
This book grows out of, and indeed connects to, previous 
efforts (Reiter 2009; nef and Reiter 2009). its realization would have been 
impossible without the support i have received from the Desigualdades net-
work of the free University of Berlin. i am very grateful for the support 
they have given me and want to express my sincere thanks, especially to 
prof. sergio costa. My time in Berlin and the dialogues i had with fellows, 
students, postdocs, and faculty have proven invaluable and allowed me to 
push my thoughts forward in significant ways. i am also indebted and very 
grateful for the critical and constructive comments i have received on earlier 
versions of several chapters of this book from Manuela Boatcă, Mitchell 
Glodek, Ulrich oslender, sergio costa, Katherine lebow, and eric Wolters. 
finally, i want to thank my home institution, Usf, especially my director, 
Rachel May, and my chair, Mohsen Milani, for allotting me the time and 
freedom necessary to finish this book. Thanks!
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introduction
Philosophers have only interpreted the world in 
various ways; the point is to change it.
—KaRl MaRx, 1845
The central theme of this book is autonomy and self-rule. it 
focuses on those sites, historical and geographical, where people have taken 
up the banner of self-rule and established democratic systems. as soon 
as they have done so—and this is the thread weaving together the different 
stories here told—they had to face the adversary of those who had some-
thing to lose, namely, their own power and their privileges. at the same time 
that this book tells the story of autonomy and self-rule, it also tells the story 
of the defense of privilege, of exclusion and second-class citizenship, because 
one story cannot adequately be told without the other.
Democracy, understood here in the strong sense, that is, as the strife 
to rule oneself and achieve autonomy, never “came about”—it was always 
fought for. in the same way, it never “vanished” or “withered away”; it was 
taken away, dismantled, or weakened by those who had something to lose 
from self-rule. The ways to establish democracy were as cunning as the ways 
to weaken and destroy it—and this book takes a closer look at how exactly 
this epic struggle played out, and still plays out, in different parts of the 
world. it focuses on the efforts of specific groups to establish self-rule and 
democracy, and it analyzes how their efforts were met by those i call “the 
included,” that is, the privileged who tend to benefit from the exclusion of 
others (nef and Reiter 2009).
it is important to highlight that this book grows out of praxis—my 
own praxis as someone working for and thus concerned with democracy, 
self-determination, power, democracy, and autonomy—both my own and 
those of others. starting from praxis, i contend, makes all the difference. 
What follows is done in an effort to think through—and offer tools to 
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analyze—some of the most central problems and questions of my life and, i 
would think, the lives of many others. how to be free? how to achieve more 
justice and autonomy? how to recognize the maneuvers of the privileged to 
undo the efforts of the excluded to attain these goals? hence also: how to 
improve the democracies we live in? Behind all these questions stands the 
will to address shortcomings and offer tools for improvement. This is at the 
same time easier and harder than it seems. it is easy because to achieve such 
practical goals, we do not need most of the extremely complicated, cryptic, 
and lofty theories offered by some of the “recognized thinkers” of our day. 
Most problems we have are not that complicated, after all, and it rather 
seems that some of “our” thinkers and writers artificially complicate issues 
in order to mystify them, instead of elucidating them. some also seem 
more motivated to add to their own prestige (and positions/salaries) than 
to offer usable tools to all those who could actually benefit from such anal-
yses. Most of academic life has become a sort of vanity fair of exalted egos 
whose central aim seems to be to flatter themselves by inventing ever-more 
sophisticated proposals and languages (attend a random academic confer-
ence to verify). it might indeed even be, as cornelius castoriadis thought, 
that “we live in a period of appalling ideological regression among the lite-
rati” (castoriadis 2001: 24). This trend also complicates this book, because 
it forces me to navigate through, and combine wherever possible, different 
languages in an act to translate the useful, decipher the cryptic, highlight 
the helpful, and in the midst of all of this, explain my own thinking.
luckily, i have found in the work of Greek philosopher cornelius cas-
toriadis (1922– 1997) a strong ally in this endeavor. his work on autonomy 
has allowed me to sharpen my gaze and, if you will, “keep the eye on the 
prize.” i share castoriadis’s starting position and focus on autonomy, and his 
definition of autonomy sets the tone for my efforts as well:
But what does “autonomy” signify? Autos: oneself; nomos: law. The person who 
gives herself her own laws is autonomous. (not, The person who does whatever 
comes into her head, but rather, The person who gives herself laws.) now, that is 
immensely difficult. for an individual, to give oneself one’s own law, within the 
fields in which this is possible, requires the ability to hold one’s own in the face 
of all conventions, beliefs, fashion, learned people who maintain absurd ideas, 
the media, the silence of the public, and so forth. and for a society, to give 
itself its own law means to accept at bottom the idea that it is creating its own 
institution, and that it creates that institution without being able to invoke any 
extrasocial foundation, any norm of norms, any measure of its measures. This 
therefore boils down to saying that such a society should itself decide what is 
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just and unjust—and this is the question with which true politics deals (we are 
obviously not talking here about the politics of the politicians who occupy the 
stage today) (castoriadis 1985: 158).
however, even if i follow castoriadis in many of his analyses and cri-
tiques and share his preoccupation with autonomy and self-rule, i do not 
share his assessment of the Greco-Roman-Western path as a unique one. 
even though it does seem that this path has thoroughly colonized the world 
(chakrabarty 2000), i simply do not know enough about the world in order 
to make, or support, such a statement. Making this sort of argument is not 
my aim here. This book, too, focuses on democratic athens as the place 
where self-rule was first documented, but this focus is due to the availability 
of sources and does not imply that similar experiments were not undertaken 
elsewhere. it then focuses on other contested historical sites of struggle for 
self-rule, namely the Roman Republic, medieval italian city-states, and 
postrevolutionary france. The struggle for autonomy and self-rule is, how-
ever, not historical—it continues to be fought today, as the struggles in 
egypt, syria, yemen, Morocco, palestine, fought while i am writing this 
book, amply testify. To capture the different struggles for self-rule and to 
analyze the ways in which, and why, these efforts are blocked and contained 
by elites and their allies, i have included four contemporary cases, namely, 
france, portugal, colombia, and Brazil.
Those cases are selected because they are particularly telling and thus 
allow us to gain exceptionally deep insights into the dynamics of this struggle 
for self-rule. chapter 1 will elaborate further on the methodology applied 
here, which is one of exploration. here, it is important to highlight that all 
those marching, and willing to die, for democracy in the past and today 
do so not to establish a system where one sort of ruler is substituted for 
another, even if elected. “elite democracy,” as it has been called, is not what 
the idea of democracy promises. it promises self-rule (Mansbridge 1980). 
similarly, at the heart of the disappointment many experience worldwide 
with their own established democracies lies a lack of self-rule, which means 
a lack of active citizenship. passive citizenship, second-class citizenship, or 
exclusion from citizenship altogether while being an effective resident in a 
democratic country, all contribute to alienation from politics, from govern-
ment, from the state, and even, as i shall show, from “the political” itself, 
so that whole generations of people living in established democracies seem 
disinterested in it.1 Why should they be interested in it if nothing seems at 
stake for them? The leaders they elect do nothing to allow self-identification 
with them and their issues (and if they do, it never seems genuine). self-rule 
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cannot be delegated. according to castoriadis, “The project of autonomy 
itself is certainly not finished. But its trajectory during the last two centuries 
has proved the radical inadequacy, to say the least, of the programmes in 
which it had been embodied—be it the liberal republic or Marxist– leninist 
‘socialism.’ That the demonstration of this inadequacy in actual historical 
fact is one of the roots of present political apathy and privatization hardly 
needs stressing. for the resurgence of the project of autonomy, new political 
objectives and new human attitudes are required” (castoriadis 2001: 26). 
i agree. The current (2011– 2012) political events filling our newspapers, 
from the arab spring to the Tea party, all suggest a profound discontent 
with the ways “democracy” has come to be understood and practiced. The 
minimal common denominator seems to be that many citizens have lost 
their trust in the political system, perceiving that politicians do not truly 
represent us and/or that they do not represent us truthfully. Rather, they 
act as elites, in their own interests, or in the interests of the most powerful 
stakeholders—in most cases big corporations. as representation is in crisis, 
the whole democratic system evokes discontent and mistrust. in short: the 
practice of citizenship needs rethinking and reorientation.
The most prevalent strategy to uphold elitism has been to shift the 
core discussions rightfully pertaining to self-rule out of the political realm 
into the administrative or legal realms, and to transform citizenship from 
a political practice to a set of legal rights and administrative rules. citizen-
ship has been thoroughly legalized and “commodified,” in the words of 
John pocock (1995)—that is, transformed from a political practice into 
a legal concept without many teeth. at the same time, in almost all con-
temporary democracies, democracy came to mean elite rule, exercised and 
upheld through representation. self-rule, the original idea behind democ-
racy, was practiced in but a few places, for relatively short periods of time, 
and it was always opposed vehemently because of its radicalism. and radi-
cal it is, as the idea of ruling oneself does not go with many of the things 
we have come to accept as fitting under the label “democracy.” such ideas 
as democratic representation and citizenship as a legal status clearly are at 
odds with what athenian citizens, the burghers of pisa and lucca, and the 
french revolutionaries wanted. They are also at odds with what the citizens 
of egypt want today, as well as with what the excluded and second-class cit-
izens of portugal, colombia, and Brazil want and expect from their already 
established democratic systems. They all want a voice and an active say in 
the molding of their lives. They want self-rule, autonomy, and justice—not 
a system of elected and corrupt, or corrupted, elites. in other words, they 
want true citizenship. But what is true citizenship? What does it look like? 
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how has it been achieved, and what can we learn from where it has failed? 
With these questions, the focus of this book is defined. i set out to analyze 
the struggles for autonomy and self-rule, and to dissect the opposing forces 
and strategies that block its advancement.
i have found the most fruitful way to achieve this by focusing on the 
relationships that link citizenship to exclusion, and on the struggles and 
processes that constitute the field in between citizenship and exclusion—
that is, the struggles of those who seek self-rule, autonomy, justice, and 
democracy, and those who oppose them for the sake of defending their own 
privileges. in other words, i have found it helpful to think of the relation-
ship between inclusion and exclusion in and from citizenship as one that is 
dialectical, where one constitutes and conditions the other. This argument 
at once constitutes the unit of analysis of this entire book—namely, the 
space, or maybe the field of tension, that emerges between the two poles of 
citizenship and exclusion.2 This focus also gives the book its title.
To demonstrate the fruitfulness of this analysis, the empirical analysis 
presented here starts where citizenship itself started—at least where we think 
and know it started, namely, in classical athens. from there, i shall follow 
the development and expansion of citizenship and democracy and thus ana-
lyze the Roman Republic, medieval city republics, and postrevolutionary 
france. all these are obvious places to look in this genealogy of citizenship, 
even though they are certainly not the only ones, and i do not want to 
claim that the european experience is superior to another. To the contrary, 
this book adds to the effort to “provincialize europe” (chakrabarty 2000) 
by offering a critical analysis of what has been called the “Western demo-
cratic tradition” and showing its inherent limitations and contradictions. To 
fully achieve this, this book also includes a discussion of three contemporary 
cases, namely, portugal, Brazil, and colombia.
it is at this point important to explain that my aim in this book is to offer 
an approach that contributes to unveiling the common thread that brings 
all the cases discussed here together, namely, the dynamics that produce 
different forms of exclusion and block the achievement of more autonomy, 
self-rule, and hence genuine democracy. i should also explain that even 
though my aim is practical, the work presented here is firmly rooted in the 
social sciences, offering theory-driven explanations of social reality. Thus, 
even though i present and use historical information, this work aims not 
at contributing to the production of historical knowledge. in fact, none of 
the historical evidence presented here is new, and it is taken almost entirely 
from already published work. i am not aiming to present new facts, but 
new explanations about facts and thus new, fruitful, and innovative ways to 
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look at facts and reality. This is, i want to argue, all that honest social sci-
ence can and thus should do. in my mind, any heuristic claims beyond are 
ill-begotten and misleading and ultimately responsible for the lack of sys-
tematic knowledge production in the social sciences. Given that this claim 
is controversial, i have dedicated some space to elaborating it. chapter 1 
discusses these issues in some detail, and by doing so it lays out the episte-
mological and methodological foundations for this book. however, chapter 
1 is relevant beyond the cases of this book. it stands on its own and can 
be read separately and taken as a general discussion on the epistemology, 
theory, and methodology of the social sciences. it is of especial interest to 
all those interested in qualitative, explorative research, as i seek to provide a 
rationale for explorative research in general.
citizenship—or better, the reality represented by it—can be analyzed 
in many different ways. This book sets out to focus on its inherent ten-
sions and contradictions, and on the ways different people and groups have 
sought to uphold and defend their citizens’ rights against others. By doing 
this, a sort of genealogy of exclusion and second-class citizenship slowly 
emerges as the books moves from one empirical case to the next. The ana-
lytical framework chosen makes it appear as if citizenship was never only 
about status and belonging to a specially delimited community, as T. h. 
Marshall (1950) has argued, but always also about setting oneself apart from 
others and thus defining and constituting one’s rights in contrast to others’ 
non-rights and duties. i deliberately chose to say “this framework makes it 
appear this way” because, as i shall seek to demonstrate in chapters 1 and 
2, the theoretical framework applied to an empirical reality will influence 
and distort what we see—even make us blind to some aspects of that same 
reality that we would otherwise see had we chosen a different theoretical 
framework (Whorf and carroll 1964; Davidson 1974; lakoff 2009). This, 
of course, leaves us in a predicament if we aim at explaining “the” reality, or 
“all” reality. i shall avoid this claim and instead explain “a” reality, one that i 
find important to also consider when reading the important and influential 
work of such authors as T. h. Marshall (1950), Margaret somers (1993), 
ensing isin (2000, 2008), ayelet shachar (2009), Joseph Tulchin and Meg 
Ruthenberg (2007), and many others—all of whom have done much to 
explain what citizenship is and how it was experienced by different peoples 
at different times.
The reality i want to further elucidate here is one hiding behind the 
legal category of citizenship. i am interested in exploring how citizenship 
is lived, experienced, imagined, and performed in people’s everyday lives, 
and how these performances reflect back on the identities of those having to 
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negotiate, defend, and uphold their status of rightfully belonging, as well as 
how they impact, influence, and qualify the democratic regimes that have 
citizenship as their cornerstones. This choice restricts the domain of this 
book to democracies and citizens, and thus excludes non-democracies and 
noncitizens from the realm dealt with here.
furthermore, this kind of approach is akin to the one applied by 
Benedict anderson (2006), who takes nationalism as an “anthropological 
category” (anderson 2006: 6) and is thus able to analyze how nationalism 
is enacted and experienced. similarly, i seek to explore what it means to 
be a citizen, and how different people and groups flesh out its meaning in 
their mutual and daily interactions, as well as their interactions with gov-
ernments and states, thus investing it with concreteness. as stated above, 
the most fruitful way to achieve this is by focusing on the field of ten-
sion created by citizenship’s inherent contradictions and its relationship to 
exclusion.
hence, this book aims to contribute. it aims to add to our understand-
ing of what citizenship means and has meant, and it aims to add to the 
knowledge that other scholars have already produced in this field. it does 
not aim to substitute for or replace that knowledge. social science, con-
ducted honestly, as i shall argue in chapter 1, should steer away from such 
totalitarian claims and position itself in a more humble fashion, because 
as social scientists, we seek to explain an ever-changing reality that is con-
stantly explained and categorized by different actors who do not share the 
same angle or approach to reality, thus producing different, divergent, and 
even contradictory readings and understandings, all of which have a ten-
dency to become reified and even institutionalized (Brubaker 2004; Berger 
and luckmann 1966). This tendency complicates the production of reli-
able knowledge about social reality tremendously, as all social facts are 
indeed laden with meaning, thus escaping an unmediated and simple, or 
straightforward, comprehension. in other words, social reality is composed 
of material things that are woven into linguistic and symbolic acts from 
which they cannot be pulled apart, because they indeed only become reality 
through this interwovenness. What some social scientists call “realism” is 
indeed a sort of epistemological and ontological naiveté about the stuff that 
reality is made of.
humility, however, is not a highly valued currency in the academic mar-
ketplace, so that most social-science treatises we know claim far too much 
and do not recognize the limits that scientific methodology automatically 
imposes on research practitioners. scientific procedure, while able to assure 
more reliable knowledge than the one produced without a clear methodology, 
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automatically cuts away all those knowledges that do not fit into a method-
ological apparatus. The great majority of the “things we know” are thus lost 
to us. as scientists, we end up instead with only what we can prove and 
demonstrate—which has been very little indeed. practicing social science is 
nevertheless worth our while if done honestly, with transparency, humility, 
insight, and self-awareness—and when aimed at the very real and serious 
problems of our times. The quest for self-rule, autonomy, citizenship, and 
democracy certainly qualifies, and although it is promising, it continues to 
pose one of the most serious challenges to our collective well-being. We can-
not afford to leave its discussion to power-seeking demagogues, self-interested 
business elites and corporations, or a media invested only in entertaining us 
while selling us things we do not need.
hence, what this book seeks to accomplish is a different, and hopefully 
insightful, way to think about citizenship and to make scientifically reliable 
and valid inquiries into the reality represented by this concept. if success-
ful, it should unveil new facets of citizenship hitherto left unexplored, 
and it should inspire others to conduct similar inquiries, providing them 
with some methodological guidelines and worthwhile questions to ask. i 
hope that the effort i have put into this book also inspires people outside 
the academic world, giving them new ideas and proposals with which to 
think about democracy, autonomy, and self-rule, and to use when deciding 
which actions to take.
chapTeR oVeRVieW
chapter 1 lays the groundwork for the book by discussing the epistemo-
logical and methodological issues and pitfalls involved in social-science 
research.3 it is particularly focused on problems of reification—that is, the 
unplanned feedback and interference created when social-science or census 
categories reflect back on the social world and are used to form identities. By 
insisting on a clear separation between words, models, and reality, the chap-
ter lays out the foundations of exploratory, inductive social-science research.
chapter 2 focuses on the concept of citizenship and proposes a way to 
fruitfully analyze the social reality represented by this concept—keeping in 
mind the caveats discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter proposes 
to think of citizenship in terms of a positional good, as well as a social 
role. such a conceptualization provides innovative analytical tools that allow 
for an analysis of some of the previously unexplored aspects of citizenship, 
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especially its inherently exclusionary character. To further capture the 
intrinsically contradictory nature of citizenship, this chapter elaborates a 
“dialectics of citizenship”—both to provide an analytical approach, and to 
adequately describe the phenomenon of citizenship.
chapter 3 focuses on classical citizenship as it was practiced in dem-
ocratic athens and republican Rome. first, the chapter focuses on the 
very sense of what it meant to be a citizen in athens, concluding that the 
main trait was that in athens, there was no clear separation between rulers 
and ruled, thus making alienation from politics, or the state, impossible. 
instead, athenian citizenship demanded many duties alongside the rights it 
offered. athenian citizenship was foremost political membership—a charac-
ter it soon lost, as the analysis of the Roman Republic demonstrates. There, 
citizenship was codified into a set of rights, perceived as entitlements, and 
access to these rights was conditional on one’s social and economic stand-
ing. Rome is also the beginning of representation, another tradition we have 
kept alive since then.
furthermore, this chapter also discusses the ways in which athenian 
politicians and reformers such as solon, cleisthenes, and ephialtes have 
sought to remedy and counteract the very prevalent social and economic 
inequalities that divided the people of attica at the time. instead of trying 
to change social or economic realities, as was done ever after, they sought to 
devise political institutions that forced different people and groups together 
into one political association, while at the same time splitting up otherwise 
powerful clans that threatened to bring imbalance into the system. in doing 
so, these reformers provided an example of what democratic politics should 
aim for and how to best achieve it—raising important questions about the 
proper separation of the social from the political. This chapter also discusses 
the many exclusions of classic democracy, especially in athens.
chapter 4 seeks to fill the historical gap between classic democracy and 
citizenship and contemporary manifestations, originating in the french 
Revolution. in the almost 1,800 years in between those democratic experi-
ments, much happened that this chapter cannot possibly account for. This 
chapter thus is the place to highlight the limits of such a study as the one 
presented here, as there are not enough sources to discuss citizenship in 
other, non-european regions. even the knowledge we have about the 1,800 
years covered in this chapter is scant, thus forcing the analyst to once more 
focus on those cases where sources exist. Given that the intent of this study 
is to critique the Western democratic tradition and to deconstruct some of 
its central tenets, i hope that this eurocentric focus will not be held against 
me. in order to reduce all the possible ways in which to discuss such a huge 
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span of time, this chapter focuses on the situation of the Jews in europe, 
because they provide a crucial case for the study of european democracy. 
Doing so, the chapter detects a pattern, namely, that christian advance was 
routinely achieved by climbing on the backs of the perpetual “others” in 
europe, the Jews. This history is reconstructed all the way from the forceful 
baptism of all Jews ordered by the frankish king chilperic in 582, to the 
granting of civil rights to Jews in prussia (1886).
furthermore, this chapter explores one of the few better-documented 
examples of medieval citizenship, namely, the one practiced in the medi-
eval Tuscan republics of florence, pisa, siena, lucca, Genoa, among others, 
between the tenth and the fifteenth centuries. The focus in this analysis is 
also on the limits and contradictions of citizenship—even though not too 
much historical material exists to gain a detailed picture. citizenship then, it 
becomes clear, meant just as much as it did in athens and was as exclusion-
ary, thus confirming the general theme that the more citizenship meant, the 
more exclusive it was held to be.
chapter 5 then shifts to the birthplace of modern citizenship, france. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. first, it discusses the limits of the 
liberal discourse that emerged during the french Revolution when black 
former slaves in the french colonies sought to apply these discourses to their 
own situation. liberalism quickly found its limits in this situation, to the 
point where all those who stood up for black rights found a quick, and often 
painful, death at the hands of those whose economic interests were threat-
ened by such ideas. however, once slavery was ended, the problems for free 
blacks continued—a phenomenon nicely captured by the title of Thomas 
holt’s (1992) book The Problem of Freedom, as historically privileged whites 
now had to devise new mechanisms to defend their undeserved privileges.
This pattern of defending white privilege, a privilege first established 
during colonization, is also what makes the bridge to contemporary france, 
where nonwhite french citizens face serious and systematic discrimina-
tion, especially in the job market. The white majority, which elects its 
representatives, has devised many ways to defend these privileges against 
nonwhites—which is the theme of the remainder of chapter 5.
chapter 6 shifts our attention to portugal, one of the richest and most 
interesting cases for any study of european citizenship—yet at the same time 
one of the least studied. What makes portugal such a rich case for explor-
atory research is its long colonial history and the “colonial entanglements” 
it created during this time. as a result of prolonged colonialism, portugal 
first defined its national community as one that included africans—only to 
later reverse this action and define it without africans. such maneuvering 
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was triggered by the need to justify still having colonies during the 1960s 
and 1970s—hence the argument that “those were not colonies, but part of 
the portuguese nation”—and later, after applying for eU membership, the 
need to demonstrate that portugal was not inviting africa into the eU, or 
even that portugal was not an african-european nation itself at the time 
of joining the eU in 1986. There are but few cases where such strategic 
maneuverings can be observed with such clarity as in portugal. not only 
does portugal allow for a study of the tensions that arise when national 
community and civil unity do not overlap; it also provides fertile ground 
for a study of what happened to different people and groups in the middle 
of these state-led changes. how to get rid of the “african connection” that 
so implicated portugal thus became a major effort of state elites, as did how 
to define the african-descendant citizens of portugal as not really belong-
ing to the nation. This was achieved, as this chapter shows, with much help 
from different state and societal elites—including those working as schol-
ars in portugal’s public universities. This chapter thus shows, as the title 
implies, how the portuguese states made foreigners out of black citizens.
chapter 7 then finally shifts the focus of the book away from europe, 
and first to Brazil. Brazilians, so the chapter argues, are “specialists in exclu-
sion.” Given this country’s long colonial history and its vast contingent of 
black and indigenous people, white Brazilians, who saw and to some extent 
still see themselves as the true inheritors of the country as it was handed 
down to them by the portuguese colonizers, had to be especially inventive 
when it came to securing their own privileges—especially after democra-
tization in 1985. and creative they were—making Brazil a very rich and 
telling explorative case for anybody interested in how exclusion works. The 
focus of this chapter has taken me away from the confinements of my own 
discipline, political science, and it made me delve into linguistics and the 
use of formalism and procedural protocols in order to shield those who 
seek inclusion and participation from gaining access and voice. in a country 
where access to formal education is still a privilege of relatively few, the his-
torically included have resorted to the use of extremely formal and erudite 
language codes—in their speech, but even more consequentially in writ-
ten Brazilian-portuguese language. By engaging in such elevated language 
games, included Brazilians are able to hold the historically excluded out, or 
to silence them if they manage to penetrate such protected societal spheres 
where money and power circulate and are negotiated daily. The theme of 
this chapter is “the formal against the informal,” as it zeroes in on the dif-
ferent strategies used by the formal sectors of society to uphold and defend 
their historical privileges.
xxii | Introduction
The final empirical chapter of this book is about contemporary colom-
bia. in 1991, the colombian state gave itself a new constitution, for the first 
time ever recognizing ethnic minorities and investing them with a set of very 
specific rights. law 70, passed in 1993, further specifies some of the general 
provisions anchored in the 1991 constitution by making specific references 
to the country’s black communities. colombia thus serves as an exemplary 
case for all the other latin american countries that have passed similar con-
stitutions over the past fifteen years. however, despite all the new laws and 
constitutions, the situation of minorities continues to be dire. The central 
research question driving this chapter is how such a great gap between law 
and reality, especially the reality of afro-colombians, can be explained. To 
address this question, this chapter explores some of the pitfalls that are inher-
ent in the tradition of legal idealism that normally comes with the code law 
tradition. laws are written without keeping reality in mind, thus presenting 
not a reality, but rather a fantasy of those able to participate in the formulation 
of such codes—elites. The colombian case is slightly different in this respect, 
because it was not elites, but a popularly elected constituent assembly—a 
constituyente—that wrote the constitutional text. The colombian case 
demonstrates how important it is to disaggregate the state when analyzing 
state action. it becomes clear that the legislative and executive branches of 
the colombian government are under firm elite control. The judiciary, to the 
contrary, has been able to secure a limited measure of independence—even 
if constantly threatened. The result is that laws that are passed are then vio-
lated by those agencies working for the executive branch, or representing the 
interests of those populating the legislative branch. furthermore, colombia 
provides a prime example of the force of racism in a country that is officially 
colorblind. Because racism is so hard to pin down, its influence is not dimin-
ished. To the contrary, racist practices are more difficult to expose and to 
counteract, so that lawsuits against racist incidents are minimal in colombia. 
This phenomenon of not taking anybody to court is also another crucial 
characteristic, not just of colombia, but of other latin american countries 
as well, including Brazil. Given that here, as everywhere, citizenship has long 
been commodified and defined as a set of legal entitlements—or, as pocock 
has argued, “the right to sue and be sued”—such a limited and highly cir-
cumscribed access to the court system provides a formidable block to gaining 
access to the full range of what citizenship can and should mean.
chapter 9 provides a conclusion in that it seeks to summarize and weave 
together the different threads this book has laid out during the different 
empirical, theoretical, and methodological chapters. in it, i also seek to 
draw some conclusions of a more general character—for example, about the 
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place of exploratory research. The book ends with a note about the impor-
tance of dialectical thinking and dialectical research designs that do not 
sacrifice knowledge for elegance or parsimony, but embrace contradictions 
and focus on these first and foremost, as they provide the deepest insights 
into the fabric of social life.

1Chapter 1
The epistemology and 
Methodology of exploratory 
social science Research
Crossing Popper with Marcuse
If you insist on strict proof (or strict disproof ) in the empirical 
sciences, you will never benefit from experience, and never learn 
from it how wrong you are.
—KaRl poppeR, ThE LogIC oF SCIENTIFIC INquIRy , 2002
This chapter seeks to propose a rationale for exploratory 
research in the social sciences. inspired by the recent debates around qualita-
tive methods (Gerring 2001; George and Bennett 2005; Brady and collier 
2004; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Ragin 2008, to name just a few), 
i seek to demonstrate that exploratory research also has a rightful place 
within the social sciences. in order to live up to its potential, exploratory 
research needs to be conducted in a transparent, honest, and self-reflexive 
way—and follow a set of guidelines that ensure its reliability. exploratory 
research, if conducted in such a way, can achieve great validity, and it can 
provide new and innovative ways to analyze reality.
in most cases, exploration demands more from the researcher than con-
firmatory research, both in terms of preparation and in terms of willingness 
and ability to expose oneself to foreign cultures and languages, as well as 
the courage to engage in a critical and honest self-reflection and critique. 
it also requires intellectual engagement with the topic at stake, far beyond 
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the needs of those running regressions from their office computers. how-
ever, exploratory research normally demands less money to conduct, as most 
projects can be done by one researcher alone, without the need to mobilize, 
train, and pay large research apparatuses. Given the disciplinary power of 
elite scholars and academic institutions when it comes to selecting research 
through funding and hiring, exploratory research thus has great emancipa-
tory potential, because it can escape the disciplinary power often exercised 
by senior “peers” and mainstream funding agencies.
To legitimize and provide a solid epistemological groundwork for explor-
atory research in the social sciences, it needs to be grounded in a philosophy 
of science, it has to be articulated within an epistemological framework, and 
it has to formulate a comprehensive methodological framework that justifies 
its methods. Thought also needs to be given to the ontology of the social 
sciences, as decisions about what counts as real and what we shall accept as 
fact necessarily impact our strategy of inquiry.
The liMiTs of confiRMaToRy social science
confirmatory social science dominates the field. Most social scientists use 
quantitative or qualitative methods in order to prove, or corroborate, their 
hypotheses. They expect to confirm laws, regularities, or conditionalities of 
the if . . . then . . . sort. confirmatory research is what graduate students train 
for and what qualifies most researchers to get a tenure-track academic job. 
confirmatory research has indeed many advantages—some of which are 
also very relevant for exploratory research. confirmatory research allows for 
a clear formulation of a theory to be tested in its application, commonly for-
mulated as hypotheses; it allows for bringing order into the research process 
by formulating theories and related hypotheses up front, and developing a 
research design and methodological tools best suited to address the research 
question, which is also formulated up front. By formulating research ques-
tions, theories, hypotheses, a research design, and a method—and by forcing 
the researcher to operationalize the involved terms and concepts and think 
of indicators to assess them—confirmatory research provides a clear scheme 
that is easy to follow and hence easy to teach. if trained appropriately in 
confirmatory research techniques, researchers know how to proceed.
By providing schematic and standardized procedures, confirmatory 
research also provides a mental map for how inquiry works and what it 
can achieve. Taking inspiration from the work of Karl popper (2002) and 
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carl hempel (1966), confirmatory research proceeds deductively by test-
ing hypotheses. The great advantage of proceeding in such a way lies in the 
clear and well-structured research process that such an approach is able to 
secure. Mental models, ideas, or theories are compared to empirical real-
ity and tested for their explanatory power. This allows for an isolation of 
an empirical domain and a focusing on one clearly delimited facet of real-
ity. it also allows for a zeroing in on one, or a small number of potentially 
causal relationships and mechanisms. This is absolutely necessary for con-
ducting any sort of empirical research, given the high complexity of reality. 
in reality, everything potentially relates to everything else—and without a 
clear theory and hypotheses, we would not be able to isolate specific causal 
relationships in order to analyze their strength and robustness. Theory and 
hypotheses allow us to simplify, isolate, and focus on particular aspects of 
a reality that, taken as a whole, is far too complex and contingent to be 
captured and explained with any degree of precision and reliability. confir-
matory research thus brings guidance and discipline into an endeavor that 
would otherwise be impossible and at risk of falling prey to the same kind 
of contingency that characterizes empirical reality.
confirmatory research, more pragmatically, also is what society and 
policymakers expect social scientists to achieve, as in the end, scientists 
are expected to explain social reality and make predictions that help guide 
actions and policymaking. one normally does not get paid to speculate. 
With so many advantages, it comes as no surprise that confirmatory research 
is the only research that receives external funding and the only research 
taught systematically at universities, american or otherwise. But what are its 
weaknesses and shortcomings? several have been identified.
When testing hypotheses, we normally are not pressed to justify where 
these hypotheses came from. popper argues that asking this question is fall-
ing prey to “psychologism.” after all, we need to concern ourselves not with 
where ideas come from, but how to assess them systematically. This, however, 
has led to a systematic neglect of capturing, and considering, the bias that 
goes into theory and hypothesis formulation. But, as such feminist scholars 
as sandra harding (1991) and Donna haraway (1988) have convincingly 
argued, research cannot start from nowhere. Who we are, our interests, back-
grounds, training, and culture—influence what questions we ask, how we 
ask them, and even what we accept as confirming evidence. our approach 
to knowledge is “situated,” and the worst thing to do is to pretend that it 
is not, thus playing the “God trick” (haraway 1988). Thinking about, and 
critically analyzing, where our theories and hypotheses come from must be 
included in the research process, else we cannot escape unreflected bias. The 
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need to also analyze where our ideas, theories, hypotheses, approaches, and 
questions come from, and how this pedigree influences our research and our 
conclusions, cannot be achieved with confirmatory research. This aspect of 
research needs to be inductive and constructivist—and it triggers the need 
for an altogether different approach to conducting empirical research in the 
social sciences.
as if this impossibility of scientifically accounting for one’s location and 
situatedness were not enough, confirmatory research has another weakness. 
as popper has made very clear, theories cannot be proved. he shows that 
“theories are not verifiable, but they can be corroborated” (popper 2002: 
248). popper concludes his examination of the Logic of Scientific Discovery 
by stating that “The old scientific ideal of episteme—of absolutely certain, 
demonstrable knowledge—has proved to be an idol. The demand for sci-
entific objectivity makes it inevitable that every scientific statement must 
remain tentative for ever” (popper 2002: 280). in other words, there is no 
way to bridge the gap that forever separates the models we formulate in our 
minds from empirical reality. all our theories, models, and explanations 
about reality will remain forever tentative, because they spring out of our 
own minds, and nothing can guarantee that reality conforms to our ideas. 
We can find laws—but nature, let alone human behavior, might not follow 
any laws. We might detect causal mechanisms, but we have no guarantee 
that history unfolds according to linear causes. independent variables are 
mind constructs and not independent in reality. Dependent variables are in 
reality dependent on much more than the independent variables we choose 
to examine. all we can do—and as a consequence, all that confirmatory 
researchers do—is to develop highly reliable procedures and machines to 
process the data we feed into them. however, as reliable as our procedures 
have become, they are still only able to test our own ideas, theories, and 
hypotheses. When conducting confirmatory research, we mobilize great 
resources to test the fruits of our own minds—not reality.
The more precise and mathematical these methods and apparatuses, the 
more “scientific” they are deemed. By factoring out the human component 
from the research process, this research seeks to control for bias—but it fails 
to take into account the human impact that informs any research at the 
very beginning of the research process, as well as the human condition of 
the very phenomena it seeks to explain. conducting contemporary confir-
matory research, especially in the social sciences, is like tapping in the dark 
with a high-tech laser beam instead of the old-fashioned broomstick. it still 
leaves us clueless about what is in the room and how our own movements 
rearrange the objects we touch and influence our findings.
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hence, sir Karl popper has put a heavy burden onto the shoulders of 
confirmatory researchers and challenged their work on the most basic and 
substantial level. The truth of his assessment becomes evident when ana-
lyzing the history of our fields and critically evaluating our achievements. 
confirmatory research has indeed confirmed very little. it spends most of 
its energy in developing and explaining new methods, computer programs, 
and other machines designed to ensure reliability—but the resulting reli-
ability only applies to the methods, programs, and the machines themselves, 
never to the findings. confirmatory research has become highly efficient in 
attesting the reliability of its own methods, but utterly unable to address the 
basic problems of reality.
if hard truths about reality, especially about social (that is, human) 
reality, are altogether out of our reach, then what can and should sci-
ence, and social science in particular, do? exploratory research offers some 
attractive alternatives. They rest on an explicit recognition that all inquiry 
is tentative; that reality is, in part, socially constructed; that researchers 
are part of the reality they analyze; and that the words and categories we 
use to explain reality grow out of our own minds and not out of reality. 
in other words, what we perceive and how we perceive it has more to do 
with us than with the reality we observe. explicitly taking all these factors 
into account and thus debunking the myth of the possibility of neutral, 
objective, and value-free research, exploratory social science offers a dif-
ferent research program altogether—one that recognizes the importance, 
and indeed necessity, of philosophy for social-science research, and one 
that draws the necessary conclusions from the foundations philosophy has 
laid out.
The TenTaTiVeness of inqUiRy
if “hard” deductive science can only achieve tentative findings and state-
ments whose truths cannot be attested, then we have good reason to 
reconsider induction. induction is prone to be incomplete and faulty, as 
a whole Western tradition of philosophy has demonstrated. however, as 
it turns out, deduction is equally unable to lead us to “the truth.” Worse, 
while focusing our attention on methodology, deduction makes us over-
look the very important problem of situatedness and leaves many crucial 
assumptions routinely made by researchers unexplained. Deductive, con-
firmatory research thus throws out the baby with the bathwater. inductive, 
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exploratory research offers a way to save the baby by admitting, up front, 
that the kind of knowledge it is able to achieve is partial and tentative.
observations always run the risk of being incomplete and missing 
important events, and we have no assurance that the world unfolds uni-
formly, thus permitting us to learn from the past. however, we have good 
reason to assume that the world unfolds regularly, and if we assume that, 
then we can learn from past events. if the world stops unfolding in a regular 
way, catastrophe is the most likely trigger, and we will not need any social 
science anymore. in the meantime, we should assume uniformity.
admitting to the tentativeness of findings and explanations of reality 
translates into making nonexclusive claims about reality. if our theories and 
hypotheses about the world cannot bridge the gap that separates them from 
reality, and if those theories and hypotheses have more to do with our own 
mental, social, and cultural situatedness, then our theories and ideas only 
allow us to make sense of the world for ourselves. Theory-driven empirical 
research—and all research is theory-driven—allows the researcher to explain 
reality so it makes sense to him or her. if successful, an explanation provides 
a fruitful and plausible way to look at and explain reality that also makes 
sense to others. it can never be the only possible way to explain it. This, 
then, leads to a more humble formulation of claims about reality and how 
reality “really” is. instead of advancing arguments that make claims to be 
exclusive truths, exploratory research provides more or less plausible and 
hence fruitful ways to examine and explain reality that can be shared, if 
successful and plausible, after a critical evaluation. in this way, competing 
and even rival explanations can coexist. This does not automatically lead to 
relativism. in exploratory research, there are better and worse explanations. 
What are the criteria?
Good and valid explanations in exploratory research are those that are 
able to demonstrate the robustness and plausibility of the link that connects 
a stipulated cause to an effect. if i can demonstrate how exactly investment 
in education led to economic growth in a given country over a given period 
of time, then i am doing a good job at explaining this claim, while being 
aware that education is not the only cause for economic growth. exploring 
the relationship between education and economic growth thus means reveal-
ing and unveiling the causal mechanisms that connect one to the other. This 
can only be achieved by formulating theories and hypotheses up front.
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a pRioRi TheoRizinG
The advantages of a priori theorizing and hypothesizing explained above 
apply equally to exploratory research. There is no theory-free perception 
of the world, because we can only relate to the world by applying our own 
mental categories, words, and frameworks. We simply do not see those 
things we do not understand. hence, a pure exploration that starts from 
scratch is impossible. it could only be achieved by someone analyzing a 
world unrelated and disconnected—thus not ours. exploratory research, 
similar to confirmatory research, thus needs to start from an explicitly 
formulated theory and clear and precise hypotheses. Different from confir-
matory research, however, exploratory research does not set out to test these 
hypotheses, because they cannot be tested and proved to begin with, as pop-
per has shown. instead, exploratory research asks how much a given theory 
and a derived hypothesis can explain, and how well it can explain it, or how 
much sense this explanation makes. exploratory research is successful if a 
previously formulated theory and hypothesis explains a lot, or if it explains 
very little but explains it very well, thus providing a very valid explanation 
by elucidating a very strong connection linking a cause to an outcome. in 
addition, exploratory research seeks to provide new and previously over-
looked explanations, and it can do so by actively engaging the researcher in a 
process of amplifying his or her conceptual tools and allowing him or her to 
pose new questions and provide new explanations by looking at reality from 
a new angle. if research depends critically on our own mental models, avail-
able categories, theories, and concepts, then better research can be achieved 
by amplifying the mental analytical repertoire of the researcher. This process 
is one rightfully called “conscientization.” it is strongly and directly related 
to education, more precisely the German Bildung—that is, general, histori-
cal, reflexive understanding.
To provide a more detailed and complete introduction to exploratory 
research in the social sciences, i will focus on some of the aspects highlighted 
above in more detail, and provide some examples to illustrate this approach.
fRoM WoRDs To RealiTy
language interferes with our lives in many ways. By wording things, we 
give them reality (searle 1997). as immanuel Kant demonstrated long ago, 
by categorizing phenomena, we create order in the world while not being 
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sure if the world has any intrinsic order outside of our categorizing and 
naming activities. But this is not a philosophical essay, so there is no need 
to address this question and resolve this puzzle here. however, the insights 
produced by such authors as immanuel Kant, John searle (1997), and peter 
Winch (2008), among many others, must produce an acute awareness that 
language and reality are strongly intertwined, yet separate, realms. To con-
found language with reality is committing a mistake, as all those who grasp 
Wittgenstein even just a little bit will understand. social scientists cannot 
afford to ignore this. language functions as a separate, autopoetic system, 
thus reproducing itself, as both ludwig Wittgenstein (2009) and niklas 
luhmann (1996) have demonstrated.
however, language, even though it functions as a self-referencing sys-
tem, is connected to reality in important ways. Words refer to reality. Words 
allow us to make sense of an overly complex and chaotic world—a world 
that, as i mentioned above, might not make any sense on its own and might 
not be well ordered, despite the old aristotelian belief that the physical 
world has an ordering and even developing principle within. We don’t really 
know, and i fear we will never be able to find out—simply because we can-
not escape our linguistic grasping of the world, our attempts to explain and 
categorize it with words and through language. We cannot think, in other 
words, about the world without using the very references we have created, 
such as “world,” “sense,” “order,” “before and after,” “development,” “evolu-
tion,” “people,” “social groups,” among others.
Words not only help us explain and make sense of the world by order-
ing it, hierarchizing it, and putting it into neat categories to which we then 
attribute causal relationships; words also create realities, and they restrict 
the possibilities of action. let me explain: The creative potential of words 
has been called “constructivism” in some of the social sciences (e.g., by John 
Ruggie [1998] and alexander Wendt [1999] in international politics). in 
sociology, the insight that reality is socially constructed is older and goes 
back to the work of edmund husserl, alfred schütz, and peter Berger and 
Thomas luckmann (1966). The philosopher John searle (1997) has con-
vincingly and systematically demonstrated how, and under what conditions, 
speech acts create institutional facts. he has argued that “Because the con-
stitutive rule enables the function to be imposed on a speech act, then just 
performing that speech act in appropriate circumstances can constitute the 
imposition of that function, and thus will constitute a new institutional 
fact” (searle 1997: 54).1
To understand reality as socially constructed merely means to be aware 
that there are no unmediated facts—that whatever action we can think of 
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is first perceived by someone, then interpreted, and finally used in the per-
ceiver’s own effort to make sense of it by placing it within a framework of 
available references. feminist epistemology, as presented by such authors as 
Donna haraway (1988) and sandra harding (1991), has long pointed this 
out, along with some sociologists of knowledge (e.g., latour, Woolgar, and 
salk 1986).
This means that the models, ideas, and theories we know and under-
stand condition the way we perceive reality, or even what reality we perceive 
(Musgrave 1993). if the analytical tools that we derive from our theories 
and ideas about the world, consciously or unconsciously, only explain one 
way to “read,” understand, and make sense of our sensorial impressions, 
then this will be the only way we perceive and understand reality, or this 
will be the only reality we get to know and understand. if, to give an exam-
ple, we understand the world in terms of “race,” then race is what we will 
see. The same is true for class, gender, religious belief, or such concepts as 
markets, equilibrium, etc.
The task at hand, then, inspired by paulo freire (1993) and Jean-paul 
sartre (1994), is to amplify and broaden our conceptual tools and thus be 
able to see more, more sharply, more accurately, and from different angles or 
positions. hence, proposing new words, concepts, theories, and hypotheses 
allows us to analyze the new realities to which those new words and con-
cepts refer. By looking at and analyzing reality from a different angle, we can 
hope to unveil previously hidden facets of reality—if we are able to dem-
onstrate the plausibility and strength of the connection our new approach 
establishes. This effort is at the core of exploratory social-science research.
This sort of work, by its very definition, is inductive. its end result 
is that by broadening, amplifying, and diversifying our conceptual tools 
and frameworks, we will be able to perceive more, better, and differently, 
being able to make sense out of that which previously struck us as nonsen-
sical and simple white noise. This task becomes a bit more complicated 
when our interest lies in human (that is, social) behavior, because human 
interaction is inherently social and thus meaningful, and it thus constantly 
requires interpretation and understanding (Gadamer 1994).
an exploRaToRy ReseaRch pRoGRaM
We can spend hours debating what “democracy,” or “citizenship” really is. 
But this discussion is beside the point. What exploratory research focuses 
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on is what reality a word like “democracy” refers to. What does democracy 
mean in colombia today? What does it mean to a poor campesino, a black 
chocoano, or an indigenous tribe member from Vaupés? We need to dis-
sect, to analyze by pulling apart, words from the reality they refer to, and as 
exploratory social scientists, we should focus on the reality, not the words. 
This means, in most cases, that we need to look for indicators that tell us 
something about the reality represented by a word.
This sounds easy enough. however, the trickiness of words and language 
goes further and tends to confuse us at deeper levels. Think about a word like 
“class.” What reality does it refer to? Do classes “really” exist? some words 
clearly have structured our thinking so much that we use them not only to 
talk about the word and make sense of it, but to guide our actions—and to 
construct our identities around them. identity construction, after all, is also a 
discursive process—one where we assemble those elements that we recognize 
as relevant and use them to construct who we are and who we want to be. To 
some extent, we assemble our identities with words, using categories that have 
proven helpful to us in other contexts. We think we are “rooted”—because 
rootedness resonates with what we want to be, what makes sense to us—
even if such a concept is borrowed from a non-human realm (stepan 1986). 
Think of the word “race” and you get a sense of how much such a category 
has offered some of us in terms of ordering the world, and ordering our own 
thinking about who we are and how we differ from others.
When doing exploratory research, we need to remain alert to the pitfalls 
of reification and avoid any tendencies to essentialize words and categories. 
instead of looking for the essence behind a word or concept, we need to 
explore what aspect of reality this word opens up for us, and what a specific 
word allows us to see, or what aspect of reality it refers to.
in terms of research design, this necessarily implies that instead of pre-
tending to be neutral, we need to be aware, explicit, transparent, and honest 
about our starting position, standpoint, situatedness, or positionality. This, 
in turn, requires that we formulate theories about the world, about how 
things relate, first, before we initiate any empirical research. We have to 
propose a structure of order—an angle, if you will—that allows us to look at 
the world in a certain way, or through a certain lens or prism. This, again, is 
necessary because there is no neutral or clean-slated perception of the world, 
as our perception of reality is influenced and indeed conditioned by the 
mental structures, ideas, and theories we already hold about the world. We 
only perceive what we already know, what is familiar to us—or in the words 
of systems theory, we only perceive that which we recognize as meaningful 
and patterned, that which makes sense to us. This is why pure discovery 
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of reality is impossible to us. We are utterly unable to look at the world 
“theory-free” as we cannot escape approaching reality through words and 
categories.
The next best thing to pure discovery and induction, thus, is a gradual 
extension and widening of our perception and understanding of the world, 
parting from what we already know and have understood. This process 
requires the explicit, up-front formulation of explanatory models—that is, 
theories.2
WhaT aRe TheoRies foR?
Theories are tentative explanations about how the different elements of the 
world relate to each other and why. This is not to say that they actually do. 
Theorizing about—and hence explaining—the world is an effort to make 
sense out of it by ordering it and putting it in causal sequence. Doing so 
allows us to shed light on a segment of reality by offering a way to fruit-
fully interpret discrete events and thus connect them. Good theories lead 
to good questions—and good questions allow us to discover new aspects 
of reality. The good question never is “how it really was”—or “what really 
happened.” What really happened will differ for everybody involved—and 
all those involved will only understand what “really” happened after some-
one has offered a way to explain it after the fact—and others have accepted 
this explanation and the implicit framework that comes with it (Goldstein 
1983). once we are aware of the theoretical models and assumptions that 
guide our approach to reality, we can then expand and ask different and 
new questions that allow us to explore the empirical terrain that surrounds 
the empirical segments we initially focused on. exploratory research thus 
becomes an act of gradual, structured, and theory-led heuristic expansion 
from an original set of models, explanations, and questions. it does not start 
from scratch.
in this context, the good question is one that allows us to see plausible 
connections that have previously not been seen, explored, or understood. 
Words, because they evoke certain realities, become functional in this 
endeavor. as words are separate from reality but refer to it in different 
ways, as argued above, new and different words, categories, concepts, mod-
els, and theories promise to allow us to see new things, or to see old things 
in a different way. Theories thus cannot be true or false, as they have no 
ontological status. as thought models, they can be more or less helpful and 
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supportive of our constant effort to explain the world by making sense of 
it (popper 2002).
Take the example of such a central social-science concept as “citizenship.” 
instead of explaining what it “really” means, i propose to engage in an effort 
to offer new ways of looking at those aspects of reality that fall under the very 
broad label of “citizenship.” for example, one can think about something 
like “second-class citizenship” not because it really exists, but because such 
a concept allows us to explore some easily overlooked corners of the reality 
represented by this word. one might also think of citizenship as a social role, 
because thinking of it in that way allows us to explore the roles and expecta-
tions we commonly associate with this term. finally, think of citizenship as 
a good, or an asset—again, not because i think it really is that, but because 
this allows us to explore an aspect of citizenship that is crucial to its reality 
and has not been captured and explained well: namely, that citizenship is 
worth something, and it might be worth more if not everybody has access to 
it. finally, think of citizenship as something inherently conflictual, embat-
tled, disputed, internally contradictory—and produce your research design 
accordingly—and chances are that you will be able to unveil new aspects and 
facets of what kind of reality the word “citizenship” represents.
The purpose of doing this is to unveil the different ways in which dif-
ferent people and groups live, experience, and invest the word “citizenship” 
with different meanings, and how citizenship is negotiated, embattled, 
defended, or upheld and substantiated in social reality and daily praxis. This 
is, in my mind, the most that honest social science can achieve. There are 
no hard rules or laws to be discovered in social life, and the establishment 
of such hard laws and rules comes with a great cost to validity: we can 
always only measure the easy things, or the easily measurable aspects of very 
complex social phenomena. We can find great rules and laws—that apply 
to very little. or, as i propose here, we can content ourselves with detecting 
new and fruitful ways to look at and analyze reality, none of which should 
lay claims to be exclusive or true—at least not truer than another, equally 
fruitful way to analyze reality.
soMe pRacTical RUles foR conDUcTinG 
exploRaToRy social science ReseaRch
in exploratory social science, the choice of cases is not random. it is predi-
cated by the logic of analyzing the richest, most telling cases and unveiling 
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the thickest and most telling connection between two variables. such a 
study is, in a strict use of the term, not a comparative case study, where cases 
are used to simulate experimental research settings. instead, cases are chosen 
so that each single one can tell a lot about the underlying conditions and 
causal mechanisms at work. instead of focusing on overlap and similarity on 
the independent or dependent variables, exploratory research seeks to detect 
causal mechanisms, that is, causal propositions that link independent to 
dependent variables. cases are selected to shed the most light on the specific 
causal mechanism in focus. The guiding question for such a procedure is: 
where can i see and explain this best? or, in what case is this causal mecha-
nism most evident?
This methodological choice is driven by several insights. first, explor-
atory studies allow us to think, not just measure—to use our imagination, 
experience, insight, and skill to propose new and innovative ways of under-
standing and interpreting reality. This is, to me, a very important component 
of being a social scientist. The best scientists we have had were not the 
bureaucratic-minded number crunchers that now dominate some of our 
disciplines. especially in the social sciences, the best of us have been able to 
infuse and enrich their work with their life experiences, travels, and innova-
tive ideas. Think of alexis de Tocqueville as maybe the prime example of a 
thoughtful and insightful analyst, who proposed new and innovative ways 
of thinking about democracy after traveling for almost one year in north 
america with his friend Gustave de Beaumont. or think of Karl Marx, 
whose proposal to think about the unfolding of history in terms of eco-
nomic power and asset ownership has influenced the thoughts and actions 
of millions. exploratory social science has been more influential by far than 
confirmatory social science. it has given ideas, inspired, helped understand 
reality in new ways, and shed light on previously not understood phenom-
ena. it has provided new and innovative readings and interpretations of the 
world, or facets thereof, without being able to test and predict the hypoth-
eses it has advanced.
second, exploratory work can be done rigorously. Whenever this is 
achieved, it promises to attain a degree of validity that is beyond the wild-
est dream of any confirmatory researcher, especially researchers relying on 
quantitative methods. as stated above, to be rigorous, exploratory work 
needs to be honest and transparent. it also demands a high level of self-
reflexivity from the researcher (alvesson and skoldberg 2009). however, to 
be rigorous, exploratory work needs to take into consideration the findings 
about epistemology and perception that different philosophers have elabo-
rated on. as explained above, the core insights are that we cannot approach 
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reality theory-free. our very perception, that is, what we perceive as mean-
ingful and how we perceive it, is influenced by what we already know—our 
preconceived ideas about the world. if we do not know what a cuacuco is, 
we will never see one, never recognize one—even if it passes right in front 
of us. Without the idea of a cuacuco, the sensorial information of a cuacuco 
is nothing but white noise to us. however, once we know, we will perceive 
the passing cuacuco; see it, because we can now make sense of this senso-
rial information; put it in the category “fish,” and recognize it as such. To 
perceive the world, in other words, we must rely on previously established 
ideas and theories and we can then expand from there. once we know the 
cuacuco, we are also able to compare and contrast it to other fish and learn 
more about the fauna of a given river (lakoff 2009; haraway 1988). We 
have no other choice but to always initiate our inquiries from an already 
formulated theory.
popper (2002) holds that epistemology must only concern itself with 
examining the logical consequence and coherence of new ideas, not where 
they come from, which is the task of psychology. placing something out-
side of the realm of legitimate reflection does not solve the problem; it 
simply avoids it. his own theory of perception and anticipation, called the 
“searchlight Theory” (popper 1974), nevertheless offers an explanation on 
just how new ideas are conceived, namely, through the comparison of new 
sensorial information with already available knowledge—which leads us to 
anticipate according to past knowledge in a movement of problem-solving 
trial and error.
no matter how this epistemological problem is solved, the debate about 
it makes clear that we have an innate tendency to anticipate, based on the 
limited information we have at our disposal. Under conditions of a lack of a 
secure and validated paradigm that would allow us to deduce research ques-
tions and programs, we must instead embrace our tendency to anticipate 
and formulate clear and testable—that is, falsifiable—hypotheses, instead 
of avoiding it. That way, we can put our own anticipations, which spring 
from our previous experiences and already accumulated knowledge, to the 
test and ask how plausible they are—that is, how much and how well they 
explain. This process, if conducted honestly and transparently, allows us 
not only to accumulate knowledge about the world by dwelling on our 
already gained knowledge and experience—it also makes a collaboration 
of scientists possible. if we reach our tentative extrapolations and expla-
nations in a transparent way, we can evaluate them critically—and expose 
them to the critical evaluation of others. This is what science can achieve 
at its best. Reaching tentative explanations gained from our previous work 
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and experience also provides a much more plausible rationale for reaching 
new explanatory models than the deus ex machina mechanisms that popper 
(1974, 2002) proposes as a replacement of what he calls “psychologism.” 
indeed, we cannot explain the emergence of new explanatory models with 
reference to our own cognitive or psychological structures, just as we cannot 
rule out the risk of cognitive solipsism. structured, self-aware, critical, and 
transparent anticipation, however, is not only what we should do as scien-
tists. it is also what we do as human beings: building on previous knowledge, 
gradually expanding it, and proposing new explanations that are derived 
from our previous knowledge. The knowledge we can obtain in this way is 
indeed not 100 percent reliable, as we cannot truly count on a uniformly 
evolving history. it is, instead, tentative and subject to critique, revision, and 
all sorts of methodological errors—but this is precisely what we are able to 
achieve. claiming to achieve more reliable or more valid knowledge about 
human behavior and interaction actually achieves less.
What we can achieve, different from the natural sciences, is to discern, 
describe, and explain causal linkages and mechanisms that connect two 
or more relevant variables in significant ways. once this is done, we can 
establish an if . . . then . . . relationship that describes a likely pattern or a 
probability of consequence, if certain conditions are met or already in place. 
it is this sort of limited (or better delimited) and structured anticipation 
that makes explicit use of available theoretical models and explanations and 
then relies on finding supporting empirical evidence in order to avoid the 
pitfalls of an extreme skepticism, that promises to advance our insight and 
understanding of the social world. it has this potential because it allows us 
to see and understand social reality in different ways, and from different 
angles. if done cumulatively, social science can then contribute to a more 
complex and complete reading of social reality—and might even aspire to 
contribute to the very real process of conscientization that should be initi-
ated in schools and continued systematically in universities.3
The knowledge produced in such a way could also be of more utility to 
everyday life than the highly formalistic and extremely technical procedures 
activated to conduct confirmatory research today. Most of the techniques 
that produce and calculate probabilities of correlations are so sophisticated 
that they take up most of the space, physical as well as intellectual, of confir-
matory research production and its debate. it is in this process of describing 
and explaining not reality but methodology that most social scientists end 
up losing most laypeople, as well as uninitiated specialists. such proceed-
ings would be justifiable if the findings about laws and regularities would 
really fall within the realm of the possible in the social sciences—but they 
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do not. as explained above, social life is far too contingent and in flux to be 
captured by rules and regularities. put simply: laws do not apply in the social 
world—and thus should not be sought for in the social sciences.
The consequence of all this simply is that exploratory, inductive research 
can achieve reliability under certain conditions. proceeding in such a way 
allows for a clearly defined starting position in the process of knowledge-
building and gaining understanding and familiarity with a subject or 
problem. it also allows for a delimitation of the empirical field that is rel-
evant to a given research question—as purely exploratory research would 
otherwise be endless and lead into the traps of infinite regression.
Different from a purely deductive research design, such a proceeding 
also allows for a revision of the initial hypotheses, and even for the reformu-
lation of the research question—in a process of slowly and gradually making 
oneself familiar with all of the phenomena associated and related to the 
problem in question. This deductive-inductive research design thus starts by 
entering a hermeneutic cycle of creating understanding and expanding this 
understanding up to the point where all the phenomena related to a given 
problem and research question can be explained (Gadamer 1994).
induction thus becomes part of a deductively initiated research project 
and allows for a pressing forward of findings up to the point where the 
causal mechanism previously established through a theoretical framework is 
explained. in other words, the outer limits of how far such a research process 
should reach need to be established by a previously formulated theory and 
hypothesis, as otherwise this process would be endless. This research process 
ends not when “everything” is explained (which is impossible), but when 
the research question is successfully answered.
The exploratory character of social-science research refers to the very 
domain of what can be detected, described, and explained. Given that our 
naming, wording, categorizing, and hierarchizing of the world is intrinsically 
linked to our perception of the world, all we can aspire to as social-science 
researchers is to offer new categories, models, and theories that allow us to 
analyze a specific phenomenon in a new and fruitful way. instead of examin-
ing the content of words and categories, our efforts should be geared towards 
holding interpretative models and reality apart and thus avoiding the pitfalls 
of reification that lurk at almost every corner of inquiry into a meaning-
fully structured social reality. if we did the structuring in the first place, we 
should not take our own categories as given, or invest them with an onto-
logical status they have only acquired through our own action of naming. 
instead, we need to propose new, or newly composed, models that approach 
reality differently, in new and innovative ways and from different angles. as 
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social reality constantly changes, this endeavor is endless, as someone else 
can describe and explain the same segment of reality i have described today 
differently tomorrow. however frustrating this might be, it is the only way 
to produce truly reliable knowledge about the social world—a world that is 
socially constructed and reproduced continuously by the same people who 
seek to explain it.
in a strict sense, exploratory research, just like confirmatory research, is 
thus only able to test the strength and plausibility of a causal link previously 
established by a theory or model—hence by the researcher. This makes any 
research self-referential. instead of exploring the world, scientific inquiry in 
the social sciences only tests the validity, reliability, or to use less technical 
terms, robustness and strength, of previously established causal links, which 
are derived by theoretical models and hypotheses. This implies that any 
research project can only claim to examine one explanation at a time.
This automatically means that the given explanation is never the only 
explanation possible. Reality is far too complex for such a claim. a scientific 
explanation rather provides one way to look at reality, one way to make 
sense of one particular segment, previously established, of reality. it neces-
sarily simplifies and it can never claim completeness, as social reality is in 
constant flux, thus creating new constellations that can be examined and 
explained differently, from different angles and by using different prisms. 
“Really” or “fully” explaining something is thus impossible. exploratory 
research is over once the empirical reality referred to by a concept or theory 
is explained so that “it makes sense” to the researcher. such an explanation 
is successful if others find this individual sense-making effort fruitful, help-
ful, or insightful, so that his or her sense-making overlaps with theirs.4 The 
practical process of conducting exploratory research thus necessarily follows 
the pattern of the hermeneutic circle, as described by hans Gadamer (1994) 
(see Reiter 2006).
The eMancipaToRy poTenTial  
of exploRaToRy ReseaRch
exploratory research has an inherently anti-authoritarian and anti-dogmatic 
potential, because in most cases it does not require the mobilization of, and 
payment for, a huge research apparatus the way that most “systematic” con-
firmatory research does. confirmatory research, because of its claim to be 
systematic, in most cases requires much time, effort, and money, which is 
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why most systematic research projects are conducted by scholars working at 
elite universities, who receive funding from highly selective, and highly dis-
ciplining, funding agencies such as the national science foundation or the 
social science Research council. The review processes involved in select-
ing research projects and publications almost never support “unsystematic” 
research, which in most cases translates into research not conducted within 
the established, quantitative confirmatory paradigms. Disciplined in such a 
way, it comes as no surprise that new findings are rarely produced. The sti-
fling process of review by powerful and hegemonic mainstream institutions 
and “peers” if anything narrows the array of what is possible and doable 
in the social sciences. They function as a disciplinary power par excellence 
(feyerabend 2010). indeed, as paul feyerabend has argued, “Twentieth-
century science has given up all philosophical pretensions and has become 
big business. it no longer threatens society; it is one of its most powerful 
supporters. humanitarian considerations are at a minimum, and so is any 
form of progressiveness that goes beyond local improvements. Good pay-
ment, good relations with the boss and colleagues in their unit are the chief 
aims of these human ants who excel in the solution of tiny problems but 
who cannot make sense of anything transcending the domain of their com-
petence” (feyerabend, quoted in Motterlini 1999: 114).
it should not be surprising that the most systematic research seems to 
originate from ivy-league professors. The same researchers able to conduct 
expensive research projects are oftentimes also involved in the decision mak-
ing about who should receive funding for what sort of research, so that the 
whole enterprise runs the risk of becoming self-serving, narrowing down 
what research is.
exploratory research, to the contrary, does not require the mobilization 
and payment of big research apparatuses. it can be conducted alone, often-
times with nothing more than access to a library and a voice recorder. it 
often involves travel and knowledge of another language, thus demanding 
more intellectual preparation and courage to expose oneself to other peoples 
and cultures from the researcher, yet less money and institutional support. 
as such, it offers interesting opportunities, especially for young researchers 
and graduate students, who otherwise have to rely on the disciplinary power 
of their senior colleagues. in short: exploratory research has emancipatory 
potential and promises to unveil new relations and causal mechanisms that 
escape the disciplinary scrutiny of the established research apparatus.5
Epistemology and Methodology | 19
DialecTics
a strong rationale for choosing an exploratory research design is that explor-
atory social science has the potential to be more insightful than confirmatory 
research by applying dialectical thinking. Dialectics, explains Theodor W. 
adorno (1973), means “to achieve something positive by means of nega-
tion” (adorno 1973: xix). The systematic treatment of dialectics goes back 
to Georg Wilhelm friedrich hegel and his Phenomenology of Spirit, first 
published in Germany as part 1 of his System of Science in 1807. hegelian 
dialectics has three components—namely, circularity, where all existence is 
constituted by its own negation, thus forming a whole only through this 
circle; the contradiction and its resolve (aufhebung); and idealism (sar-
lemijn 1971: 4). in 1841, the young Karl Marx famously “put hegel back 
on his feet” by stripping his work of its idealistic component and proposing 
a dialectical materialism instead (Marx [1841/42]: 1971: 28). it is this ver-
sion of dialectics that inspired the critical theorists of the frankfurt school, 
especially T. W. adorno, Max horkheimer, and herbert Marcuse. instead 
of hegel’s ontological dialectics, what interests exploratory social scientists 
today is the analytical methodology that emerges alongside its ontological 
counterpart.6
according to Marcuse (1960), “The power of negative thinking is the 
driving power of dialectical thought, used as a tool for analyzing the world 
of facts in terms of its internal inadequacy. . . . ‘inadequacy’ implies a value 
judgment. Dialectical thought invalidates the a priori opposition of value 
and fact by understanding all facts as stages of a single process—a process 
in which subject and object are so joined that truth can be determined only 
within the subject-object totality. all facts embody the knower as well as 
the doer; they thus ‘contain’ subjectivity in their very structure” (Marcuse 
1960: viii).
in other words, there can be no objective or neutral social science, 
because the researcher is always and automatically involved and implicated 
with the object and the subjects of his or her inquiry. Dialectical thinking—
that is, thinking about inherent contradictions, and understanding progress 
not as a linear process but a gradual unfolding of oppositional forces—
provides a fruitful way to conduct social science, even more so if and when 
social scientists accept that they themselves are part of history’s unfolding 
and deeply involved in the reproduction of the knowledge they seek to ana-
lyze, which is what Marcuse suggests in the quote above. a prime example 
of such thinking is provided by Karl Marx and friedrich engels (1848) in 
their attempt to describe and explain the revolutionary power of markets in 
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the Communist Manifesto, as well as by horkheimer and adorno’s (1944) 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. Both books, despite their shortcomings in terms 
of producing adequate predictions about the future, still stand as power-
ful diagnoses of our times. The depths of their insights have secured these 
documents a place in history. consider, for example, this passage from the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment:
in the enlightened world, mythology has entered into the profane. in its blank 
purity, the reality which has been cleansed of demons and their conceptual 
descendants assumes the numinous character which the ancient world attrib-
uted to demons. Under the title of brute facts, the social injustice from which 
they proceed is now as assuredly sacred a preserve as the medicine man was 
sacrosanct by reason of the protection of his gods. it is not merely that domina-
tion is paid for by the alienation of men from the objects dominated: with the 
objectification of spirit, the very relations of men—even those of the individual 
to himself—were bewitched. The individual is reduced to the nodal point of 
the conventional responses and modes of operation expected of him. animism 
spiritualized the object, whereas industrialism objectifies the spirits of men. 
automatically, the economic apparatus, even before total planning, equips 
commodities with the values which decide human behavior. (horkheimer and 
adorno 1997: 28)
horkheimer and adorno detect in the project of demystifying the world, 
which they trace back to ancient Greece and term “enlightenment,” the very 
seeds of its reversal into an even worse state of affairs, where individuality 
succumbs to mass society, and human desires and actions blindly follow the 
dictates of empty consumerism. Thus the project of rationalization turns 
into irrationality, and freedom from the powerful grip of nature and venge-
ful deities, which restricted lives during antiquity, is substituted with an 
even worse unfreedom: that of the market and the fetishism of products we 
seem compelled to buy, knowing that they will not bring us happiness or 
peace of mind.
as this example demonstrates, dialectical thinking aims at exploring the 
internal contradictions of phenomena. in seeking to do this, one can follow 
herbert Marcuse’s (1955) prescription, namely, that “any particular form 
can be determined only by the totality of the antagonistic relations in which 
form this relation exists” (Marcuse 1955: 26).
in a slight variation to the initial dialectical tradition, which is still 
burdened by hegel’s legacy in that it suggests history itself unfolds dialecti-
cally, exploratory research uses dialectics as an analytical tool and way to 
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look at reality. it does not claim that history itself unfolds dialectically, but 
that thinking about and analyzing history through the prism of dialectics 
allows for new insights and angles of observation. When thinking about 
citizenship, for example, dialectical thinking leads one to look for inherent 
contradictions and negations that together fall under the label “citizenship,” 
and the reality for which this label stands. Thinking about citizenship in 
terms of its internal or inherent contradictions thus promises to produce 
fruitful ways of analysis, allowing for deeper insight and understanding. 
such a dialectical thinking about citizenship allows us to go beyond the 
very common simplistic, dualistic models that dominate the social sciences. 
instead of focusing on dualisms and discrete phenomena, dialectics points 
our gaze towards processes and those connecting elements that link dif-
ferent phenomena, which translates into a search for internal, and maybe 
inherent, dynamisms, contradictions, and different forces pulling in differ-
ent directions.
hence, by approaching reality dialectically, one can analyze a reality of 
connectedness, entanglements, and mutual continuations, which allows for 
a depiction of reality as a space where privilege and access are constantly 
negotiated and fought over. The resulting depiction of reality promises to be 
much richer and more telling than those strangled by dualistic approaches—
as Thomas holt’s The Problem of Freedom (1992) or Gary Wilder’s The 
French Imperial Nation State (2005), to name but two supreme examples, 
can amply attest to.
The pRoBleM of The ReseaRch DoMain
a final, procedural word about the research domain and the unit of analysis 
of this endeavor is called for, given the differences, maybe even contradic-
tions, between everyday knowledge and language and academic lifeworlds, 
with their specific and technical language and methodologies.
in exploratory-research design, cases are selected to demonstrate a high 
level of clarity when it comes to the unveiling of connecting mechanisms 
and links. They should convey a richness and saturation of empirical infor-
mation that allows for a clear depiction of how something comes about and 
why. The implications of assuming such a position from the very start are 
many, and i shall pinpoint some of the more common and consequential.
When conducting social science under the awareness that the ordering 
of reality is as much a product of our own minds as a result of the reality 
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“out there,” then exploratory cases should be selected because they offer 
analytical richness, not because of their historical specificity. The aim of 
exploratory research is to establish plausibility among different variables, 
previously defined by the researcher—not to add to the factual, historical 
knowledge. exploratory research is thus firmly committed to a constructiv-
ist view of reality. The outcome of a successful exploratory-research project 
is to propose a new, insightful, fruitful, and plausible way to think about 
and explain reality—not to detect new material facts.
furthermore, exploratory research is by its very nature interdisciplinary, 
and should freely borrow from the various social sciences. it is precisely by 
adopting, comparing, and trying out a linguistic, ethnographic, anthropo-
logical, geographical, sociological, economical, or political-science gaze that 
new insight can emerge and rich exploration can occur.
conclUsion: exploRaToRy, 
DeDUcTiVe-inDUcTiVe, anD DialecTical
in this chapter, i have sought to argue and demonstrate that reliable induc-
tive, exploratory, dialectical research can be achieved if conducted in the 
structured, transparent, and honest way described above. if successful, the 
findings and insights produced in such a way can help shed new light on 
phenomena that have already been explained partially and in different ways. 
furthermore, if successful, exploratory research can help to conscientize 
those that read it by unveiling previously unthought-of connections and 
causal mechanisms. Given that the procedural apparatus able to generate 
the findings presented here is not a sophisticated computer program or a 
mathematical model operating at high levels of abstraction, exploratory 
research also addresses non-specialists and non-academics, offering to them 
the same sort of knowledge produced from reflexive, self-critical, transpar-
ent, and dialectical research. There are no secrets or complicated procedures 
that require years of initiation. instead there is engaged dedication to the 
phenomenon under scrutiny, and prolonged, systematic inquiry—paired 
with reflection, comparison of different cases, formulation of tentative 
explanations, revisions, dialogue, and finally, the formulation of new and 
hopefully fruitful ways to look at the reality represented by such words as 
“citizenship,” “democracy,” and the like.
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conceptualizing citizenship
Disjunctive, Dual, Divided, 
Entangled, or What?
Theory is theoria: the gaze that puts us face to face with something and 
inspects it . . . I can elucidate my relation to language, but I cannot 
abstract myself from it and “look at” it, nor can I “construct” it from 
the outside. I cannot make a “theory” out of the institution, for I am on 
the inside. . . . There is therefore a deep-seated dependence, in respect to 
language, between what I think and what I say.
—coRneliUs casToRiaDis, 1985
in his seminal work on Citizenship and soCial Class, T. h. Mar-
shall ([1950] 1992) argued that in europe, civil rights preceded political 
rights, and once both these rights were achieved, social rights would fol-
low. Marshall predicted that the twentieth century would see an expansion 
of social rights, which he defined as “the whole range from the right to a 
modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full 
in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standards prevailing in society. The institutions most closely connected with 
it are the educational system and the social services” (Marshall 1992: 8). for 
him, the state was called upon to reduce the risks associated with capitalism 
for the poorest citizens (Jones and Gaventa 2002: 3). as explained by Jones 
and Gaventa, this state action would lead to an “overarching sense of com-
munity and civilization” (Jones and Gaventa 2002: 3).
When the twentieth century came to an end, it became clear that 
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Marshall’s prediction was too optimistic. in 2012, many european citizens 
are effectively still excluded from social rights, to the point where some ana-
lysts argue that europe is developing an apartheid system (Balibar 2004). 
especially, nontraditional, nonwhite european citizens see their civil rights 
curbed by the forces of prejudice and racism. in many countries, they are 
treated as foreigners and intruders despite their legal citizenship.1 instead 
of social rights following civil and political rights, it rather appears that the 
exercise of civil rights depends on the previous achievement of social rights, 
as racism is undermining the effectiveness of civil and political rights of all 
those stigmatized as “others within.”
Racism is at the core of this exclusion, and it is Marshall’s underestima-
tion of the power of racism that led him to formulate overly optimistic 
predictions about europe’s democratic future. in europe, as elsewhere, rac-
ism continues to be functional for the maintenance and reproduction of 
privilege. Worse, under conditions of increased market competition, char-
acteristic of advanced capitalist systems, the importance of racism might 
grow. Racism becomes more pronounced when different actors compete 
for scarce, and thus highly desirable, goods (Winant 2001). Under such 
conditions, whiteness functions as additional capital, bestowing competitive 
advantages on those able to claim it with success (Reiter 2010).
ciTizenship
citizenship is a broad concept. according to Webster’s definition, it is “the 
status of being a citizen.” T. h. Marshall (1992), in turn, defines citizen-
ship as “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. 
all who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties 
with which the status is endowed” (Marshall 1992: 18). Tom Bottomore, 
who wrote the essay “forty years on,” which together with T.  h. Mar-
shall’s own essay constitutes the publication through which Marshall’s work 
is accessible (1992), already points out that citizenship in our day (his were 
the days of the 1990s) faces new challenges, some of which Marshall could 
not have foreseen. among others, he mentions the problems triggered by 
increased migration, thus causing greater ethnic heterogeneity among euro-
pean citizenry and posing new challenges to citizenship. To capture these 
new challenges, Bottomore proposes a distinction between formal and sub-
stantive citizenship—a distinction introduced by Rogers Brubaker (1989, 
1992). he quotes Brubaker, who had argued that “formal citizenship is 
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neither a sufficient, nor a necessary condition for substantive citizenship” 
(Brubaker 1992: 36, quoted in Bottomore 1992: 66).
several authors have disputed the notion of citizenship as a status. for 
communitarians such as Michael sandel (1998), citizenship is more than 
a right, it is an obligation and a calling to participate and actively engage 
in one’s community. civic republicans, such as Jürgen habermas (1998), 
have stressed that what makes one a citizen is the ability to participate in 
collective decision making and thus fulfill one’s role as an active constitu-
ent of popular sovereignty. according to Jones and Gaventa, “at the centre 
of much contemporary writing is the need to conceptualize citizenship as 
both a status, which accords a range of rights and obligations and an active 
practice” (Jones and Gaventa 2002: 5). several authors have since tried to 
expand the notion of citizenship, and they have proposed alternative ways 
of conceptualization. Margaret somers, for example, has defined citizenship 
as “a set of institutionally embedded social practices” (somers 1993: 589). 
More recent treatments of citizenship, e.g., those collected in Tulchin and 
Ruthenberg (2007), follow this focus on citizenship as a practice. James 
holston (in Tulchin and Ruthenberg) proposes “to study the full experience 
of citizenship, and not only its political aspect” (holston, in Tulchin and 
Ruthenberg 2007: 77). in his book Insurgent Democracy, holston (2008) 
indeed applies an anthropological framework to the analysis of how citizen-
ship is experienced in everyday life.
however, these recent efforts to adequately capture and explain what 
citizenship effectively is, and what it means to different people, have not yet 
produced a conclusive framework, and frances hagopian’s call (in Tulchin 
and Ruthenberg 2007) to focus on citizenship, especially when studying 
such “disjunctive democracies” (holston 2008) where political and civil 
rights do not necessarily go hand in hand, still stands.
To be able to do so, we first need a useful analytical framework—a lens 
that allows us to focus on and delineate what kinds of realities and prac-
tices the word “citizenship” stands for. The elaboration of such a framework, 
able to capture the empirical phenomena and practices associated with the 
term “citizenship,” is the aim of this chapter. “citizenship” is but a word, 
and fighting over words, to me, is time wasted. The real question is what the 
word refers to, what slice of reality is represents, how this section of reality 
works, and how it articulates with broader society, the state, the economy, 
inequality, and the like. i shall, hence, be careful to avoid the very com-
mon pitfall of reification, as my exercise in this chapter is merely one of 
conceptual tool building so that they can be applied to examining reality. 
conceptual tools help us to analytically separate an overly complex and 
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synthetic reality. The categories so created have no ontological status; they 
do not exist “out there.” The scientific game is necessarily one of simpli-
fication, reduction of complexity, and schematization aimed at detecting 
patterns, important connections, and causal mechanisms. The purpose of 
this chapter thus is to propose analytical tools that allow us to make fruitful 
and insightful inference into the reality of democracy and citizenship. i will 
leave the empirical application of this framework for later.
i first propose to accept Brubaker’s distinction of formal and substantive 
citizenship, and in this chapter i shall further elaborate on the meaning of 
substantive citizenship. What exactly is substantive citizenship, and how 
can we, as social researchers, assess it? My main argument is that substantive 
citizenship has two important dimensions—namely, substantive citizenship 
as a social role, and substantive citizenship as a relational asset. indicat-
ing the relative presence or absence, as well as the quality, of possession on 
both dimensions allows us to gain a deeper, more specific, more precise, and 
hence more accurate and valid capturing of the empirical reality represented 
by the concept of citizenship.
hence, this chapter proposes that the concept of citizenship and the 
rights associated with it has two important dimensions yet unexplored—
or rather, not yet applied systematically to the study of democracy. first, 
citizenship is not just a legal status; it needs to be a practical and practiced 
reality for it to have any impact on people’s lives. as such, citizenship is 
associated with a certain role—namely, the role of being a citizen invested 
with certain rights and duties, and protected by the state that makes and 
enforces the rules and laws that define citizenship. citizenship, then, is best 
understood as a social role, as Brazilian anthropologist Roberto da Matta 
(1987) has long pointed out and James holston (2008) has more recently 
highlighted again. if some citizens are not treated as citizens, citizenship 
remains an empty concept. second, citizenship is also an asset, and just like 
any other asset, it is disputed. as an asset, the value of substantive citizen-
ship is relational—that is, its value is derived from how much substantive 
citizenship one person or group has, compared to another person or group. 
having access to the asset of citizenship when most people do not bestows 
extra value on its possession.2
The main claim i seek advance here, thus, is that we can explore hith-
erto unexamined realities associated with the concept of citizenship by 
focusing on its dimension as a social role, and its dimension as a relational 
asset. Doing so promises to produce answers to what i consider the most 
important question we need to ask when discussing citizenship—namely, 
why democracy has gone hand in hand with so much inequality, consistent 
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exclusion, and, as a result, a widespread disillusionment with democratic 
systems worldwide. focusing on citizenship as a social role and a relational 
asset promises to provide new, richer, more complete, and more insightful 
answers to this important question.
sUBsTanTiVe ciTizenship as a RelaTional GooD
as stated above, the concept of “substantive citizenship,” as proposed by 
Brubaker and discussed by Bottomore, provides a specification of the 
more general term “citizenship” as it contrasts with the formal aspects 
of citizenship. But what makes citizenship substantive, and how can we, 
as social scientists, assess and measure the amount of substantiveness of 
citizenship?
The first step in this endeavor must necessarily consist of recognizing 
and treating substantive citizenship as belonging to the realm of the social. 
in other words, substantiveness cannot merely be a formal and hence legal 
issue. once citizens hold formal citizenship, the question becomes how this 
formal status translates into everyday practice, and how a formal status of 
equality under the law is used and applied by individuals and groups in their 
struggle for social mobility, status, access, and power.3 substantive citizen-
ship is a contested status, and for it to translate into reality, it needs to be 
defended, upheld, substantiated, and negotiated vis-à-vis the state and other 
individuals and groups who share the same formal status. To adequately 
capture this dimension of citizenship, i propose to approach the quality of 
citizenship by treating substantive citizenship as an asset. The asset dimen-
sion of citizenship exposes it to problems of scarcity and competition. To 
some people it might be worth more when—and as long as—others do 
not possess it. citizenship as an asset thus behaves like a positional good, a 
concept developed by the american economist fred hirsch (1976). in a nut-
shell, hirsch argues that certain goods only deliver the sought-for benefit as 
long as not everybody possesses them, and once more people possess them, 
more goods are needed to fulfill the same function. educational degrees are 
a case in point. if everybody has a college degree, having a college degree 
no longer guarantees access to good jobs, and educational requirements will 
rise. hirsch points out that in advanced capitalist markets, competition for 
“positional goods” increases as capitalist development advances. according 
to hirsch, positional goods derive their value not from their absolute utility, 
but rather from their relative position to others. at the same time, the costs 
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in terms of investment required to have the same outcome steadily rise, in a 
process he calls “screening” (hirsch 1976: 41).
a very important corollary of this theory is that those who have a his-
torical advantage will always lead the race for more restricted goods. as 
hirsch demonstrates, the maintenance of the privilege of access resides on 
a better starting position. When applying this insight to the relational good 
of “scenic property,” hirsch explains that “What matters in the acquisition 
of scenic property is less one’s own present income than the present and past 
incomes of other people. To secure the objects in the auction catalogue, it is 
relative rather than absolute income and wealth that count. a head start in 
this competition for relative ascendancy accrues to those who acquired such 
assets in earlier, less expensive auctions” (hirsch 1976: 36).
This logic, i contend, applies not just to real estate and education, 
the cases hirsch focuses on. it also characterizes access to substantive citi-
zenship, because one can get more out of being a citizen if others do not 
share the same status. on a more concrete level, this logic has already been 
applied to the job market, where Roediger (1999) has demonstrated that 
ethnicity has helped american whites to secure access to scarce jobs. We 
are also becoming more aware that the, at times, vehement reaction against 
affirmative action can be explained by this logic, because affirmative action 
undermines the advantage that historically privileged groups have been able 
to accumulate, thus providing them with a better starting position (Brown 
et al. 2003). applying this concept to the case of citizenship in general, we 
can deduce that thinking about citizenship as a relational good allows us 
to understand it as a competitive practice. seen under this lens, if every-
body has access to the same rights, then those rights lose value. This way 
of thinking about citizenship makes it possible to make sense of its exclu-
sionary character by focusing on its internal contradictions and inherent 
tradeoffs. analyzed in such a way, it becomes clear that for the historically 
privileged, rights were never perceived as equal rights for all, but rather as 
a privilege for themselves, and at best a favor granted to dependent oth-
ers. equal rights threaten to undermine the whole patron-client system that 
allows the privileged not only to perpetuate their own advantage, but to 
transform the underprivileged into their servants and clients. stated bluntly, 
rights are worth much more if they are privileges. not only do privileges 
reduce the number of equals and thus reduce competition; they also ensure 
the reproduction of clients—dependent people who can be used, exploited, 
or rewarded depending on one’s likings and needs. if rewarded, of course, 
clients can become loyal subjects and potential supporters and thus a highly 
valued resource in any system that relies on the support of others. in the 
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language of hirsch, “positional competition, in the language of game the-
ory, is a zero-sum game: what winners win, losers lose” (hirsch 1976: 53). 
furthermore, this author explains that
What the wealthy have today can no longer be delivered to the rest of us tomor-
row; yet as we individually grow richer, that is what we expect. The dynamic 
interaction between material and positional sectors becomes malign. instead of 
alleviating the unmet demands on the economic system, material growth at this 
point exacerbates them. The locus of instability is the divergence between what 
is possible for the individual and what is possible for all individuals. increased 
material resources enlarge the demand for positional goods, a demand that can 
be satisfied for some only by frustrating demand for others. The intensified 
positional competition involves an increase in needs for the individual, in the 
sense that additional resources are required to achieve a given level of welfare. 
in the positional sector, individuals chase each others’ tails. The race gets longer 
for the same prize. (hirsch 1976: 67)
i agree with the logic this analysis unveiled over thirty years ago, although 
i contend that hirsch’s approach was too cautious. The positional logic 
does not just characterize late capitalist markets, as he thought. it indeed 
characterizes a majority of human interaction—whenever this interaction 
is competitive. Most goods and assets are indeed worthier the scarcer they 
are—which is what makes them worthy in the first place. hence most goods 
are positional in that they benefit from being exclusive.
This insight is based on my reading of such authors as norbert elias 
(2000), who has argued that what is called “civilizational progress” is indeed 
a struggle over cultural forms and norms in a constant striving for distinc-
tion and the production of privilege. privileged groups constantly invent 
new mannerisms, mores, or customs, not because they are qualitatively bet-
ter, but because they serve the purpose of setting themselves apart from 
the mainstream. as soon as elites invent such new forms and manners, the 
middle classes seek to imitate and copy them in order to claim in-group 
status. hence, to some extent, the form is the content; emulating and adapt-
ing upper-class behavior constitutes the upper class. furthermore, according 
to elias, forms, manners, and customs fulfill important gate-keeping func-
tions, as they are able to regulate who rightfully belongs and who does not.
another basic insight about the social world as one constituted by a con-
tinuous struggle over privilege, where individuals and groups use whatever 
means they have at their disposal, comes from pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu 
(1987) very convincingly shows that the social world is indeed reproduced, 
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structured, and hierarchized through the constant efforts to position one-
self higher up on the social structure based on one’s material possessions 
(financial capital) as well as symbolic capitals (social, cultural, and, i suggest, 
racial), via the idea of habitus, that is, the way one consumes and displays, 
or performs, this consumption.
according to henri Tajfel, group difference and identity are constituted 
together. This insight goes back to hegel’s discussion of the master-slave 
relationship. according to Tajfel (2010), groups constitute themselves in 
relation to other individuals and groups. a sense of identity is fostered 
through the drawing of borders that separate those inside from those out-
side. This drawing of borders not only permits the effective separation of 
one group into two or more, it also constitutes each group with reference to 
the others. Tajfel’s main dialectical insight was that one group can only exist 
by defining itself as different from another.
furthermore, as Rogers Brubaker has demonstrated, groupness is a 
variable and not a constant. as such, it cannot be presupposed. Brubaker 
(2004) argues that we should think of groupness as events and projects, 
oftentimes proposed and pushed through by “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” 
and the organizations they control and manipulate. Behind many of these 
group projects stand very tangible power interests. Brubaker also highlights 
the potentially tricky relationship between groups and categories—be they 
social-science categories or census categories. he asks, for example, “how 
categories become groups.”
Taken together, these authors present a vision of the social world as 
one of perpetual struggle over positional goods, assets, or capitals, which 
individuals and groups use to position themselves higher up on the social 
hierarchies of their societies. By doing so, those same social hierarchies are 
created and molded—hence the overlap of form and content—in a process 
that anthony Giddens (1986) has called “structuration.”
applied to the study of citizenship, these basic insights about the work-
ing and constitution of the social world lead me to think about citizenship 
as a relational asset. as such, its value is constituted by the fact that its 
possession is not readily accessible to all in the same amount. from this per-
spective, substantive citizenship is best described as a contested good, which 
implies that those who have citizenship have strong incentives to ensure 
that not everybody is able to substantiate their citizenship, transforming it 
into effective claims. if this logic applies, then we are likely to end up with a 
spectrum of citizenship, with first-class citizens on one end and second-class 
citizens on the other. With increased international exposure and interde-
pendence, there is no reason to believe that the competition for substantive 
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citizenship will not assume global dimensions and become more embattled 
as the world is growing closer together. after all, substantive citizenship is a 
very desirable asset that most people on this globe want to possess, or possess 
more of, in those countries where citizenship has already reached high levels 
of substantiation. as the competition over citizenship sharpens, there is no 
good reason to believe that we will eventually reach a point where most of 
the world’s population enjoys equal access to substantive citizenship rights. 
There is, to the contrary, more reason to believe that the struggle over sub-
stantive citizenship will get harsher as more people compete for the rights, 
privileges, and entitlements it promises.4
a complicating, yet important question with regard to the asset charac-
ter of substantive citizenship leads away from analytical frameworks towards 
empirical reality. The analytical conceptualization of substantive citizenship 
as an asset is so powerful because it allows one to make sense of historical 
developments. When applying this lens, one is able to see how citizenship 
has indeed undergone a gradual change from being considered an obliga-
tion and responsibility, to a right and even an entitlement. John pocock, as 
discussed below, has hinted at this change of the original athenian mean-
ing of citizenship as early as under the Roman Republic. such authors as 
hannah arendt have also pointed out that citizenship has lost its original 
meaning of a public obligation and become a mere right, for which citizens 
now seek enforcement. although there is not enough space to examine how 
exactly citizenship lost the component of responsibility and obligation, the 
end result of such a development is that once transformed into a right with-
out obligations, citizenship has indeed become a commodity and an asset 
that can be requested. in the extreme case, probably experienced in its pur-
est form in the contemporary United states, the rights associated with one’s 
citizenship have indeed become commodified to such a degree that their 
enforcement is advertised by the media. U.s. lawyers thus actively seek to 
recruit all those whose rights have been violated so that they can help them 
reclaim them (and make some money in the process). in terms of a geneal-
ogy of citizenship, this represents a thorough transformation of citizenship 
as a public obligation, which grew out of being a full member in a polis, to 
citizenship as a social status (as described by T. h. Marshall), to the kind 
of citizenship that characterizes most contemporary liberal democracies, 
namely, citizenship as an asset.
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sUBsTanTiVe ciTizenship as a social Role
substantive citizenship is not only relational. By locating the domain of 
struggles over its effectiveness in the social realm, we need to take a closer 
look at citizenship as a practice that relies on mutual validation. some 
citizens, even though the state grants them equal rights, might still face dif-
ficulties when exercising those rights because they suffer from restrictions 
created by fellow citizens. hence, any discussion of citizenship must address 
the question of whether citizens are respected and treated as citizens—not 
just by the state, but also by their fellow citizens. To adequately capture the 
effectiveness of citizenship, we necessarily enter the social domain, where 
access, respect, and status have to be negotiated among citizens in their daily 
routines, and their meaning has to be substantiated by daily practice.
substantive citizenship is also very fruitfully analyzed as a social role that 
needs to be learned, accepted, and validated by others. Roberto da Matta 
(1987), writing about Brazil—where the struggle for citizenship rights has 
long occupied social movements and produced many academic treatises 
about the limits of citizenship, as well as its different contestations—has 
pointed out that citizenship is indeed a social role and, as such, it needs to 
be learned. according to da Matta, Brazilians treat anything related to the 
state with suspicion, even the role of being a citizen. During his empiri-
cal research, conducted during the late 1980s in Rio de Janeiro, da Matta 
found that Brazilians always used the word “citizen” in negative situations, 
to demarcate the position of someone who is at a disadvantage or infe-
rior. Da Matta further found that invariably, Brazilians, when asked, “how 
would you classify a person who obeys the laws in Brazil?” answered nega-
tively. The general tone of the answers provided to this question, according 
to da Matta, was that a person who follows the law in Brazil is considered 
an idiot (da Matta 1987: 318). Da Matta thus demonstrates that citizenship 
is a social role that needs to be learned. he also shows that the role of being 
a citizen can vary greatly—depending on the kind of specific socialization 
that formal citizens experience when learning the meaning of this attribute. 
in the Brazil of the 1980s, as da Matta shows, being a citizen meant very 
little, and it did not include such things as having basic rights that are pro-
tected and enforced by the state. But whereas da Matta uses his analysis to 
ponder about the penetration of private social relations into the realm of the 
public, for the purposes of this chapter it is important to retain the basic 
insight that substantive citizenship is indeed a social role that needs to be 
validated in order to have concrete consequences for a citizen.
James holston (2008) has more recently termed this quality of citizenship 
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“everyday citizenship.” holston argues that “The quality of . . . mundane 
interaction may in fact be more significant to people’s sense of themselves 
in society than the occasional heroic experience of citizenship like soldiering 
and demonstrating or the emblematic ones like voting and jury duty. every-
day citizenship entails performances that turn people, however else related, 
into fellow citizens related by measures specific to citizenship” (holston 
2008: 15).
according to da Matta and holston, then, democracy is faltering when 
the concept of citizenship, although theoretically understood and anchored 
as a core principle in a constitution, has not developed into an everyday 
practice. applied to the case of Brazil, this insight highlights the fact that 
many Brazilians do not know what it means to act as citizens, nor do 
they know what kind of treatment a citizen can and should expect from 
other citizens and from the state. in Brazil, as these authors demonstrate, 
citizenship is but a word. To the rich and privileged, called the “owners 
of power” by another astute Brazilian social scientist (Raymundo faoro 
[1957] 2001), citizenship is a privilege and something the privileged access 
whenever needed, thus making it their private domain. To them, citizen-
ship is a special right, which requires money and influence in order to give 
it a practical dimension. as holston and caldeira (1998) explain, “The 
protections and immunities civil rights are intended to ensure as constitu-
tional norms are generally perceived and experienced as privileges of elite 
social statuses and thus of limited access. They are not, in other words, 
appreciated as common rights of citizenship” (holston and caldeira 1998, 
in agüero and stark 1998: 276).
in order to take advantage of civil rights and liberties, one needs either 
to have money, or to know the “right” kind of people. all those unable 
to count on this capital are subject to a system that consistently denies 
basic civil rights, or at least severely complicates access to them. corrupt 
executive branches, and yearlong, often decade-long delays in the judicial 
system—which is also plagued by innumerable accounts of impunity for 
the well-off—have undermined the quality of Brazilian citizenship to the 
point where its dimensions, effectiveness, and reach are not experienced by 
average citizens and hence not perceived as rights. To the poor, indigenous, 
black, and excluded, citizenship is but an empty concept, as to them, nei-
ther the state nor the majority of citizens respect their autonomy, value their 
opinions, consider their political preferences, or treat them as equals.
Brazilian elites are not only above the state, they perceive the state and 
any state-related services as instruments of their whim. Brazilian elites, in 
other words, have privatized the state and the public realm and use them 
34 | Chapter 2
as instruments to control, co-opt, appease, or, if pressured, serve the ordi-
nary people. This service, if it exists at all, is always treated more as a favor 
than a duty and it is, more often than not, of bad quality. But the Brazilian 
example is just that: an example introduced here to illustrate the fruitfulness 
of thinking about, and analyzing, citizenship also as a social role.
however, the effectiveness of being a citizen depends on the recognition 
of individual autonomy and the possession of inalienable rights by oneself, 
by others, and by the overarching institutions that exercise power over one’s 
life—first and foremost the state. The implications of this argument are not 
readily apparent, but they are far reaching. on a very basic level, this argu-
ment goes directly against the idea that citizenship rights can be created by 
decree. no law or legal framework can possibly create effective, that is sub-
stantive, citizenship. equal status under the law, in short, is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition of effective citizenship. according to Jürgen haber-
mas, “only in an egalitarian public of citizens that has emerged from the 
confines of class and thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social stratifi-
cation and exploitation can the potential of an unleashed cultural pluralism 
fully develop” (habermas 1998: 308). i shall develop other implications of 
the social dimension of citizenship below, especially when discussing the 
colombian and Brazilian cases.
The DialecTics of ciTizenship
Thinking about citizenship as a social role and a relational asset already 
implies adopting a dialectical analytical framework, as it focuses the analyst’s 
gaze away from fixed and static phenomena onto the dynamics and tensions 
that result between given extremes and ideal types. a dialectical analysis 
instead focuses on process, negotiation, and tensions. applying such a 
perspective alerts us to the fact that citizenship went hand in hand with 
exclusion from its very conception in democratic athens. indeed, it is hardly 
coincidental that citizenship lost much of its substance as soon as it was 
applied to a larger group of people. in democratic athens, we can observe 
a dialectical relationship between the amount of rights and privileges that 
citizenship granted and the degree of its exclusivity. as soon as citizenship 
gained more meaning after the successive reforms by solon, cleisthenes, 
and ephialtes, pericles, who succeeded these important democratic reform-
ers, labored to restrict access to citizenship rights. according to ober, “in 
451/0 a new law, advocated by pericles, limited citizenship to those who 
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could demonstrate that they were sons of athenians on their mother’s as 
well as their father’s side. formerly, sons of non-athenian mothers had been 
allowed to become citizens” (ober 1989: 81). furthermore, “an attempt in 
403/2 to limit franchise to property owners was rejected, as was a proposal 
to broaden the franchise by granting citizenship to slaves who had helped 
in the revolution against the Thirty. The athenians thus reasserted both 
political equality among citizens and the exclusivity of the citizen body. . . . 
allowing slaves to be citizens would deny the linkage between patriotism 
and citizen blood. homonoia, ‘same-mindedness,’ demanded both equality 
and exclusivity” (ober 1989: 97f ).
This restriction of the citizenry happened in response to important 
democratic reforms conducted some fifty years earlier—reforms that deep-
ened the rights associated with citizenship. according to ober, “in 462, 
an important, if somewhat obscure, series of reforms crippled the direct 
political power of the elite. a certain ephialtes led a movement to strip the 
‘extra powers’ from the areopagus council . . . the areopagus probably lost 
some of its legal powers, including the authority to review and set aside as 
‘unconstitutional’ decisions of the assembly” (ober 1989: 77). Thus, when 
elites lost privileges and citizenship gained in importance, it also became 
more exclusive.
The development of citizenship and its relation to exclusion also becomes 
very clear in the Roman Republic and during the empire. according to John 
pocock, in Rome, “citizenship has become a legal status, carrying with it 
rights to certain things—perhaps possessions, perhaps immunities, perhaps 
expectations—available in many kinds and degrees, available or unavailable 
to many kinds of persons for many kinds of reasons” (pocock, in Beiner 
2007: 36). it no longer meant what it had in athens, where “citizenship is 
not just a means to being free; it is the way of being free itself ” (pocock, 
in Beiner 2007: 32). Thus it appears citizenship lost its muscle whenever it 
was extended to a greater number of people. for pocock, the legalization 
of citizenship conducted under the guidance of the Roman lawyer Gaius 
(c.e. 130– 180) was the beginning of possessive individualism and the rise 
of “homo legalis”—a person whose rights and political power were defined 
by the amount of assets he commanded. it was also the beginning of strip-
ping citizenship of its aspects of obligation and responsibility. The more 
citizenship came to solely mean access to rights and entitlements, the more 
it became subject to the logic of competitive markets, where most assets 
were worth more if others did not possess them. More than the legaliza-
tion of citizenship, this transformation meant a gradual commodification of 
citizenship, and its mutation into a possession and a good that only the rich 
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and powerful could afford. in 1981, pocock wrote: “it begins to look, how-
ever, as if the characteristic tendency of jurisprudence was to lower the level 
of participation and deny the premise that man is by nature political. . . . 
as the polis and res publica declined toward the level of municipality, two 
things happened: the universe became pervaded by law, the locus of whose 
sovereignty was extra-civic, and the citizen came to be defined not by his 
actions and virtues, but by his rights to do things” (pocock 1981: 359f ).
These classical examples amply testify to the fruitfulness of conceptu-
alizing citizenship in terms of relational assets and social roles, especially 
when considering the nature, reach, and conditions of citizenship in rela-
tion to exclusion. seen from this angle, citizenship and exclusion are indeed 
intimately connected, or even mutually constitutive, and hence causally 
entwined.
Modern examples of the dialectical relationship between citizenship 
and exclusion equally abound. The last european constituencies practicing 
direct democracy, some swiss cantons, also controlled the right to be a citi-
zen very closely, in some cases excluding women from being full citizens. 
once full suffrage was achieved across all of switzerland (in 1971), direct 
democracy started to mean less, and it underwent a similar transition—
described by pocock when discussing the transition from the strong sense 
of citizenship that prevailed in athens to the weaker legal notion that char-
acterized Rome. as a result, more and more of the decisions previously 
made by citizen assemblies are now conducted by specialized agencies, and 
direct democracy in switzerland is gradually changing and morphing into a 
representative system, while those cantons that retain direct rule are among 
the most exclusionary (Kriesi 2008). citizenship, it appears, is indeed best 
thought of as constantly negotiated and heavily embedded in social inter-
actions. as a privilege and an entitlement, it is not equally distributed and 
not easily socialized.
RacisM anD The poWeR of WhiTeness
To add further validity to my proposal of analyzing substantive citizen-
ship through the lens of social roles and asset distributions, i shall focus 
on another, very pervasive way in which the substantiation of citizenship 
is denied to some individuals and groups by their fellow first-class citizens, 
namely, through racism. for many minorities, racism translates into second-
class citizenship, as it undermines trust in public institutions and exposes 
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those stigmatized to the discriminatory practices of their fellow citizens. The 
remainder of this chapter explores some of the ways in which the distinction 
between first- and second-class citizens is upheld by those benefiting from 
it. as stated above, i seek to demonstrate that one of the most significant 
and far-reaching ways to defend first-class citizenship vis-à-vis second-class 
citizenship is racism.
accepting the assumption that substantive citizenship is at the same 
time a social role and a relational asset leads me to the third component of 
my argument—namely, the importance of racism in conditioning and con-
straining the effectiveness of citizenship for racialized subjects.
an important dialectical relationship exists between two key aspects of 
racism—namely, the relationship between the normalization of whiteness, 
where whiteness functions as a symbolic capital, and the racialization of 
nonwhites, and their transformation through this process into “others” (har-
ris 1993; Reiter 2010). successfully claiming to be white, at least in those 
societies structured by european colonialism, and under conditions where 
citizenship finds foremost expression in rights and entitlements, whiteness 
functions as a symbolic capital that marks one’s belonging to the group of 
the historically privileged—those who have rights and can give favors. it 
also demarcates the boundary between the privileged and the others—all 
those who have to depend on favors and protections. The process through 
which this structuring of social hierarchies works not only separates people 
into two groups—the “deservingly” privileged and the undeserving rest; it 
is through this very process that “the rest” become “others.” in this pro-
cess, whiteness is anything but a biological reality, but a negotiated symbolic 
good and a capital. To those who are able to claim it successfully, it offers 
important tools with which to uphold and defend privilege.5
Michel foucault has termed this process “normalization,” because 
by applying whiteness as a criterion to structure social space, white-
ness becomes the norm and nonwhiteness the exception. furthermore, 
through this process, whites become the moral majority and nonwhites 
minorities and “others”—even in societies where whites actually represent 
a numerical minority. as whites become the norm, nonwhites become 
problems and objects of scrutiny, preoccupation, and desire—but they 
never become equals. Whiteness, to be sure, is not a biological attribute, 
but a symbolic good that has to be negotiated and validated socially. as 
such, it works in increments, so that some people are able to claim more 
of it than others, irrespective of their biological background. in most 
societies, successful claiming to be white is a matter of financial capital, 
behavior, language, and dress code, among other things.
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hence, this process of ordering and hierarchizing social space by using 
whiteness as a criterion is at the same time one of racialization and normal-
ization. applied to the case of citizenship in the part of the world colonized 
by europeans, claiming to be white is one of the central tools used by his-
torically privileged groups to explain their own privilege and justify their 
privileged access to rights. it is also the main resource for explaining and 
justifying the exclusion of all “others.” according to Reiter (2010),
Whiteness constitutes capital in addition to the other types of capital, namely 
financial, social, and cultural. Their importance, however, does not follow a 
simple additive logic. one type of capital rather connects to the others and 
together they determine the social place an individual will hold in a society. 
This allows for some flexibility, as one form of capital can be used to partly 
compensate for the lack of another, although this flexibility is limited precisely 
by the lumped condition of the different capitals. in that way, as Bourdieu 
points out correctly, each single form of capital tends to over-determine the 
social position of its carrier, as the presence or absence of each single one is 
perceived as being indicative of the presence or absence of the others. it is in 
this sense that whiteness over-determines its carrier, bestowing him with a social 
position that might not be warranted. in other words, because of the composite 
character of the different forms of capital, whiteness signals the presence of 
other forms, even though they might not be present. (Reiter 2010: 29)
The result of upholding whiteness as a criterion for privilege and using it 
as a demarcation to separate first- from second-class citizens is that a formi-
dable barrier to achieving general, substantive citizenship is created. it tends 
to place nonwhite citizens living in europe, and the part of the world colo-
nized by europeans, outside of the realm of effective citizenship. Despite 
their formal citizenship, they are treated as second-class citizens or even for-
eigners, as etienne Balibar (2004) has argued for france, and Reiter (2008) 
has demonstrated for portugal. in countries like Brazil, where nonwhites 
account for over 40 percent of the total population and where blacks pre-
dominate in some regions and cities, the same tendency prevails, as Brazilian 
historian Beatriz Gois Dantas (1988) has convincingly shown. To the white 
elites of the americas, nonwhites are not really part of “their” nation; they 
remain suspicious, foreign, alien, and “others within,” in the case of blacks, 
and a nation apart, or “others outside,” in the case of indigenous people.
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conclUsion
europe’s difficulties in integrating non-europeans, and the trumping of 
nationalism over citizenship, as well as the related trumping of particularism 
over universalism, put it in company with other regions and countries of 
the world that face similar challenges of redefining belonging under condi-
tions of ethnic and cultural diversity, increased transborder migration, and 
heightened market competition. europe’s difficulty in dealing with “others” 
thus invites international comparison, which proves helpful to finding new 
and innovative ways to analyze citizenship. analysts of Brazilian democracy 
James holston and Teresa caldeira (1998), for example, argue that in Bra-
zil, “the protections and immunities civil rights are intended to ensure as 
constitutional norms are generally perceived and experienced as privileges of 
elite social statuses and thus of limited access. They are not, in other words, 
appreciated as common rights of citizenship” (holston and caldeira 1998: 
276). etienne Balibar (2004) reached a similar verdict for europe in general, 
and for france in particular. lessons learned from studying the limits of 
citizenship in Brazil thus prove helpful to the analysis of french citizenship 
in particular and european citizenship in general—and vice versa.
at the center of the limitations of citizenship, be it in contemporary 
europe, latin america, or the ancient world, seem exclusive definitions of 
community. The struggle over privilege always seems to be a struggle over 
holding “them” out, so that “we” can enjoy our privileges undisturbed. in 
this very process, who counts as “us” and who as “them” are enacted and 
reinforced. once the question of who “they” are is settled, the identity of 
“us” follows by default. in its modern manifestation, this logic takes the 
form of nationalism—but before nation-states emerged, the struggle over 
erecting, justifying, and defending exclusive communities was no less fierce, 
as i shall demonstrate below.
hannah arendt stated wisely that “of all forms of government and 
organizations of people, the nation-state is least suited for unlimited growth 
because the genuine consent at its base cannot be stretched indefinitely, 
and is only rarely, and with great difficulty, won from conquered peoples” 
(arendt 1966: 126). in her analysis of The origins of Totalitarianism, arendt 
further argues that
conquest, as well as empire building had fallen into disrepute for very good 
reasons. They had been carried out successfully only by governments which, 
like the Roman Republic, were based primarily on law, so that conquest could 
be followed by integration of the most heterogeneous peoples by imposing on 
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them a common law. The nation-state, however, based upon a homogeneous 
population’s active consent to its government (“le plebiscite de tous les jours”), 
lacked such a unifying principle and would, in the case of conquest, have to 
assimilate rather than to integrate, to enforce consent rather than justice, that 
is, to degenerate into tyranny. Robespierre was already well aware of this when 
he exclaimed: “Perissent les colonies si elles nous en coutent l’honneur, la liberté” 
(arendt 1966: 125).
edwige lefebvre (2003), in turn, argues that “homogeneity is the 
precondition for the unity of the pouvoir constituant, and the goal of the 
constitution is not the organization of the life of the nation, but the estab-
lishment of government rules” (lefebvre 2003: 18). Gary Wilder (2005) 
proves this argument to be right by demonstrating that the french imperial 
nation-state was never able, or willing, to expand full and equal citizenship 
rights to its conquered peoples in the caribbean. according to Wilder, 
“Republicanism, bureaucratic authoritarianism, and colonialism were 
internal elements of an expanded french state that were articulated within 
an encompassing imperial system” (Wilder 2005: 26). on a similar note, 
laurent Dubois (2004) depicts the difficulties that the first Republic 
encountered in accepting and integrating its former slaves in Guadeloupe. 
his detailed historical analysis of the years immediately following the 
french Revolution allows us to witness not only the racist bias of colonial 
masters, who had much to lose by granting slaves citizenship rights, but 
also some mainland revolutionaries who sought to uphold culturally biased 
definitions of the “universal rights of men.”6
in the Western world, citizenship, it appears, was contested from its 
very beginning and contrasted with the second-class citizenship of those 
rendered “others” by nationalist power politics that sought to restrict sub-
stantive citizenship rights in order to secure the privileges that european 
descent could provide. Making former colonial subjects formal citizens 
without ever including them in the “imagined community” of the nation, 
and without extending the concrete and substantive rights and entitlements 
of citizenship to them, thus offered the “perfect solution” to uphold social 
hierarchies. This move signaled the beginning of white double standards 
and guilt, as well as black double-consciousness and indigenous apartheid. 
This diagnosis also casts a deep shadow over the reach and depth of the 
modern principles of universal rights advocated by the french Revolution, 
as fraternité appears to have had a restrictive meaning from its very begin-
ning. Beginning with the french revolutionaries, european colonizers and 
their descendants did not imagine nonwhites to truly be brothers. The 
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genealogy of these dialectics of exclusion can be traced back all the way to 
the beginning of citizenship in classical athens.
in this book, i thus propose to examine the quality and substantiveness 
of citizenship and democracy by analyzing it through the lens of citizen-
ship and second-class citizenship, rights and duties, inclusion and exclusion, 
belonging and remaining an outsider, being a national and a foreigner. 
instead of arguing that reality is indeed structured by these dualisms, i pro-
pose to only use these categories and words as lenses, or angles, that allow 
us to analyze reality in innovative and fruitful ways. This endeavor is the 
more fruitful the more this angle is able to capture the dynamics that bind 
the above dualisms together, and the more it is able to focus the analysis 
on the mutually constitutive dimensions of these analytical pairs. Reality, 
to be sure, is not structured around dualisms. it is complex, heavily inter-
dependent, and contingent along a multiplicity of factors. nothing can be 
said that “truly” captures reality, be it the reality of citizenship or any other. 
however, by proposing to analyze the reality of citizenship by focusing on 
its everyday dimensions, its substantiveness, its relational character, and its 
social embeddedness, i propose a theory-driven and hence simplifying angle 
that puts this segment of reality into a certain order, thus allowing it to make 
sense. any order, as immanuel Kant knew, springs out of our own minds 
and is not inherent to nature, let alone to social reality. The worst way to 
deal with this potentially disturbing fact is to ignore it and pretend that our 
understanding of reality is direct and unmediated, neutral, objective, and 
not influenced by our own situatedness. second worst is to argue that real-
ity is indeed structured by the categories and theories we use to explain it. 
Doing so means falling prey to reification and risking the analysis of oneself 
while claiming to analyze the world.
equipped with the ontological, epistemological, conceptual, and meth-
odological tools elaborated in chapters 1 and 2, i should be able to steer 
free from all the potential pitfalls already discussed, and i am now ready to 
apply the analytical tools and insights i have created to empirical reality. 
in what follows, i will thus apply this analytical apparatus to several cases 
in order to illustrate their usefulness and fruitfulness for producing insight 
and understanding about the workings and conditionalities of effective 
citizenship. as explained above, the cases presented here do not serve the 
purpose of testing my hypotheses. They are also not selected according to 
a traditional case-study rationale. instead, each case serves the purpose of 
highlighting one central theme, or facet, of how citizenship is lived and 
experienced by different peoples at different times and under different cir-
cumstances. if similarities and patterns emerge—and i hope to be able to 
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demonstrate that they do—then these regularities are more an unveiling 
of the human condition when living in society, or otherwise organized in 
groups, than they are an unveiling of regularities, or even laws, of nature 
or behavior. in essence, each case study focuses on one particular way in 
which citizenship is lived, experienced, performed, and implicated by other 
factors external to it, so that by the end, the reader should have gained a 
relatively complex and well-rounded picture of the different realities hiding 
behind the term “citizenship.” after reading this book, he or she should also 
be in a position to formulate specific questions about citizenship regimes in 
different places and at different times.
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Chapter 3
classical citizenship
The Political and the Social
In a quarter century, greek self-knowledge passed from the idea of a 
divine anthropogony to the idea of man’s self-creation. The stasimon from 
Antigone and, with it, consubstantially and unsurpassably, Thucydides’ 
Funeral oration, which comes twelve years later, give this self-knowledge its 
most striking forms.
—coRneliUs casToRiaDis, 1991
This chapter focuses on classical citizenship as practiced 
and experienced in athens and the Roman Republic. To do so, for a politi-
cal scientist, is to venture onto thin ice, as i have to rely almost entirely 
on secondary sources and a few translated primary sources. The chapter is, 
however, a necessary part of this book, as it allows me to add a historical 
dimension to the problem of democracy, citizenship, and exclusion. exclu-
sion from citizenship, as well as the establishment of second-class citizenship 
as a contrast to full, or first-class citizenship, is not new, as this chapter will 
show. it reaches back to the very beginnings of democracy—at least to those 
democracies of which we have records.1
a thorough critique of the Western democratic tradition and the ideas 
associated with it, such as liberalism and republicanism, the way i intend 
to conduct it here, would be incomplete without an analysis of classical 
athens and Rome. By including these cases, as well as the chapter to fol-
low about citizenship in medieval city republics, i also seek to provide 
a genealogy of citizenship. if exclusivity and discrimination were indeed 
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integral parts of every historical example of citizenship we know of, as i 
seek to demonstrate, then it is safe to say that citizenship and exclusion 
are indeed mutually constitutive of each other to the point where one has 
never existed, and in all likelihood cannot exist, without the other.
This chapter, then, focuses on athenian citizenship when it first 
emerged, in 594 b.c.e., with the reforms instituted by solon. it develops 
several themes: first, what democracy and citizenship meant to athenians; 
second, whom it excluded and how; third, how societal inequality was dealt 
with in athens; and fourth, what happened to athenian democracy once it 
was absorbed by Rome.
The analysis of the Roman Republic is crucial to one of the central 
arguments of the whole book, namely, the commodification of citizenship, 
which started, according to John pocock (1995) as early as the second cen-
tury c.e., when the Roman lawyer Gaius started to codify Roman law, thus 
changing the character of citizenship from political to legal. The second 
part of this chapter will thus focus on the Roman Republic and the rela-
tionship between a codification of laws and the resultant depoliticization of 
democracy.
DeMocRacy anD ciTizenship in aThens
The descriptions of ancient Greek democracy by aristotle, plato, xenophon, 
herodotus, polybius, and pericles, and the many modern and contempo-
rary scholars who have made ancient Greece their field of study, allow us to 
reconstruct how democracy was practiced in athens and surrounding attica 
between 507  b.c.e., when cleisthenes reformed athenian governmental 
institutions in such a way as to avoid the concentration of power among the 
elites, and 338 b.c.e., when athens came under the control of philip ii of 
Macedon, after the battle of chaeronea, and joined the league of corinth 
in 337 b.c.e., effectively ending its independence.
The ancient Greek polis sought to nurture its members’ sense of moral 
responsibility towards the collective. accordingly, the chief benefit of living 
in a polis was justice and moral improvement, as, according to aristotle, the 
polis “enunciates what is just, thereby allowing man’s best qualities to flour-
ish” (Manville 1997: 45).
aristotle explains in his Politics: “To be fellow citizens is to be sharers 
in one polis, and to have one polis is to have one place of residence” (Pol. 
1260b40– 1261a1) according to aristotle, the citizen of the polis is one “who 
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enjoys the right of sharing in deliberative or judicial office” (Pol. 1275b18– 
20). Thus, according to the words of one analyst, athenian citizens were not 
taxpayers, but shareholders in a corporation whose profits were moral excel-
lence (Manville 1997: 45).
To be a full athenian citizen thus did not mean to have influence 
in the doings of the state, but rather to be part of the state. athenian 
democracy provides not only the strongest example of direct democracy, 
but also an example of a political system where ruling and being ruled 
overlapped considerably. The core of athenian democracy consisted of 
not separating rulers from ruled. indeed, athenian citizens all participated 
in the ruling of their polity. To ensure that this setup remained in place, 
athenian statesmen devised several means, such as appointment to office 
by lot. in addition, several institutions were created for the purpose of 
avoiding a concentration of power among state officials. The strong com-
mitment to avoiding a system where something like a political ruling class 
emerged becomes evident from many of the formulations aristotle uses to 
describe athenian democracy; for example, when he explains that since 
some people are not superior to others, “it is clear that, for a variety of 
reasons, all must share alike in the business of ruling and being ruled by 
turns” (aristotle, Pol. 1332b12, 1992: 432).
The chaRacTeR of aThenian ciTizenship
according to Manville (1997), “citizenship was membership in the athe-
nian polis, with all that this implied—legal status, but also the more 
intangible aspects of the life of the citizen that related to his status. it was 
simultaneously a complement of formal obligations and privileges, and the 
behavior, feelings, and communal attitudes attendant upon them” (Man-
ville 1997: 7).
in fact, athenian full citizens had plenty of rights and even more obliga-
tions. once they reached legal adulthood, all young athenian male citizens 
were expected to serve in the military. citizens also were entitled to par-
ticipate in public cults, festivals, and religious worship. They had the right 
to attend, speak, and vote in the popular assembly (ekklesia). They could 
serve (after the age of thirty) as a juror in the law courts (dikasteria). Very 
importantly, depending on age and eligibility, they could exercise elected 
and allotted offices (archai). They were entitled to redress and receive pro-
tection from the laws. They were allowed to own land in attica. finally, they 
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were entitled to receive public disbursements for services provided (Man-
ville 1997: 9).
Thus, athenian citizenship consisted of a set of rights and obligations 
and duties towards the collective. it was not a set of legal entitlements only, 
but rather a political system of breaking down the barriers between ruling 
and being ruled as much as possible. for ostwald, “the Greeks tended to see 
citizenship more in the context of sharing and being part of a community 
on which the individual depends for his or her sense of identity” (ostwald 
1996: 49). in athens, citizens ruled themselves. according to Josiah ober, 
“for the first time in the recorded history of a complex society, all native 
freeborn males, irrespective of their ability, family connections, or wealth, 
were political equals, with equal rights to debate and to determine state 
policy” (ober 1989: 7).
To clarify: classical citizenship, rather than a right, instead focused on 
responsibilities and duties. in his famous speech, pericles emphasizes the 
duties and responsibilities of athenian citizenship when he states, “for we 
alone regard the man who takes no part in such things not as one who 
minds his own business (apragmona), but as one who has no business here 
at all (achreion). (2.40.2)” (quoted in Manville 1997: 15).
athenian citizenship thus meant a lot to all those who were citizens. 
it made them power holders and rulers of their own destinies. how could 
such a system be achieved and sustained? The successive reforms conducted 
under solon, cleisthenes, and ephialtes provided the institutional frame-
work that made athenian democracy possible.
solon, cleisThenes, anD ephialTes: 
coUnTeRBalancinG socieTal ineqUaliTies 
ThRoUGh poliTical insTiTUTions
aristotle says of solon (c. 638  b.c.e.– 558  b.c.e.): “By setting up courts 
drawn from the entire body of citizens, he did establish democracy in ath-
ens” (aristotle 1992: 161). for aristotle, popular participation in the courts 
(dikasteria) was the core element where popular sovereignty ultimately 
rested. Martin ostwald, the renowned scholar of ancient Greece, agrees, 
arguing that “solon established popular power by opening membership in 
the law courts to all” (ostwald 1986: 5). ostwald further explains that “from 
pre-solonian times on, there were in athens two kinds of law courts. Most 
private litigation fell within the jurisdiction of one of the nine archons, each 
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in charge of his own tribunal and each within a well-defined sphere of com-
petence, authorized to judge lawsuits in their own fight, and not, as they do 
nowadays, merely to conduct the preliminary inquiry” (aristotle, Ath.Pol. 
3.5). other cases regarded as private were tried before the areopagus—that 
is, the council of ex-archons with considerable power across several jurisdic-
tions, which had, at all times in athenian history, jurisdiction in all cases of 
homicide, of wounding or poisoning with intent to kill, of arson, and such 
religious matters as the care of the sacred olive trees (ostwald 1986: 6f; also 
sealey 1964: 12).
aristotle credits solon for the introduction of the procedure of eisangelia 
and explains, “a characteristic feature of eisangelia in classical times was 
that it could be initiated by any citizen, usually before the council but on 
occasion also in the assembly (aristotle, Ath.Pol. 43.4)” (ostwald 1986: 
9). Most specialists agree that the core of the solonian reforms consisted of 
three measures. first, the prohibition against giving loans on the security of 
the person of the debtor, thus providing important safeguards against losing 
one’s freedom, and thus establishing very basic rights of unalienable person-
hood for athenian citizens; second, the right to take legal action on behalf 
of an injured party, independent from one’s social standing; and third, the 
institution of an appeals procedure (ephesis) and a new court (the heliaia) to 
hear appeals, which provided a check against the arbitrary administration of 
justice on the part of the aristocratic establishment and made the people the 
court of last resort (ostwald 1986: 14f ).
Democratic reform in athens was advanced even further by cleis-
thenes (c. 570– 507 b.c.e.). cleisthenes’s reforms were mentioned by the 
historian herodotus, who credits him with the true establishment of athe-
nian democracy. The central question that cleisthenes addressed was how 
to prevent societal inequalities from spilling over into the public realm. 
in contrast with modern reform proposals that target societal inequali-
ties and seek to achieve equitable political influence by equalizing society, 
cleisthenes took societal inequalities for granted and instead sought to 
devise ways to diminish their importance in the political realm. The main 
way cleisthenes pursued this goal was by breaking ethnic loyalties and 
replacing them with civic ones. This was achieved, in the main, by divid-
ing attica into three regions—city, coast, and inland—and then creating 
small administrative units, called demes. above the demes, cleisthenes 
created thirty trittyes and above those, ten phylai. each phylus (tribe) con-
tained three trittyes, one trittye from each of the three regions (Jones 1999: 
155). The system that emerged from the cleisthenic reforms is depicted 
in the figure.
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This institutional design provided a way to neutralize the political influ-
ence of dynastic clans, family factions, and regional loyalty by diluting them 
and forcing different regional groups (pedieis, the faction of the plains; 
paralioi, the faction of the coast; and hyperakrioi, the faction of the hills 
[ellis and stanton 1968: 98]) together into new associations. furthermore, 
cleisthenes created six new trittyes, that is, regional associations, amplifying 
them from the previous four and populating those new trittyes with demes 
from different regions, with different social and economic standing. This is 
the mixed form of government that aristotle talks about in his treatise on 
politics (ostwald 1986: 19).
however, according to ostwald, even after cleisthenes’s reforms, the 
athenian upper class still controlled several important political institutions, 
thus giving it supremacy and control over the ordinary citizens. particularly, 
the treasurers still had to be members of the highest property class, and the 
nine archons, or governors, of the highest two. furthermore, the aeropagus, 
that is, the high court of appeal for both criminal and civil cases, was still 
dominated by societal elites (ostwald 1986: 26f ).
however, cleisthenes also sought to weaken the power and influence 
of the aeropagus by shifting authority of certain cases over to the lesser, 
less elite-dominated court of the heliaia (ostwald 1986: 28). considered 
as a whole, the cleisthenian reforms created the basis for political equality 
among citizens through enforcing, institutionally, the principles of political 
equality, or isonomia (ober 1989: 70).
Source: University of Oregon.
Classical Citizenship | 49
The final measures towards establishing true political equality among 
citizens are associated with the third of the athenian reformers, ephialtes. 
ostwald explains, “Just as political isonomia implied that no legislative 
measure could be valid without the approval of the assembly, so a judicial 
isonomia was introduced, either by cleisthenes himself or soon after his 
reforms, in crimes against the state, in which the verdict of the people as a 
whole acted as a counterweight to what had been the sole jurisdiction by 
a body composed of the rich and well born. ephialtes’ achievement was 
to complete the process by giving the people full sovereignty in handling 
crimes against the state” (ostwald 1986: 39f ).
according to ober, “in 462, an important, if somewhat obscure, series 
of reforms crippled the direct political power of the elite. a certain ephialtes 
led a movement to strip the ‘extra powers’ from the areopagus council . . . 
the areopagus probably lost some of its legal powers, including the author-
ity to review and set aside as ‘unconstitutional’ decisions of the assembly” 
(ober 1989: 77; also Rihil 1995).2 ostwald provides some more detail on 
the reforms introduced by ephialtes. he explains that
The transfer of judicial powers in political cases from an aristocratic body, 
the areopagus, to the council of the five hundred, in which every deme of 
attica was represented, to the assembly, of which every adult male citizen was 
a member, and eventually to the jury courts, on which every adult male was 
eligible to serve, did not, to be sure, place executive power into the hands of 
the demos. The highest offices in the state remained the preserve of the higher 
property classes, and even the opening of the archonship to the zeugitai as of 
457/6 b.c. (aristotle, Ath.Pol. 26.2), which was a further step toward a more 
complete democracy meant only that this office no longer ranked as a major 
magistracy. still, by transferring jurisdiction in political cases from the areopa-
gus to popular organs, ephialtes gave the demos an effective control over the 
executive offices that is tantamount to guardianship over the state; by extend-
ing to judicial proceedings the isonomia that cleisthenes had given the people 
in legislative matters, he created popular sovereignty, which was justly called 
demokratia. (ostwald 1986: 49)
each deme annually sent a fixed number (based upon its population) of 
individuals to serve on the new advisory council of 500, which replaced the 
solonian council of 400, and by doing so, the elite lost its veto power over 
the decisions of the masses (ober 1989: 78). in this council of 500, every 
athenian citizen had the right to speak, called isegoria, thus making it the 
basis of popular sovereignty.
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after 462, athenian democracy saw a lowering of property qualifications 
for office holding, as well as the introduction of pay for government service 
(ober 1989: 79). in 457 all offices, including the archonships, were opened 
to the zeugitai, that is, manual workers (ober 1989: 80). This movement 
away from property qualification was indeed gradually expanding during 
the fifth century b.c.e., so that by the fourth century there were no more 
property qualifications for office holding, and even thetes, that is, landless 
peasants and agricultural laborers, could hold public office—and in fact 
many did (ober 1989: 80).
in sum, athenian citizens learned, through practical political participa-
tion, how to rule themselves and their polity, leading ober to the conclusion 
that “at athens the masses ruled, and the decisions of the majority were 
binding upon the minority .  .  . the absence of property qualifications for 
the exercise of citizenship rights was a basic principle of the athenian politi-
cal order. pay for office holding and for political participation, selection 
of magistrates by lot, and the right of free speech in the assembly—all of 
which were guaranteed by the binding nature of mass decisions upon the 
entire populace—made domination of the state’s political apparatus by rich 
citizens more difficult” (ober 1989: 193).
however, given that athenian citizenship bestowed so many rights and 
duties on every citizen, it is not surprising that athenian citizenship was 
highly circumscribed and exclusive. furthermore, the more rights and duties 
became associated with athenian citizenship, the more restrictive it became. 
The relationship between the depth of citizen rights and responsibilities and 
its exclusivity deserves some further inquiry.
DiffeRenTiaTeD VoTinG RiGhTs anD 
xenophoBia UnDeR peRicles
Max Weber (1968) provides a rather skeptical assessment of the degree to 
which average poor citizens were able to wrest power away from the hands 
of the rich and aristocratic. according to Weber, in athens, “the political 
equality of the free-born citizenry was vitiated by the gradation of voting 
rights and office eligibility, originally in terms of ground rents and armed 
service capabilities and later according to wealth” (Weber 1968: 1311). 
indeed, in athens, the right to be elected into certain offices was restricted, 
first by descent and later by wealth, and then again, during the time of 
pericles, by descent, which is commonly attributed to the increased influx 
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of foreigners (xenoi) into attica—some of whom would be eligible for office 
if wealth had remained the criterion to regulate active citizenship.3
in the years 450– 451, athens introduced payment for judicial office-
holders, as well as for all those serving in the boule, thus making it possible 
for the poor, and all those dependent on their daily income, to take time 
off in order to attend to issues of public interest. however, this measure to 
popularize political participation and office holding was counterbalanced 
by measures aimed at restricting the definition of who counted as a citizen.
a typical dialectical tradeoff was set in motion, one that would make 
reappearances throughout the history of democratic rule and, as a con-
sequence, appears in several chapters of this book. When citizenship is 
valuable to those who have it, they will seek ways to restrict access to it. 
The asset character of citizenship becomes clear in all these maneuverings. 
When citizenship means little and promises few tangible benefits, access is 
relatively open. When, however, citizenship is invested with more rights, 
privileges, and entitlements, those who have it tend to seek to limit the 
number of people with whom they wish to share the benefits. athens is but 
one example of many—but it is certainly the oldest one on record.
During the time when pericles (495– 429 b.c.e.) was exercising much 
influence on athenian politics, in the 450s, citizenship was restricted to 
those who descended from both an athenian father and mother—whereas 
before that time, having an athenian father was sufficient. as John Thorley 
(1996) points out, during the time of pericles “the advantage of being an 
athenian citizen and the feeling of power it gave were very real” (Thorley 
1996: 66). Thorley is referring to the export and import taxes paid to athens 
at the harbor of piraeus. furthermore, pericles’s time was one of expansion 
and establishment of colonies in italy and Thrace, and hence the appearance 
of colonial subjects. Under such circumstances, athenian citizens moved to 
secure their privileges by shielding them against foreigners (xenoi) and what 
today are termed legal resident aliens, metics (metoikoi).
By classifying and separating political rights from civic responsibilities, 
and reserving rights to some while demanding responsibilities from others, 
athens also gave birth to a regime of differentiated first- and second-class 
citizenship.
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exclUsion anD seconD-class 
ciTizens: XENoI anD METoIkoI
even after the reforms of solon, cleisthenes, and ephialtes, athenian citi-
zenship remained heavily circumscribed. aristotle argued that “The citizen 
must not live a mechanical or commercial life. such a life is not noble, and 
it militates against virtue. nor must those who are to be citizens be agricul-
tural workers, for they must have leisure to develop their virtue, and for the 
activities of a citizen” (aristotle, Pol. 1328b24, 1992: 415). for aristotle, 
women, slaves, foreign residents, visitors, and manual workers (banausoi) 
did not deserve full citizenship rights. Banausoi could participate in assem-
blies, but they were not allowed to hold office. explains aristotle: “But the 
best state will not make the mechanic a citizen. But even if he is to be a 
citizen, then at any rate what we have called the virtue of a citizen cannot 
be ascribed to everyone, not yet to free men alone, but simply to those who 
are in fact relieved of necessary tasks” (aristotle, Pol. 1277b33, 1992: 184).
indeed, after 450, athenian citizenship was restricted to those of double 
athenian descent, while women, slaves, and resident aliens—the major-
ity of the total adult population—remained excluded from participation 
in political life (ober 1989: 5). according to ober, “in 451/0 a new law, 
advocated by pericles, limited citizenship to those who could demonstrate 
that they were sons of athenians on their mother’s as well as their father’s 
side. formerly, sons of non-athenian mothers had been allowed to become 
citizens. The immediate concern prompting the reform may have been the 
tendency of athenian clerouchs [that is, athenian citizens residing in one of 
the colonies] . . . to marry foreign women while abroad” (ober 1989: 81; 
also Walters 1983: 332).
as mentioned above, it was indeed after the reforms of solon, cleis-
thenes, and ephialtes that foreigners (xenoi) and resident aliens (metoikoi) 
saw their citizenship rights further curtailed, or eliminated altogether.4 This 
limiting of citizenship happened precisely at a time of increased foreign 
presence in athens. explains ober (1989), “an attempt in 403/2 to limit 
franchise to property owners was rejected, as was a proposal to broaden the 
franchise by granting citizenship to slaves who had helped in the revolu-
tion against the Thirty. The athenians thus reasserted both political equality 
among citizens and the exclusivity of the citizen body. . . . allowing slaves 
to be citizens would deny the linkage between patriotism and citizen blood. 
homonoia, ‘same-mindedness,’ demanded both equality and exclusivity” 
(ober 1989: 97f ).
according to peter J. Rhodes (2004), in the athenian polis of the fifth 
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and fourth centuries b.c., “making a decision was entrusted to the citizens 
directly, in an ekklesia, assembly, open to all citizens (some kinds of busi-
ness required a quorum of 6,000, perhaps 10 percent of the citizens before 
the peloponnesian War of 431– 404 and 20 percent after), guided, but not 
seriously limited by the boule, council, numbering 500, a representative 
body whose membership changed each year” (Rhodes 2004: 3). Rhodes 
also explains that “There was no property qualification for the enjoyment 
of political rights (but even athens had a qualification for office holding, 
still enforced in the 5th century but not in the fourth, when the number of 
citizens was lower), and the stipends made it easier for the poorer citizens to 
exercise their rights; and the assembly was not dominated by authorities but 
was a powerful body and one in which all the citizens could play an active 
part” (Rhodes 2004: 4).
after athens had lost the peloponnesian War in 413  b.c.e., which 
brought economic hardship to athens and stripped it of its regional suprem-
acy, athenian citizenship became even more restrictive. in the 370s, the law 
regulating citizenship was as follows:
if an alien shall live as husband with an athenian woman in any way or man-
ner whatsoever, he may be indicted before the Thesmothetae by anyone who 
chooses to do so from among the athenians having the right to bring charges. 
and if he be convicted, he shall be sold, himself and his property, and the third 
part shall belong to the one securing his conviction. The same principle shall 
hold also if an alien woman shall live as wife with an athenian, and the athe-
nian who lives as husband with the alien woman so convicted shall be fined one 
thousand drachmae. (Demosthenes 59.16)
This new, more restrictive regulating of access to the benefits of athenian 
citizenship gives further evidence of the apparently inherent tradeoff between 
the quality of citizenship rights and the inclusiveness of such a regime.
lessons fRoM aThens
The most important lesson from athens is that athenian citizens estab-
lished “the political” as a central part of citizen life. politics, government, 
governance, and the state were all integral to athenian citizens’ everyday 
lives. There was no alienation from politics or from the state, because the 
citizens literally were the state. for aristotle, humans thus were political 
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animals by nature and vocation. “politics” in such a world was not a separate 
reality, conducted and controlled by a special group of people, and neither 
was the act of lawmaking. To the contrary, making the laws that govern the 
community was at the heart of this model, highlighting its strong commit-
ment to self-rule and autonomy. This is the time and place that triggered 
protagoras to say that “Man is the measure of all things.” it was also the 
time of sophocles, who wrote Antigone in 442– 43  b.c.e. and, according 
to castoriadis (1991), his anthropology “presupposes nothing: there, men 
create these capacities and possibilities themselves; simply, clearly, and insis-
tently, it posits humanity as self-creation. Men have taken nothing from the 
gods, and no god has given them anything whatsoever. That is the spirit of 
the fifth century, and it is to this tragedy that the athenians gave the laurel 
wreath” (castoriadis 1991: 22ff ).
an exploration of the athenian case under the analytical angle of citizen-
ship as a social role and a positional good, as well as from the perspective of 
autonomy, allows us to see that athenian citizens indeed planted the seed 
for self-rule, and also found a way to counteract the economic and social 
inequalities that divided them to establish political equality—particularly 
with the reforms of ephialtes. The most defining element of ancient Greek 
democracy was precisely the lack of distinction between ruler and ruled. 
The citizens were the state and the government. citizenship, although 
highly circumscribed and restricted, meant falling under the rule of law and 
making those laws at the same time. no passive sense of citizenship existed. 
This is what sets athenian democracy aside from most, if not all, democratic 
models to follow.
athenians ruled themselves, and they found ways to organize and pre-
serve this self-rule against the ever-present threats posed by aristocrats, 
oligarchs, and by sheer numbers. over 30,000 athenian citizens were 
effectively able to practice self-rule in a time when means of transportation 
and communication were precarious, if measured against contemporary 
possibilities. Despite strong social, cultural, economic, and educational dif-
ferences among citizens, they devised a system where many of them had to 
be involved in running public affairs. on top of the institutional design, 
which broke up regional and tribal ties into boules and required a very active 
and frequent presence in public meetings, discussions, and decision making, 
the Greeks also shunned those who did retreat into private life.
however, the athenian case also points at the conditionalities for estab-
lishing such a form of self-rule, and we can see that from its very invention, 
citizenship was highly exclusive, circumscribed, and disputed. even in this 
early example of democratic rule, we are able to detect the struggles over 
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popular access to the different branches of government. only some 10 to 
20 percent of the population living in attica during the time of athenian 
democracy were citizens, thus highlighting its exclusiveness.
it appears that the division between those with rights and those with 
duties was born with democratic citizenship, and analyzing athenian citi-
zenship as an asset thus provides some insight into its dynamics and the 
ways in which it was lived and experienced. as John Davies (2004) points 
out, athenian citizens were not merely a descent group, but also an interest 
group, because being an athenian citizen came with very tangible privi-
leges. Davies hints at the relationship between the value of citizenship and 
its exclusiveness when he states, “citizenship was a valuable privilege, both 
economically and politically, and became more so as athens’s power grew 
in the fifth century and as the prerequisites of citizenship became more 
valuable, more frequent, and more pervasive: to open citizenship to all who 
wanted it would devalue it unacceptably” (Davies 2004: 25).5
The athenian case thus sets the stage for a drama that unfolds at dif-
ferent stages of human history. We do not know exactly how much of 
the knowledge about athens influenced subsequent acts—but that is not 
important for the purpose of this book. similar to the athenian case, each of 
the cases discussed in this book allows us to see and discuss another aspect of 
democratic citizenship and the limits to the struggle over self-rule, allowing 
us to assemble a puzzle where every piece is different and tells a different 
story; but together they provide a detailed picture of the conditions, limits, 
and inherent contradictions of citizenship.
The strong connection between making rules and living under them 
indeed started to wither once the athenian model was transplanted to 
Rome. The Roman Republic (509– 27 b.c.e.) already represented a form 
of governance that lacked what was at the heart of the athenian system, 
namely, the element of direct citizen rule. Representation came to replace 
the principle of direct self-rule, and it was this already modified version of 
democracy that became the Western democratic model par excellence. This 
being the case, a deeper look at democracy as practiced under the Roman 
Republic is warranted.
The RoMan RepUBlic
from its very inception, the Roman variety of democracy differed signifi-
cantly from the athenian model. Representation combined with pronounced 
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societal inequalities, and no institutions to block the spilling over of these 
inequalities into the public and political realms, produced a system where 
some ruled and others, the majority, were ruled and had no active saying in 
the making of the rules and laws by which they had to live.
Well before the beginnings of the Republic, commonly dated at 
509 b.c.e., Roman society was divided into patricians and plebeians. adcock 
(1969) explains that “The patrician body . . . was united in tradition and 
social consciousness; small as it was, by its military and landowning char-
acter and its clientele it went far to justify the position of privilege which it 
enjoyed” (adcock 1969: 20).
The change from the rule of the people to elite rule through represen-
tation and with elections was, however, not a necessary development, as i 
shall argue here, and not precipitated by increased numbers. Rather it was 
a development actively advanced by those who had much to gain from it: 
Roman elites, especially those represented in the senate.
The Roman Republic was established when the early monarchy was ter-
minated in 509 b.c.e., and it lasted until the year 27 b.c.e., when octavian 
was named augustus and became emperor. Under the Roman Republic, 
sovereignty rested with spqR, “Senatus Populusque Romanus”—the senate 
and people of Rome (shotter 1994: 4). however, the people of Rome were 
highly stratified and divided into several property classes (Vanderbroeck 
1987: 18). according to specialist paul Vanderbroeck, “at the bottom of 
society were the (male) free citizens, who had the right to vote and who 
participated in the popular assemblies. among this group large differences 
could exist.  .  .  . a special phenomenon of Roman society was that freed 
slaves were enfranchised. The relationship between members of the upper 
strata and the lower strata is mostly to be qualified as a patron-client rela-
tion. Vertical ties permeated all status groups and existed in multifarious 
forms” (Vanderbroeck 1987: 20).
Rome had two types of popular assemblies. The centuriate assembly 
was divided into five property classes, which were subdivided into 193 cen-
turies. The comitia centuriata decided on war and peace and elected the 
highest magistrates. The comitia Tribute, in turn, decided on most legisla-
tion, elected the lower magistrates and the tribunes of the plebs, and in 
jurisdiction could serve as a court of appeal. The tribal assembly was divided 
into thirty-five tribes (residential districts), four for the city and thirty-one 
for the countryside. The number of citizens in a century varied. The high-
est census class had seventy centuries, while the unpropertied citizens were 
packed into one century and therefore only had one vote in the centuri-
ate assembly (Vanderbroeck 1987: 17f ). The social Wars of 90– 87 b.c.e. 
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between Rome and its italian allies (the socii) were resolved largely by Rome’s 
extending citizenship to all those south of the river po in 90 b.c.e. a census 
conducted in the year 70 b.c.e. indicates that by then, Roman citizenry had 
reached the number of 910,000 (Millar 1998: 28).
Roman citizenship was thus split into two groups—patricians and 
plebeians. plebeians had access to sovereignty and could be elected to the 
senate, but political office was not remunerated, which made it practically 
impossible for average plebeians to serve. popular sovereignty rested in the 
assemblies—three comitia and the concilium Plebis. however, according to 
shotter, “There was neither freedom of debate nor power of initiating busi-
ness from the floor. The people’s function, in other words, was limited to 
that of voting” (shotter 1994: 5).
The senate, dominated by the rich, exercised broad clientelistic power 
over the common people, and “senatorial endorsement (senatus consultum) 
was considered a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of popular sover-
eignty” (shotter 1994: 5). plebeian citizens had the right to protest senate 
decisions (provocatio) and they could elect their own tribal leaders, called 
tribunes. in the concilium plebis, binding decisions could be made that 
became law once the two consuls, elected from within the senate, agreed. 
however, in the third century b.c. the decisions of the plebeian assembly 
were given the independent force of law (shotter 1994: 7). This strengthen-
ing of popular sovereignty has led one of the foremost scholars of Republican 
Rome, fergus Millar (1998), to conclude that “The populus Romanus was 
not a biological descent group, but a political community defined by rights 
and duties (the latter consisting predominantly of military service in the 
legions), and it was formed above all by the progressive extension of Roman 
citizenship throughout italy, and by the distinctive Roman custom of giving 
citizenship to freed slaves. participation as a citizen was not limited by con-
siderations of wealth or class (though the holding of elective office certainly 
was), but it will have been far more profoundly affected by distance. The 
unaltered convention that the citizen could exercise his rights only in per-
son, by voting in the forum or the campus Martius, gave an overwhelming 
predominance in the politics of the late Republic to those ‘representatives’ 
of the wider populus Romanus who lived in and around the city” (Millar 
1998: 211).
During the early republic, when Rome still had no standing army, 
Roman citizens had the following rights: “in 197 b.c., the ‘right to appeal’ 
was extended to the citizen on campaign, thus freeing him from his com-
mander’s ultimate sanction of summary execution. second, by a law of 177 
b.c., Roman citizens were given a greater proportion of war booty” (shotter 
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1994: 11). overall, however, the scale of participation in the Roman Repub-
lic remained very limited. according to henrik Mouritsen (2001), only a 
few percent could actually attend the meetings and assemblies, and often 
the level of attendance was much lower. as a result, a large majority of the 
population never took part in the political process. for Mouritsen, “The 
Roman system was, in other words, based on the few rather than the many” 
(Mouritsen 2001: 128). The same author finds that the cause for this short-
coming was not distance itself, but rather “the particular position of the 
influence which the system reserved for the elite. The mere existence of a 
permanent body of nobles, who monopolized all political initiative, experi-
ence and authority in the Roman state, would inevitably have threatened 
the powers held by the comitia” (Mouritsen 2001: 129).
Thus, whereas the athenian polis categorically excluded women, slaves, 
and foreigners from being active citizens, during the Roman Republic prop-
erty was the main, even if not the only, criterion for exclusion from the 
political community. furthermore, it was also during the Roman Republic 
that the principle of electing representatives to decide for oneself became the 
dominant practice of democratic rule. according to frank adcock (1969), 
“in terms of political power the closed body of patricians became as it were a 
state within a state, with special rights protected by custom if not conferred 
by statute, and no doubt a strong corporate sense” (adcock 1969: 22).
plebeians, however, had legislative authority in their conciliums, and 
the tribunes elected from these had significant power. They could veto laws, 
elections, and the actions of other magistrates they felt were against the 
interests of the plebs. in the middle of the fifth century, Rome passed a legal 
code that added protection to plebeians. The very same legal code that pro-
tected them by establishing the rule of law also institutionalized the division 
of society by outlawing marriages between patricians and nonpatricians—
although this prohibition was revoked a few years after its passing into law. 
nevertheless, the mere attempt to institutionalize status difference points to 
the importance of this societal division in Rome.
The WaTeRinG DoWn of ciTizenship: 
fRoM ResponsiBiliTies To RiGhTs
John pocock (1995) asks whether exclusion from full citizenship rights 
are “accidental or in some way essential to the ideal of citizenship itself ” 
(pocock 1995: 31). he finds in the redefinition of citizenship under Gaius 
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(130– 180 c.e.) the deciding moment where the character of citizenship 
shifted from being a political concept, as inherited from aristotle, to a 
legal concept. for pocock: “the origins of possessive individualism” (pocock 
1995: 35). pocock explains that in Rome, “citizenship has become a legal 
status, carrying with it rights to certain things—perhaps possessions, per-
haps immunities, perhaps expectations—available in many kinds and 
degrees, available or unavailable to many kinds of persons for many kinds 
of reasons” (pocock 1995: 36). once citizenship was defined in terms 
of legal rights and the protection of one’s property, political rights were 
transformed from the right to decide one’s destiny and the destiny of the 
community in which one lived, to the right to elect representatives, who 
from now on decided for the community.
according to peter Brunt (1971), “in democratic athens, the ordinary 
citizens met frequently in popular assemblies open to all, which decided 
every question of policy and closely supervised the executive officials; each 
citizen counted for one and not more than one. Rome, too, had popular 
assemblies, though they were not based, like the athenian, on the principle 
of equality. . . . only at the very end of the Republic was provision made for 
70,000 to vote together, about 6 percent of the total citizen body” (Brunt 
1971: 8). Brunt further argues that “The Romans themselves contrasted 
favorably their liberality in granting citizenship with the exclusiveness of 
athens. it is perfectly true that their liberality gradually did much to win 
the loyalty of subjects first in italy and later, from caesar’s time, in the prov-
inces. This policy could only have succeeded because the Roman system was 
undemocratic” (Brunt 1971: 9).
in other words, had Roman citizenship meant more and provided 
more rights and entitlements, access would have been far more restrictive. 
although sovereignty ultimately belonged to the people—as the people 
elected magistrates, declared war, made treaties, and passed laws—the peo-
ple could “meet only on the summons of one of the higher magistrates, vote 
only on the proposals he chose to submit, select candidates from a list he set 
before it, and say only ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ to a law he proposed; it might contain 
hundreds of clauses, but no amendment was possible” (Brunt 1971: 46). 
Brunt also explains that “The assemblies of the people were also far from 
democratic. a majority was obtained not by counting heads but by count-
ing units. . . . citizens who had virtually no property, the proletarii, formed 
only a single century, which voted last, if at all” (Brunt 1971: 46).
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The leGalizaTion of ciTizenship
in 451– 450 b.c.e., Roman law was first codified. The codification of rights 
had an unintended side effect, changing the very character of citizenship. 
instead of being associated with the ability, and indeed responsibility, to 
participate in the making of rules, citizenship now became associated with 
a set of codified rights and protections. access to this system, however, was 
complicated and demanded prerequisites. legal procedure was a secret of 
the pontiffs, and a litigant could be nonsuited for using a single wrong word 
in a formula (Brunt 1971: 54). This development is highly relevant to the 
argument of this book, as it not only signals the beginning of the separation 
of the state from society—which then triggered the codification of rights 
and protections from the state—but also signals the depoliticization of the 
life of citizens, which thus opened the door for their separation and alien-
ation from politics, government, and the state.
John pocock (1995) has focused his attention on the Roman lawyer 
Gaius (130– 180 c.e.) as one of the main agents in this process of legal-
izing the political—but we must suppose that this process started much 
earlier, namely, when Roman law started to be codified. i thus follow 
pocock’s logic, without necessarily following his timeline. pocock explains 
that Gaius was instrumental in shifting the meaning of “citizen” from a 
political being to a legal being. according to pocock, after Gaius, citizens 
defined themselves vis-à-vis their possessions, and they carried these defi-
nitions into the public realm. for pocock, this represented “the origins of 
possessive individualism” (pocock 1995: 35). pocock further explains that 
in Rome, “citizenship has become a legal status, carrying with it rights 
to certain things—perhaps possessions, perhaps immunities, perhaps 
expectations—available in many kinds and degrees, available or unavail-
able to many kinds of persons for many kinds of reasons” (pocock 1995: 
36). What emerged was, in pocock’s words, a “homo legalis”—that is, 
no longer a political man, actively involved in making the rules of his or 
her community, but instead a person subject to the rule of law, where the 
law was not of his or her own making. This change indeed profoundly 
altered what it meant to be a citizen. instead of being part of the state and 
the authority, Roman citizens, especially the less fortunate ones, had to 
live under a system not of their own making and needed to address any 
wrongdoings against them to the judicial assembly, instead of addressing 
them in the legislative assembly, to which they no longer had access. at 
the same time, as pocock also demonstrates, property and the right to 
property became a legal condition for citizenship, which resulted in the 
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characterization of groups that owned no property as “savages,” who were 
then placed outside of citizenship.
lessons fRoM RoMe
Romans extended citizenship to a far larger group of people—after conquer-
ing them. in doing so, they secured their allegiance. however, extending 
citizenship rights to so many triggered a countermovement that had two 
related dynamics: first, it led to the establishment of a political class of rich 
and powerful citizens who became first-class citizens, and degraded ordi-
nary citizens to a second-class status; secondly, a system of representation 
was established so that the first class of citizens made decisions for and no 
longer with all the people who lived under the jurisdiction of the laws they 
passed. Democratic elite rule was thus established, and the true seed of 
democracy—namely, self-rule—was killed. The motivation to concentrate 
political power in the hands of the few was not triggered by larger numbers 
of citizens per se, but by the will of those who had privileged access to the 
spheres of power to preserve their advantages, as Mouritsen (2001) seems 
to think and as the violent reactions by elite senators against the demo-
cratic reforms proposed by the Gracchi brothers further demonstrate. in 
133 b.c.e., when Tiberius Gracchus proposed land reform and an extension 
of Roman citizenship to latin allies directly to the popular assembly, thus 
sidestepping the senate, he was clubbed to death by Roman senators (stock-
ton 1979, syme 1956, scullard 1982).
This movement away from self-rule, which makes sense if analyzed under 
the prism of citizenship as an asset, was further strengthened, it appears, 
by the codification of laws and the transformation of political citizenship 
into legal citizenship that this process automatically produced. even though 
pocock (1995) focuses on a time when the Roman Republic had already 
given way to empire, his analysis still proves insightful in that it highlights 
the change of character that such a process potentially entails. as a result 
of the codification of law, political aspects of citizenship were transformed 
into legal ones. Because the channels for self-rule and direct participation 
were restricted, the legalization of politics finally closed off the realm of 
politics to ordinary citizens. from now on (even though we do not know 
with certainty when this now exactly was), the majority of Roman citizens 
became bystanders and audiences of the political life exercised by the few in 
their name and, supposedly, on their behalf. Democracy as self-rule and as 
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a way to live with, maybe even within, politics had given way to a system of 
representation by political elites, who were, at the same time, the social and 
economic elites of the society they controlled.
conclUsion
societal inequalities present a formidable obstacle to democratic self-rule. if 
societies are deeply divided, and if some of its members are not recognized 
as full members, democracy runs the risk of producing a concentration of 
power in the hands of what we might call a “structural minority”—that 
is, in the hands of one class of people. This risk becomes an even further 
threat when democracy is exercised merely in the form of representation, as 
representation automatically implies not only that some people will decide 
for others, but also that some people remain outside of, and are potentially 
alienated from, the political process. Under conditions of extreme and nor-
malized inequality—that is, where some people are perceived as “natural 
leaders,” “superior,” or a “political class”—there is great risk that democracy 
decays into elite rule, where the rulers dominate public and political affairs 
and serve their own interests. The more general problem out of which this 
phenomenon emerges is that societal inequalities have the proclivity to spill 
over and contaminate the political process of a democracy.
one way to confront this risk is by targeting societal inequalities. Marx-
ist approaches confront societal inequalities in order to achieve political 
equality. The cost of this strategy has become apparent in all those countries 
where the state started to regulate and control private affairs for the sake of 
the common good. at this stage in time, it is fairly safe to say that this strat-
egy has failed, because the price we have to pay for achieving societal equality 
is too high. even the less radical social-democratic welfare approaches that 
characterize most advanced capitalist systems aim at ameliorating economic 
inequalities in order to achieve some degree of distributional justice. how-
ever, these, too, do not successfully address political equality, as even after 
these measures are taken, the remaining inequalities tend to spill over into 
the political realm. furthermore, any measure aimed at economic redistri-
bution necessarily creates a conflict between collective, distributional justice 
and individual justice (Rawls 1999). furthermore, economic redistribution 
creates economic disincentives, which create not only economic problems, 
but political ones as well.
however, the severest shortcoming of economic strategies is that they 
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do nothing to address the political inequalities that characterize all con-
temporary democracies. if political equality of voice and citizenship is 
our aim, then our strategy must focus on those—and not on economic 
inequalities, as it is utopian to the extreme (and undesirable indeed) 
to think that we will one day achieve total economic equality. even if 
we could, there is no guarantee that out of economic equality political 
inequality would result.
cleisthenes approached this problem from an altogether different angle, 
one that was more strictly political. cleisthenes recognized that Greek society 
was economically divided and hierarchically structured. instead of seeking 
to fight inequality in society, cleisthenes sought to first devise institutions 
that cut across the ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic bonds that struc-
tured Greek society, and second to design institutions that blocked a spilling 
over of societal inequalities into the political realm. By designing collective 
decision-making institutions that overlapped and cut across existing soci-
etal cleavages, he designed a system where people of different backgrounds 
had to come together and make collective decisions. combined with the 
older practice of assigning public offices by lot, the ancient Greek model of 
democracy not only broke down the distinction between rulers and ruled, 
it also sought to ensure that societal cleavages and associations would not 
lead to the consolidation of a ruling class. concretely, according to Jones 
(1999), “The new phylai, trittyes, and demes, but especially the demes, it 
is argued, were set up as rivals to an already existing network of regionally 
based aristocratic cultic associations. The democratic units were meant to 
bypass, divide, duplicate, or otherwise neutralize their aristocratic predeces-
sors” (Jones 1999: 55; also finley 1962: 4, 16).6
Democracy and citizenship thus started strong in athens—and because 
it was so strong and meant so much, it was highly restrictive and exclusion-
ary. only a minority could enjoy the rights that came with it. it is also clear 
that the rights and entitlements of being an athenian citizen were consider-
able and thus coveted. however, inseparably linked to the rights of being 
an athenian citizen came considerable responsibilities. one was busy as a 
citizen, and citizens could not escape the duties their status demanded, as 
many offices were drawn by lot. alienation from politics, under such cir-
cumstances, was virtually impossible. The people were the government and 
the people were the state. There was no “us” versus “them”—at least not in 
the political realm. There was, however, great societal inequality and vast 
inequalities of wealth. instead of seeking to undo those, which would have 
required invading the private sphere of the household, such politicians as 
solon, cleisthenes, and ephialtes rather sought to address them in a strictly 
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political way: by devising institutions that aimed at neutralizing societal 
inequalities in the sphere of politics.
The guiding principle for all three athenian statesmen analyzed here 
was that of justice. The core principle here was that of mixing. Mixing 
meant forcing the rich to share political associations with the poor. This 
was accompanied by splitting: splitting up family clans so that civic bonds 
could replace family bonds—and one can easily extend this logic and apply 
it to clan, descent, “blood,” or ethnic bonds. Democracy, to these reformers, 
then meant that the people ruled on an equal basis, and that no other bonds 
interfered or even replaced the bond that connected them to the polis, that 
is, the other citizens.
This provides the first important lesson we can learn from classical ath-
ens, something that the contemporary french philosopher Jacques Rancière 
(2004 and 2007) has also alerted us to more recently, namely, the clear sepa-
ration of the social from the political realm. according to this logic, most 
problems are of a social nature, but the political is the realm where these 
social problems can and should be addressed. There are indeed few purely 
political problems, and most of them are not that serious. problems of social 
inequality, however, tend to be very consequential politically.
clearly, we have moved far away from these principles. While the left 
has sought to undo social inequalities, thus violating people’s individual 
rights and invading their private spheres, the Right has let go of any attempt 
to achieve civic bonds altogether.
athens also provides important insights into the apparently inherent trad-
eoff between the quality of rights and the exclusivity of access to them. The 
more athenian citizenship ensured tangible benefits, the more restrictive it 
became—a phenomenon that was worsened by the economic scarcity caused 
by defeat in the peloponnesian War in 413 b.c.e. This confirms that thinking 
of citizenship as an asset allows for discerning new aspects of its regime.
The other important lesson from classical times comes from Rome. 
it appears that when extending citizenship to the many, powerful elites 
sought, and were able, to secure their own privileged access to the politi-
cal system by introducing the idea of representation, and by legalizing 
citizenship rights. living in the Roman Republic no longer meant ruling 
oneself. it meant having certain rights—and more of them if one was rich 
and powerful, as access to the legal system was complicated and dependent 
upon one’s ability to hire the assistance of legal specialists who domi-
nated the very formalistic language of the codes, as well as the forms and 
protocols that had to be followed in order to address the courts. This 
shift towards the codification of laws must be seen as the end of political 
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citizenship. people no longer ruled themselves, and a distance separated 
them from the government, the state, and politics. This is also the begin-
ning of even the possibility of feeling and effectively being alienated from 
politics, government, and the state.
it is this version of democracy and citizenship we have inherited and 
still practice today. The very few attempts at establishing something more 
direct have always been deemed radical and been quickly subdued. and 
radical it was, considering that in the Roman Republic we can also witness 
a very familiar phenomenon indeed: the rule of the rich. starting in Rome, 
the rich ruled and did what they thought, and indeed knew, was best for 
the state, the country, or later the empire. and as they were the state, the 
country, and the empire, they did what was best for them.
athens and Rome thus set the tone for how democracy and citizenship 
developed in the years, decades, and centuries to follow, and the param-
eters for the struggle over power, influence, control, rule, and exclusion were 
already set.
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Chapter 4
Medieval european citizenship
Christian Rights and Jewish Duties
Without neglecting the fantastically rich and polyphonic complexity of the 
historical universe unfolding in Western Europe from the 12th century 
onwards, the most appropriate way to grasp its specificity is to relate it to 
the signification and the project of (social and individual) autonomy. The 
emergence of this project marks the break with the “true” Middle Ages.
—coRneliUs casToRiaDis, “The ReTReaT 
fRoM aUTonoMy: posT-MoDeRnisM as 
GeneRaliseD confoRMisM,” 2001
it would certainly be wrong to say that democracy suc-
cumbed after the collapse of the Roman Republic. The problem is rather 
one of historical sources—and the lack thereof. Democratic experiments 
in africa, asia, the Middle east, or the pacific region are simply not as well 
documented to base an analysis of the dialectics of citizenship on them.1 
The history of medieval european city-states, however, provides a rich case 
of analysis within the context of this book, as it allows for a highlighting of 
the advances of democratic self-rule on one side, and the contrasting exclu-
sion from these city-states on the other.
following the logic and rationale established earlier, which is not to com-
pare cases, but rather to explore each one separately for salient characteristics, 
this chapter takes a closer look at the developments in Western europe after 
the decline of the Roman empire in the West in the sixth century c.e. Thus, 
whereas the previous chapter focused strongly on the included and what 
citizenship meant to them, this chapter takes a closer look at the excluded, 
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how their exclusion was constructed and justified, and what their exclusion 
meant to them and to the democracies that practiced and enforced it.
of special interest is the situation of the excluded group par excellence 
during this time period: Jews. The first focus in this chapter thus consists 
of an analysis of the relationship between christian rights and Jewish duties 
and exclusion. The second interest pursued in this chapter is the analysis 
of the internal dynamics of the emerging, mostly florentine, democratic 
republics, as they provide an example for a renewed attempt at self-rule and 
the pursuit of autonomy (castoriadis 2001). This focus also allows me to 
continue the theme of a critique of the Western tradition.
in the West, with the decline of the Roman empire came a decline of 
democratic principles and institutions, and feudalism dominated the politi-
cal landscape. Roman catholic religion became the universal eschatological 
principle, and around it, the Roman catholic church constructed a Mani-
chean world of good and evil; believers and heathens; christians, Jews, and 
saracens; pious religious followers and rebellious witches. it was only when 
the Reformation started driving a wedge into the solid power of the catholic 
church, thus considerably weakening it, that democracy again found some 
space to expand, giving gradual rise to modern democracies and their domi-
nant manifestation in nation-states (zakaria 2003). Before that, democracy 
and citizenship were practiced only on a very small scale for a very limited 
period of time—for example, in a number of relatively small city republics 
in northern italy, emerging around the late tenth century.
The scarcity of sources and the scantiness of our knowledge about what 
citizenship meant concretely during the long stretch of time from 44 b.c.e., 
when Julius caesar effectively ended the Roman Republic and made him-
self dictator, to the late eighteenth century, when the american, french, 
and haitian revolutions brought citizenship and democracy back to the 
european map, allows for only a very sketchy depiction of the dialectics of 
citizenship.
chRisTian RiGhTs, JeWish DUTies
according to leonard Glick (1999), during the eleventh century the 
development in europe was marked by a double movement: as christians 
prospered, Jews slid into a precarious situation. To some analysts, animosity 
and mutual hatred was such an integral part of medieval life that they called 
it a “structural fact of social and legal existence” (Bossy 1998: 54). indeed, 
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exclusion of such “others” as Jews was functional in strengthening the bond 
that united all those coming together to form communities during medieval 
times (smail 2001: 94).
The question i seek to explore here is what were the causal relations that 
linked christian prosperity and expanding citizenship to Jewish exclusion. 
according to Glick (1999), “for christians the changes were in the form 
of remarkable social and economic advancement, while for Jews precisely 
the opposite was true. in other words, just as life began to improve for 
christians, it began to worsen for Jews” (Glick 1999: 77). This chapter 
argues that the growth of christian prosperity, which in part rested on the 
acquisition of civil and political rights in emerging free cities, was indeed 
causally connected to the decline of Jewish prosperity that occurred at the 
same time.
Under the title “laws and legal status,” Glick (1999) discusses the restric-
tions imposed on Jews in the kingdoms and states emerging at the fringes of 
the decaying Roman empire. Jews had lived in the lands that came under 
frankish, that is, Merovingian rule before catholicism became dominant in 
the Roman empire (after the conversion of emperor constantine in 336) and 
before clovis, the Merovingian king of the franks who followed the Roman 
model in 500.
Under Roman law, since constantine had granted freedom of religion 
in 313, Jews were granted the freedom to practice their religion. however, 
by the end of the fourth century, when catholicism became the official 
religion of the Roman empire, the situation of the Jews, together with that 
of other religious minorities, changed. now, special provisions had to be 
enacted to regulate the treatment of these groups. in 388, Roman law pro-
hibited intermarriage between Jews and christians. in 423, it outlawed the 
ownership of christian slaves by Jews. frankish law followed suit, outlaw-
ing christian-Jewish intermarriage in 533 (Glick 1999: 34f ). according 
to Bachrach (1977), the growing number of restrictions against Jews that 
occurred towards the end of the Roman empire is due to the fact that Jews 
“grew in power and prestige” during the sixth century (Bachrach 1977: 64).
in 582, chilperic, then king of the franks and heir to the Merovingian 
throne, ordered all Jews of the kingdom to be baptized (Glick 1999: 37). 
although this campaign was not entirely successful, it forced Jews to hide or 
move, and the baptism campaigns continued (at least up to the last of the 
Merovingians, Dagobert, in 629).
The beginning of the first crusade abounds with stories of massacres 
of entire Jewish communities—for example, those living in the cities of 
speyer, Worms, Mainz, and cologne, all of which happened in the year 
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1096—all conducted by crusaders under the command of count emicho, 
described as “a minor landholder in Upper loraine” and “a man of very ill 
repute on account of his tyrannical mode of life” (Glick 1999: 95). emicho’s 
band never made it to Jerusalem, and most were killed in hungary, on their 
way east. The christian chronicler albert of aix provided this comment 
about emicho: “so the hand of the lord is believed to have been against the 
pilgrims, who had sinned by excessive impurity and fornication, and who 
had slaughtered the exile Jews through greed of money, rather than for the 
sake of God’s justice, although the Jews were opposed to christ” (quoted in 
Glick 1999: 102).
as this comment amply demonstrates, the religious fervor sparked by 
the call for a holy war, uttered by pope Urban ii in november 1095 in 
clermont, france, offered many opportunities to become rich by stealing 
money from Jews. While some christians resorted to simply killing Jews in 
order to take their money and property, others—mostly those in situations 
of power, such as bishops, priests, and lords—used the occasion to ask the 
Jews for ransoms in order to protect them from the incited mobs. one way 
or another, Jewish wealth thus passed into christian hands, and in most 
cases, the paying of fees and giving of gifts to which the Jews resorted in 
order to save their lives did not prevent their eventual killing by the crusad-
ers and all those inspired by their example.
During the twelfth century in general, “as christians progressed and 
prospered, Jews became pariahs” (Glick 1999: 115). Glick argues that 
this was particularly the case for Jewish political rights. Whereas euro-
pean christians were able to carve out more political and civil rights for 
themselves (although still of limited nature), the advance was negotiated by 
pushing the Jews among them into a status of dependence—a dependence 
that was used to extract money from them in return for protection and tute-
lage. for Glick, “The clearest evidence for this trend was in their changing 
political rights. The charters that had been issued to Jews earlier—louis’s 
ninth century charters to individual Jewish merchants, for example, or the 
speyer charter of 1084 to an entire community—had one thing in com-
mon: The Jews were assumed to be independent persons, free to decide 
where they lived and on what terms. But now they were becoming depen-
dent; they were assumed to be helpless, in need of protection and obliged 
to please their protectors” (Glick 1999: 115).
By declaring the Jews in need of protection, the christian kings and 
dukes who passed such measures relegated them to a second-class citizenship 
status—a status they shared with women and children. it was also during 
this time that Jewish business activity was by decree restricted to money 
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lending, which thus created a situation of even higher risk: confined to lend-
ing money and dependent on the protection of their overlords, Jews needed 
to pay for their safety and were always at risk of falling victim to pogroms 
whenever their payment was not enough and their overlords thought that 
more money could be gained by simply taking it from them. on top of that, 
Jews were now constantly at risk of being accused of usury. as christian 
rights progressed, Jewish rights became more and more restricted.
fRee ciTy RepUBlics
citizenship is invariably linked to the development of cities. This was the 
case with classical citizenship as practiced in athens and Rome, and it was 
again the case in post-imperial europe, once the unifying institutions of the 
Roman empire had faded (holston and appardurai 1996). once more, out 
of the political power vacuum created by absent or distant overlords, peo-
ple sharing a location started to press for political autonomy and self-rule, 
thus opposing the claims of feudal lords for authority over land and people. 
however, much as was the case in athens and Rome, the reemerging citi-
zenship of early medieval europe was heavily circumscribed and exclusive; 
after all, and following the theoretical approach developed earlier, citizen-
ship was, and continues to be, a highly disputed good, precisely because it 
provided those able to claim it with privileges and special rights. however, 
according to the classic study by Bella Duffy in 1892, these emerging com-
munes “were not, as at one time believed, the lineal descendants of the 
Roman municipalities” (Duffy 2011: 1). instead, something qualitatively 
new emerged in medieval europe.
city republics emerged from the power vacuum left by the crumbling 
carolingian empire, towards the end of the ninth century. into this vacuum, 
catholic church officials stepped, ordering not just religious life, but com-
mercial, military, and civic as well. however, not everybody was happy with 
the rule of kings and bishops. according to Daniel Waley and Trevor Dean 
(2010), there were three causes that led to the emergence of city republics in 
northern italy, where this phenomenon took root the most. first, emperors 
were too distant and unable to provide the kind of governance that some 
thriving commercial centers needed. second, the secular power of bishops 
was challenged from within by the ecclesiastical reform movement, which 
demanded a retreat of the church to things religious. finally, as transregional 
trade expanded, different people from different places started coming, and 
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settling, in such emerging commercial centers as Milan or siena. These new-
comers did not readily accept the authority of the bishop and oftentimes 
rebelled against it.
indeed, the development of city communes was intimately linked to 
trade. according to Max Weber (1968),“The circumstance that the city was 
a market with relatively permanent opportunities to earn money through 
commerce or the trades induced many lords to exploit their slaves and serfs 
not as workers in their own houses or enterprises but as sources of annuities; 
they trained them to be artisans or small merchants and permitted them to 
pursue their livelihood in the city in return for the payment of a body rent 
(Leibzins); at times (as in antiquity) they also equipped them with working 
capital” (Weber 1968: 1238).
Trade, as stated above, brought newcomers to town, and among those 
newcomers were also traders from further away. To the south, once the 
saracens had conquered southern italy in 823, Muslim traders introduced 
new products and offered new outlets—including slaves (Duffy 2011: 8). 
among the new traders were also Jews, who were especially active and pres-
ent in coastal towns. as a result, the free towns constituted themselves in 
the north of italy as communities of faith (Weber 1968), and they also 
emerged as homogeneous communities against an increased populational 
heterogeneity.
The communes that emerged slowly wrested power from kings and bish-
ops, via concessions. such was the case, for example, with lucca, which 
secured a concession from henry iV in 1081 not to build castles within 
six miles of the city, and no building within its city limits. “henry also 
renounced jurisdiction within the city of pisa and promised to name no new 
marquis in Tuscany without the consent of the pisans” (Waley and Dean 
2010: 9f ). apparently, such concessions were preferable to the violent upris-
ings that some cities had organized when their claims were denied. To Waley 
and Dean (2010), “communes filled these gaps, providing effective connec-
tions between political power and local elites” (Waley and Dean 2010: 10).
The ways other communes emerged in this region are very similar. “first, 
we have the Marquis, or his representative the viscount, of Teutonic origin, 
presiding in the courts, surrounded by his Scabini, or judges, who, although 
in one sense imperial officers, seem nevertheless to have been chosen usu-
ally from among the inhabitants of each town and territory, and not to have 
travelled about in the suite of the overlord” (Duffy 2011: 3). according to 
Duffy, these relatively independent Scabini gave the starting impulse for 
further independence.
Duffy also highlights the fact that such a development occurred 
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in northern italy precisely because the bishop was less influential than 
elsewhere—and the German overlord, in the figure of the marquis, was 
relatively distant. What emerged in Tuscany, as a result, typically was a 
relatively small commune of free citizens, who regularly met in a popular 
assembly and, so assembled, elected “twelve principal citizens, who are vari-
ously distinguished as Buoni uomini, Sapientes, or Majores. Thirty years or 
so later, these Buoni uomini are fewer in number, and have received the 
title of consuls” (Duffy 2011: 6).
once these communities had reached maturity, the people of the lower 
classes were able to challenge the dominance of the richer merchants and 
craftsmen, especially by creating powerful guilds. social parties and associa-
tions also started to emerge. in fourteenth-century florence, for example, 
social parties formed around income and social standing, thus constituting 
a party of the upper-middle class (Grassi), one of the middle class (Medi-
ani), and one of the lower class (Minuti). high-ranking officials were now 
elected from those three. according to Duffy (2011), “in little more than 
one year florence had undergone four changes of government, the final 
result of which was to strengthen the power of the two lower classes at the 
expense of those rich and powerful members of the community who, when-
ever the grandi succumbed, had remained the dominant faction” (Duffy 
2011: 162f ).
indeed, in the first half of the fourteenth century, florence’s rich and 
powerful citizens lost so much influence in the administration and man-
agement of city affairs that many withdrew to the countryside out of 
frustration. however, this rise of the lower guilds was soon met by con-
certed efforts of the higher guilds, who sought to control the power of the 
lower classes by establishing an oligarchy. according to Duffy (2011), “in 
1371, the supremacy, thus obtained, of the Ricci and albizzi, was felt to 
be so intolerable that the people named a commission, or Balia of fifty-six 
members, for the express purpose of excluding those two families entirely 
from office” (Duffy 2011: 174). continued discontent among the people 
of florence finally led to a violent popular uprising, in June 1378, through 
which the lower classes of florence secured their influence in city politics. 
Their influence lasted until 1433, when cosimo de’ Medici’s tyranny finally 
ended the communal republic of florence. Towards the end of the fifteenth 
century, all of the citizen republics of northern italy finally succumbed to 
the competing influences of pope francesco della Rovere, sixtus iV, and 
lorenzo de Medici, the Magnificent (Duffy 2011: 298f ).
according to Max Weber (1968), “To develop into a city-commune, a 
settlement had to be of the nonagricultural-commercial type, at least to a 
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relative extent, and to be equipped with the following features: 1. a fortifica-
tion; 2. a market; 3. its own court of law and, at least in part, autonomous law; 
4. an associational structure (Verbandscharakter) and, connected therewith, 5. 
at least partial autonomy and autocephaly, which includes administration by 
authorities in whose appointment the burghers could in some form partici-
pate” (Weber 1968: 1226).
one of the core features of these free cities was their relatively small 
size. Very few had more than 20,000 inhabitants. This small size was also 
grounded in the conviction that for a community to work, its members had 
to know and be able to discuss daily affairs with each other. Just like plato 
and aristotle, medieval city leaders thought that 100,000 inhabitants was 
the upper limit of viability for a republic (Waley and Dean 2010: xxi).
Weber also explains the principle of “stadtluft macht frei”—“city 
air makes free,” because the economic opportunity that cities offered 
allowed many to purchase their freedom from slavery or serfdom and 
join the commune of free citizens (Weber 1968: 1238). indeed, accord-
ing to Weber, “The urban citizenry therefore usurped the right to dissolve 
the bonds of seigniorial domination; this was the great—in fact, the 
revolutionary—innovation which differentiated the medieval occidental 
cities from all others. in the central and northern european cities appeared 
the well-known principle that Stadtluft macht frei, which meant that after 
a varying but always relatively short time the master of a slave or serf lost 
their right to reclaim him” (Weber 1968: 1239).
in most cases, the time it took to actually become a free member of 
the city commune was not so short—typically one year and one day, but 
sometimes much longer than that—and it was also bound to a series of con-
ditions, such as buying a house and thus becoming a resident and being able 
to pay a minimum amount of taxes. it was also conditional upon a whole 
list of duties and responsibilities. still, free city communes offered a way to 
escape the rule of the feudal lord and to become a free citizen.
in fact, citizenship in the early italian city republics implied more duties 
than rights—and it was not enough to be a formal citizen in order to be 
eligible for administrative office (Waley and Dean 2010: 62). The require-
ments and duties of citizenship included loyalty to the commune, obeying 
its laws and officers, performing military service, attending meetings, paying 
taxes, and others. citizens in these city republics were required to regularly 
participate in the great assemblies, called arengos, which met regularly to 
decide major collective matters. The size of such arengos varied from some 
two hundred up to four thousand (Waley and Dean, 2010: 36).
in addition, citizenship meant active office in one of the many civic and 
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military organizations responsible for conducting and regulating city life. 
Waley and Dean (2010) stipulate that similar to the athenian democracy, 
in the medieval north italian city republics, about one third of citizens held 
office every year (Waley and Dean 2010: 65f ).
in most cases, citizenship also required owning a house in the city. such 
was the case, for example, in parma and pisa. in pisa, effective residence 
of at least nine months of the year was another condition for citizenship. 
according to Waley and Dean (2010),
pisa also demanded a birth qualification (the citizen or his father had to be born 
within the city or contado) and a period of residence, originally twenty-five 
or twenty years, though later this was reduced to ten and even three (1319). 
(Waley and Dean, 2000: 63)
furthermore, in most cases, citizenship required a certain income and 
excluded certain groups due to their lack of ability to pay taxes, or lack of 
regular residence (such as sailors, agricultural laborers, landless men, and 
herdsmen). in florence, for example, participation in the general assembly, 
which constituted a parliament, excluded “the working classes and lower 
orders or plebs as well as the inhabitants of the contado [municipality]” 
(Duffy 2011: 56) during the twelfth century. The exclusion of women, serfs, 
Jews, Muslims, and slaves in the twelfth century was perceived as so “natu-
ral” that it went without mentioning.
citizens, in the city republics we are looking at, tended to be inter-
nally divided into at least two main factions, namely, nobles and populari 
(Waley and Dean 2010: 128). nobles were those landholding aristocrats 
and knights who were actively present and engaged in city business. nobles, 
in many italian republics, had their own association, the societas militum, or 
association of knights, and the cities relied on the knights, particularly at the 
beginning of these communes, for protection. These knightly associations 
existed alongside—and often in opposition to—the ones of the common-
ers, called societas populi. Blanshei (1976) has shown that in the commune 
of perugia, most internal conflict was rooted in the attempts of traditional 
families to defend their inherited privileges against the newcomers who 
sought to ascend politically, after having already ascended economically. for 
Blanshei, conflict arose when reform programs, aimed at integrating these 
newcomers, “conflicted with the older established families’ privileges and 
immunities” (Blanshei 1976: 11).
The nobles residing in the city, together with their allies who controlled 
the country, were able to take control over all italian city republics during 
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the fourteenth century, thus effectively ending the republican experiments 
in this region and substituting them with feudalism.
furthermore, and paralleling the general pattern of christian ascent 
bought with Jewish oppression, free cities were first and foremost religious 
communities that relied on sharing worship as a central means of strength-
ening and renewing the horizontal bonds that united all citizens against 
aristocratic owners of lands and peasants. according to Weber, “The fully 
developed ancient and medieval city was above all constituted, or at least 
interpreted, as a fraternal association, as a rule equipped with a correspond-
ing religious symbol for the associational cult of the burghers: a city-god 
or city-saint to whom only the burghers had access” (Weber 1968: 1241). 
Typically, Jews were thus not allowed to become members and citizens of 
the commune. as in the case of Venice, they were indeed only permitted 
to settle within the city limits once the republic had fallen, in 1509 (finlay 
1982: 140).
in antiquity,
membership in one of these associations remained the distinguishing mark of 
the citizen with full rights, entitled to participation in the religious cult and 
qualified for all offices which required communication with the gods (in Rome: 
participation in the auspicial). it was the need to qualify for participation in the 
religious rites which made such membership indispensable, for an association 
with claims to legitimacy could rest only on the basis of the traditional, ritually 
oriented organizational forms such as the clan, the military association (phra-
trie), and the political tribal association (phyle), or at least had to create such 
a basis by fiction. all this was quite different in the medieval “founded” cities, 
particularly in the north. here, at least in a new foundation, the burgher joined 
the citizenry as an individual, and as an individual he swore the oath of citizen-
ship. his personal membership in the local association of the city guaranteed 
his legal status as a burgher, not his tribe of sib. (Weber 1968: 1246)
Jews, thus, could not be full members and were relegated to the status of 
guests. as Weber explains, “The ritual exclusion of connubium—otherwise 
foreign to the occident—and the actual impediments to table community 
between Jews and non-Jews, but above all the absence of a common share 
in the ritual of the lord’s supper, effectively prevented fraternization. The 
medieval city, after all, was still a cultic association.  .  .  . The Jews, there-
fore, remained from the beginning outside the burgher association” (Weber 
1968: 1246f ).
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fRoM ciTy sTaTes To feUDal sTaTes anD eMpiRes
During the fifteenth century, european city-states fell prey to imperial expan-
sion, and most were defeated and integrated into the emerging empires. 
however, not all of them vanished. as late as in the seventeenth century,
there were some 4000 of what Mack Walker has called the German “home towns,” 
most of them with between 750 and 10,000 inhabitants. altogether, these towns 
housed a quarter of the entire German population. Thus, the history of one Ger-
man in four in the seventeenth century is not that of the major territorial states, 
but that of freudenstadt, nordlingen, esslingen, Braunschweig, hildesheim, 
Bamberg, eichstatt, Würzburg, Tübingen or a host of others. in towns such as 
these, guilds and craft organizations remained the basis of social and economic 
life. Nahrung—social justice, or more specifically the protection of a just standard 
of living through economic self-sufficiency—remained the ideal of such organiza-
tions. (Mackenney 1989: 37)
prime examples of cities that maintained political autonomy also include 
london, leiden, hamburg, and frankfurt. city-states thus survived in 
europe, even though democratic city-states were rare and their degree of 
“democraticness” limited. Guilds played an ambivalent role in this regard: 
on one hand they were the powerful organizations representing the interests 
of the burghers, that is, of craftsmen and traders—against feudal lords and 
the church. at the same time, however, “the guilds opposed any attempt to 
ease the entry of members of the minority groups into the ranks of citizens, 
which meant that the limited civil liberties of immigrants were never trans-
lated into political freedoms” (Mackenney 1989: 37). and even though in 
some places the power of guilds was broken, as in frankfurt, where all guilds 
were abolished after the artisan uprising of 1612– 16, “the crafts retained 
immense influence” (Mackenney 1989: 38). Medieval guilds thus exem-
plify the dialectical dynamics between wresting rights away from overlords 
and replacing them with horizontal bonds among common citizens, only 
to replace such a regime of vertical dependence with one that is even more 
exclusionary. once a community of equals is established, membership to 
this community becomes a matter of extreme dispute and circumscription.
Just as in earlier times, Jews, made to reside outside of christian communes 
and relegated to do the one trade that christian observance forbade—money 
lending with interest (that is, usury)—remained outsiders. christian citizens 
wanted their money and relied on their international connections—the fruit 
of age-old persecution and the resultant dispersion—but did not grant them 
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equal status. The same remained true for women, the poor, the landless, and 
all those not owning their own homes. Thus, not much had changed since 
athens and Rome, where the luxury of citizenship was equally bought with 
the free labor of slaves, women, serfs, and foreigners. The situation of euro-
pean Jews thus provides but one example of a more pervasive phenomenon. 
it is, however, a very telling example, and the history of Jewish pogroms and 
gzeirots are indeed too numerous to count. in this respect, austria-hungary 
is a particularly telling case, due to its significant Jewish population. in 
1744, for example, Maria Theresa, monarch of austria, ordered a gzeirot, 
the “total and immediate expulsion of the distinguished and long-settled 
Jewish community of prague. it was to be carried out almost immediately. 
it was to be followed in short order by the expulsion of all Jews from all of 
Bohemia and Moravia” (Vital 1999: 1).
although the Jewish community of prague was able to avoid expulsion 
in 1744 by paying lots of money, the history of Jews in europe is full of 
similar episodes—and so is the expectation that Jews needed to pay dearly 
for their survival, peace, or to remain in a given city, county, or land. at one 
point or another, Jews were expelled, be it from emerging medieval city-
states or from the emerging nation-states of england (1290), france (1306), 
Germany (1348), lithuania (1445), spain (1492), and portugal (1497).
according to Vital (1999), “Underlying everything was the central fact 
that under the old regime no Jew was, or could be, a member of (civil) soci-
ety. no matter how learned or wealthy or contingently influential he might 
be within or without Jewry itself, a Jew was held to belong to a moral and, 
of course, theological category inferior to that of the meanest peasant” (Vital 
1999: 6).
even though in 1782, Joseph ii, emperor of austria, passed a patent 
of tolerance (Toleranzpatent) and thus lifted many of the professional and 
social restrictions his mother had imposed on the life of Jews, none of these 
concessions came with citizenship. Vital (1999) explains that “The emper-
or’s rescript specifically laid down that the right of admission to certain 
occupations and institutions did not carry with it the right of citizenship 
and craft mastership. from these the Jews ‘remained excluded’ [wovon sie 
ausgeschlossen bleiben]” (Vital 1999: 36).
Jews were never treated as equal members in prerevolutionary europe, 
no matter where one looks. The reason everywhere was that they were not 
trusted as members of faith—be it the christian faith, or the faith and alle-
giance to the sovereign (Kim 2004). in the words of Vital (1999), “The 
difficulty about the Jews was that, over and above all the old objections 
to their presence, they seemed to present an insuperable obstacle to the 
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establishment of just such a coherent, smoothly operating centrally directed 
social order as was striven for” (Vital 1999: 32).
When considered at all, they were discussed for what could be obtained—
and more often than not squeezed—from them, which in most cases meant 
money. however, while newly emerging and rationalizing european states 
sought to increase their control over Jews by forcing them to conform, 
their evaluation was always predicated by deep-seated prejudice. accord-
ing to Vital (1999), “nothing was rarer than for those who for one reason 
or another addressed themselves, however briefly, to the matter of the Jews 
than to begin, at least implicitly—and as often as not explicitly—with the 
proposition that they were not only hopelessly stubborn and difficult to deal 
with, but in many ways depraved, ignorant, and unclean” (Vital 1999: 33).
The tropes about uncleanliness, being unfit to join a “civilized com-
munity,” of being depraved and sexually overactive, repeat themselves in 
history and seem to stem from the same motivation to establish pure and 
“clean”—that is homogeneous—communities that ethnic and religious 
“others” threaten to pollute, penetrate, and violate. others are always those 
who are not only physically close, but with whom the hegemonic group is 
intimately connected and thus dependent on. hence the sexually loaded 
language (Bauman 2001). This reality also hints at the need to establish, 
and maintain, a tight-knit community able to retain sovereignty. The more 
power it wielded, the more anxious its members were to defend it against 
any form of “penetration” or “pollution” from outsiders.
The special case of polanD
There are a few examples where Jews were given rights, and it is thus worth 
taking a closer look at these cases. in 1264, the polish prince Boleslaw the 
pious decreed the privilegium principle, which declared that Jews did not fall 
under the same legal code as christians, effectively giving Jews a special status. 
some one hundred years later, this special status was extended to the whole of 
poland by casimir the Great. Under this privilegium, Jews were given the right 
to handle all civil cases involving only Jews themselves, through rabbinical 
courts. hence, the christian church, the christian nobility, and the chris-
tian urban patriciate could no longer judge Jews in cases that only involved 
civil disputes among themselves. according to Vital (1999), “considering 
that in old poland, as elsewhere in the Middle ages, judicial authority was 
a prime symbol of government as well as one of its major instruments, these 
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were remarkable concessions. They highlighted the formal separation of the 
Jews from the rest of the body politic” (Vital 1999: 8).
indeed, in many of the polish estates, Jews could look back at a long his-
tory of tolerance—even if the application of royal tolerance or privilege decrees 
depended on the local sovereigns that controlled the different estates making 
up the polish territory. This was of particular importance during the many 
times when unity under one king was lost and poland consisted of a series of 
dukedoms. in general terms, however—as the quote above demonstrates—the 
condition for tolerance was that Jews kept themselves apart and did not inte-
grate, or even mingle, with christians (Teller, Teter, and polonsky 2010). This 
only changed in the late eighteenth century, when polish Jews were granted 
civil rights and released from constraints. They were even permitted to pur-
chase and own land and housing. They were also allowed to retain a degree of 
juridical autonomy and permitted to wear their characteristic dress and beards 
(polonsky 2009). however, even this integration came with a price—in the 
concrete sense of the term. “The money by which the nobility, the church, 
and the burghers—and the crown itself—were to be paid off in exchange for 
their acquiescence in this radical change would come from the Jews them-
selves” (Vital 1999: 73).
in eighteenth-century poland, the nobility had been opposed to giving 
non-catholics political rights. They were only admitted to municipal citi-
zenship in 1775 (Vital 1999: 74). however, the strongest opposition to all 
changes in the status of the Jews was voiced by the middle-class burghers, 
because they perceived urban Jews as competitors and thus strongly pressed 
for their exclusion from urban citizenship rights. Urban citizenship, espe-
cially in those towns that did not belong to the christian church or to some 
landlord, brought with it the right to join a guild and thus to be allowed to 
conduct business in the town, be it as a craftsman or a merchant. as else-
where in europe, urban citizenship also brought the right to participate in 
the making of municipal law, voting, and holding public office. it was pre-
cisely in those free towns that the burghers opposed Jewish membership the 
most, confirming the general pattern detected thus far—namely, that the 
value of christian citizenship was established, at least in part, by contrasting 
it with Jewish non-rights and exclusion.
Reforms to Jewish citizenship only came after 1789, in the wake of 
much broader polish state formation. however, even then, christian power 
holders and political elites in general perceived it as entirely normal that 
Jews had to pay—and pay heavily—for whatever right or entitlement they 
wanted to have.
later developments in those european states that counted on relatively 
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strong Jewish communities all follow a similar pattern. in the austro-
hungarian empire, after 1818, the state relied heavily on extra payments 
made regularly by Jews, and it was taken for granted that christian privi-
leges and rights had to be sustained and financed through Jewish special 
duties. so even after the french Revolution, Jews remained “a people apart,” 
and their admittance to the community of christians was dependent on 
what they had to offer in return—thus instrumental, and not driven by a 
genuine will to integrate them and give them equal-citizen status.
Jewish citizenship in europe remained tenuous and tentative, continu-
ously threatened and invaded, its substantiveness challenged or invalidated 
in daily interactions. in nineteenth-century prussia, for example, Jews were 
granted formal citizenship only in 1869, and formal citizenship was a far cry 
from substantive citizenship and being able (and allowed by one’s “fellow” 
citizens) to actually live and practice the social role of being a full citizen. as 
Vital (1999) argues, “While the principle of full equality was conceded in 
principle it was only grudgingly and incompletely accorded in practice: the 
unwritten, but almost total, ban on the inclusion of Jews into the official 
civil and military hierarchies (with the partial exception of the lower judi-
ciary) was retained” (Vital 1999: 177).
The french Revolution changed little in this respect. if anything, as the 
european developments of 1933 to 1945 demonstrate, once Jews became 
effectively more secularized and more integrated, the irrational fear of 
sneaky pollution and hidden penetration only increased (Bauman 2001).
conclUsion
after citizenship succumbed to empire in athens and Rome, it reemerged 
in several, mostly small, cities in Tuscany. Before these cities were able to 
declare themselves sovereign, limited citizenship rights were granted by 
kings, emperors, marquises, dukes, and the like to their subjects. after the 
Tuscan city republics were swallowed up by the catholic church and the 
worldly powers with which it was at times united, the situation fell back to 
a granting of certain, although limited, rights to subjects. in this chapter, i 
have sought to analyze all three of these scenarios: citizenship before the city 
republics, during the city republics, and afterwards.
The situation of the city republics allows us to detect clear parallels to 
the classical period, especially athens. in places like florence, citizenship 
meant a lot to all those who were citizens. More than rights, it implied 
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duties. however, the rights and entitlements derived from citizenship were 
also considerable—and valued enough to be under constant dispute and 
siege. similar also to the classical examples, citizenship in one of the Tus-
can towns was very exclusive and circumscribed. slaves, serfs, women, and 
generally the poor were not granted membership. particularly the poor, at 
least those residing within the city walls, constantly challenged their own 
exclusion and were able to carve out more rights for themselves—as hap-
pened, for example, in fourteenth-century florence. however, the ascent of 
the lower classes to power almost always marked the beginning of the end of 
these republics, as it gave rise to violent reactions by the rich citizens.
When citizens were internally divided, it became easier for their much 
more powerful outside enemies to succeed, so that the rise of the lower 
classes during the fourteenth century brought the end of those republics.
a constant of any self-ruling community in europe, from classical 
times to modern states, was its faith-based character. faith, as Kim (2004) 
explains for england, was the number one condition for membership: faith 
in the same God, and at the same time faith in the sovereign and in the rules 
emanating from the sovereign—even if the collective was the sovereign, in 
which case “allegiance” would be a more adequate term. The sharing of 
christian ritual, as Max Weber explains, sealed the pact that the members 
of such communities made and gave it strength.
This is precisely where the exclusionary character of such pacts emerges. 
as during most of europe’s history, civic pacts were religious pacts, and Jews 
were not allowed to join. how exactly this exclusion of the Jews unfolded 
before, during, and after the city republics is highlighted throughout this 
chapter. it becomes clear that the Jews provided an important background 
against which the privilege of christian citizenship was constructed. Whereas 
slaves, women, serfs, and the poor provided the labor, the Jews allowed for 
an active engagement in commerce and trade. They were also functional in 
the construction of the first banks. But more than fulfilling instrumental 
roles that allowed for the accumulation of profits, Jews served the purpose 
of contrasting the “pure” inside group of fellow christians to their “impure” 
outsider status. This is because such tropes as homogeneity and purity can 
only work if contrasted to something else, and nothing and no group can be 
pure and homogeneous by itself.
What emerges, then, from this succinct genealogy of citizenship is its 
inherent contradiction, which manifests itself in its exclusionary trait. The 
following cases, focusing on contemporary democracies, will add validity 
to this characteristic and further explore the different facets and limits, or 
tradeoffs, of democratic self-rule.
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Chapter 5
france
Liberalism unveiled
People always talk about Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité, and yes, there is 
freedom, but not everywhere and for everyone. Remember, we’re French; we 
were born here. our grandparents fought in wars to defend France. Back 
then, they were considered unsuitable, and today so are we.
—siyaKha TRaoRé, “open leTTeR To fRance,” 2006
france is a crucial case in this study. france presents itself—
and is widely imaged—as being the next step from, or the natural 
continuation of, the ancient Greek invention of democracy. france thus is 
important historically. it is, however, also important conceptually, as france 
to this day stands out as a nation that has held onto the liberal republican 
traditions that motivated the french Revolution. The fifth Republic still 
is a place where special rights and associations, and the privileges that such 
association could represent, are actively undermined. The unitarian french 
state only recognizes individual citizens and is weary of the special interests 
that easily grow out of secondary associations.
The history, and justification, of such a philosophy and the public poli-
cies it triggers can easily be found in french history. as alexis de Tocqueville 
(1955) explains, “The revolution set out to replace feudal institutions with 
a new social and political order, at once simple and more uniform, based on 
the concept of the equality of all men” (Tocqueville 1955: 20). aristocrats 
and the catholic church had, of course, created powerful associations that 
claimed significant privileges for themselves. aristocrats did not pay taxes 
and towards the end of the eighteenth century had very few administrative 
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tasks—thus living in a situation with many privileges and few, almost no, 
obligations. The situation of the Roman catholic church was no different. 
This institution, too, had important privileges that were not matched by 
concrete responsibilities towards the collective.
The french revolutionaries did away with the privileges of the aristoc-
racy and the church. Their associations were prohibited, their special rights 
to land, taxes, and rent-derived income canceled. Many aristocrats and cler-
ics died swift deaths delivered the modern way, by the guillotine. The new 
france decided not to tolerate any interest groups and associations; no “spe-
cial” groups with special rights and privileges survived. The Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and the citizen was adopted in august 1789 by the 
national constituent assembly. it was the first step toward writing a new 
constitution for france, which was ratified in 1791. The declaration of 1789 
became the preamble of the new constitution. The whole emerging system 
was strongly influenced by the motivation not to provide the aristocracy 
with any opportunities to dominate the political system—hence the option 
for unicameralism.
probably the most important philosophical godfather of the new consti-
tution was Jean Jacques Rousseau, with his Social Contract, first published 
in 1762. in it, Rousseau had established popular sovereignty as the basis for 
modern democratic legitimacy (Rosanvallon 1992: 26). among other state-
ments, Rousseau declared that “The legislative power belongs to the people, 
and can belong to it alone” (bk. 3, chap. 12: “how the sovereign authority 
Maintains itself ”). With regard to the law, Rousseau highlights the same 
principle: “every law the people have not ratified in person is null and 
void—is, in fact, not a law” (bk. 3, chap. 15: “Deputies or Representatives”).
central to the establishment of “one person, one vote” was Rousseau’s 
work on the general will. indeed, Rousseau’s thinking on this issue provided 
the blueprint for article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
citizen. it reads:
The law is the expression of the general will. all citizens have the right to con-
tribute personally, or through their representatives, to its formation. it must be 
the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. all citizens, being equal in its 
eyes, are equally admissible to all public dignities, positions, and employments, 
according to their capacities, and without any other distinction than that of 
their virtues and their talents.
This focus on the equality of all individuals, as long as they were citizens, 
and the aversion to any kind of special interests, groups, and associations 
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still characterizes the french republic today. This chapter examines some of 
the implications, as well as shortcomings, of this republican tradition. My 
focus is on two specific shortcomings: first, the very foundational problem 
of who counts as a Man, and secondly, the related problem of how such a 
tradition is translated into contemporary politics. This chapter will demon-
strate that nonwhites were not considered Man by the french metropolitan 
forces that dominated the political scene in revolutionary france. from 
the very beginning, the supposed radicalism of the french Revolution was 
thus severely flawed. More than universal principles, it expressed Western 
white principles that were, in addition, further limited by their gender bias. 
i further argue that this ambivalence is still characteristic of contemporary 
france, so that the supposedly neutral framework of “one man, one vote” 
serves the purpose of perpetuating privilege while prolonging second-class 
status for nonwhites. The relation between defending privilege while pro-
ducing exclusion is indeed dialectical in that one constitutes the other.
Methodologically, the best place to unveil the mechanisms that constitute 
privilege through exclusion and second-class citizenship are at the very mar-
gins of the french polity—there where the regime ran thin. Before delving 
into the politics of contemporary france, i will thus explore the situations in 
some of the french colonies.
colonies: WheRe liBeRalisM hiTs The fan
after the fall of the ottoman empire in 1918, france assumed a mandate 
of what today is syria and lebanon, which lasted until 1946. france had 
indeed acquired experience in the “orient” after napoleon’s conquests of 
egypt in 1798—and was thus deemed well suited by the league of nations 
for this task. During that time, “the french established a tacit pecking order 
of access to state jobs and other economic benefits. in lebanon, christians 
obtained a disproportionate number of civil service jobs, despite the consti-
tution’s promise of equitable access” (Thompson 2000: 81). once it became 
clear, through the 1932 census, that the french colonial administration was 
biased against Muslims and for christians, the french did what they still do 
to this day: they stopped collecting ethnic and religious data in the census 
(Thompson 2000: 82).
one can observe similar contradictions in other corners of the french 
colonial empire. There, as elsewhere in the colonized world, racism was 
integral to domination, as ann stoler has so vividly explained when stating, 
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“Racism is an inherent product of the colonial encounter, fundamental to 
an otherwise illegitimate access to property and power” (stoler 2002: 24).
in the french caribbean, for example, revolting slaves did not find the 
sympathy and support from the revolutionary champions of fraternité and 
égalité back in the colonial motherland. even Robespierre, as radical as he 
was, did not push for the de facto emancipation of slaves—even if he favored 
it in theory (James 1938: 59).
To the contrary, such influential public figures as condorcet, while 
favoring abolition in theory, argued for a gradual investment with citizen-
ship rights, because at the time of the french Revolution, the “stupidity 
contracted through slavery by the corruption of their morals (the necessary 
result of their masters’ influence), the slaves of the european colonies have 
become incapable of fulfilling the duties of free men” (condorcet, quoted 
in Dubois 2004: 181).
When emancipation was proclaimed in haiti in 1794, after the slave 
revolt, french colonial administrators sought for ways to block the full 
political emancipation of blacks and instead proposed a gradual transi-
tion that would not endanger the economic structure of the island (Dubois 
2004: 183).
in haiti, when nonwhites raised the banner of liberty, they were quickly 
dealt with. so in 1790, when “lacombe, a Mulatto, claimed for his peo-
ple [mulattos, not blacks] social and political rights. The whites of le cap 
hanged him on the spot” (James 1938: 49).
Many similar stories are found in the classic study of the haitian Rev-
olution by c.l.R. James. There is the case of M. de Baudière, a french 
colonial administrator in haiti, who also in 1790 proposed a “moderate 
petition for some Mulattoes seeking to improve their status” (James 1938: 
49). he was lynched by the local whites, his body “shamefully mutilated” 
(James 1938: 49).
Back in paris, where the taking of the Bastille and the passing of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the citizen inspired the masses, it 
quickly became clear that blacks and mulattoes were not included among 
the Men and citizens. abbé Grégoire, spokesman for the “friends of the 
negro,” as well as a member of the french national assembly, proposed that 
the declaration thus gave mulattoes (not blacks!) the right to vote. To this, “a 
san Domingo deputy protested. another deputy moved that the discussion 
be closed. De lameth, the same who had chirped so noisily three months 
before, agreed that Gregoire’s ‘indiscreet proposal’ should not be discussed, 
and the house decided not to discuss it” (James 1938: 55). By denying 
political rights to mulattoes and not even considering blacks, the french 
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Declaration of the Rights of Man and the citizen indeed made nonwhites 
nonhumans—a point stressed by frantz fanon in 1956. in his resignation 
letter to the french colonial minister in algeria, fanon wrote: “What is the 
status of algeria? a systemized de-humanization” (fanon 1970: 63).
indeed, as c.l.R. James (1938) shows, haiti could only achieve eman-
cipation for its slaves by breaking with france. napoleon had sent his own 
brother-in-law, charles leclerc, to haiti to restore slavery and bring haiti 
back to france, so that it could continue to produce the riches france so 
desperately wanted. The biggest army napoleon had ever sent abroad was 
given the mission to reinstate slavery for the land of universal freedom and 
brotherhood. however, almost all of the 34,000 french soldiers found their 
death in haiti.
clearly, as etienne Balibar (2004) has argued, the european enlighten-
ment not only accepted racism—it indeed constituted it. To claim cultural 
heights for europeans rested on the previous establishment of civilizational 
hierarchies that were profoundly racialized. This view assumed that euro-
peans had climbed to the cultural heights that gave them specific rights 
and entitlements, whereas non-europeans had not achieved this stage yet 
and thus lacked the intellectual, cultural, and hence civilizational qualities 
that provided the groundwork on which liberalism rested. since Kant, this 
groundwork was comprised of rational, autonomous individuals whose rea-
son and intellectual autonomy allowed them to decide for themselves, and 
whose individual preferences could then be amassed and translated into col-
lective decisions (Rosanvallon 1992). in particular, africans provided the 
necessary contrast to these european achievements (eze 2008). africans 
were classified by european analysts as not rational or autonomous enough 
to have their voices heard and considered. They instead needed tutelage. as 
frantz fanon has argued, the colonized were part of the realm of dehuman-
ized *non-being (fanon 1967: 10).
The constitutive function of black backwardness as the measure for 
white advancement, which translated into white rights and black obliga-
tions, found expression not just in the french first Republic. in the second 
Republic, after slavery was abolished again (in 1848) and blacks obtained 
formal rights, antillean social rights were restricted and labor coercion insti-
tuted (Blackburn 1988). indeed, after slaves in Guadeloupe, Martinique, 
Guyana, and Réunion declared their freedom, the national assembly in 
paris voted not to facilitate their integration, but to compensate their former 
masters (Blackburn 1988: 501).
When the second Republic embraced industrial production in the 
form of usines centrales for the massive industrial production of sugar in 
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the caribbean, it searched for a way to force the newly freed blacks to 
fuel these new, emerging machines—a task not easily achieved during 
the short-lived second Republic. When the republic gave way to the sec-
ond empire, “the Bonapartiste regime endeared itself to the planters and 
sugar companies by taking immediate and vigorous measures to ensure a 
larger and more disciplined labour force. in february 1852 an imperial 
edict suppressed all colonial representation and self-government; Guade-
loupe’s Le Progrès had already been banned. Draconian labour legislation 
was introduced. every adult was obliged to carry a livret with details of 
employment and residence; those failing to comply could be subjected 
to penal labour. subsequent regulations stipulated that those occupying 
plantation lands should render labour services to the planters, for which 
they might receive nominal payment” (Blackburn 1988: 502f ).
according to Blackburn, “The slave had been forced to work by the 
whip; the ex-slave was forced into an unequal contract by the need to 
prove gainful occupation or to pay a capitation tax” (Blackburn 1988: 
503). indeed, bonded laborers for senegal soon replaced the former 
slaves in the french caribbean. in 1852, such bonded labor contracts 
were allowed by imperial decree. This regime operated until 1860, bring-
ing a total of 16,000 africans to the french caribbean (Blackburn 1988: 
503). even though african indentured labor was ended in 1860s, “some 
77,000 indians, 1,300 chinese and 500 Vietnamese were introduced to 
the french antilles”—all as indentured, that is, unfree, laborers and serfs 
(Blackburn 1988: 503).
Then, under the Third Republic (1870– 1940), “the antillean people’s 
rights were nominally reinstated, even as they were also subject to an author-
itarian colonial administration that governed a racially organized society. 
During the century following emancipation, rationalized bureaucracy, 
modern agro-industrial production, and republican colonialism became 
interdependent” (Wilder 2004: 37).
in one way or another, postrevolutionary france used nonwhite colo-
nials and postcolonials to construct economic power, which was then used 
to justify the claim of high cultural, intellectual, and civilizational standing 
for themselves. indeed, this hierarchy became so ingrained in the french 
Selbstverstaendniss, the way of thinking about oneself, that it arguably still 
informs french nationalism and mainstream representation. To this day, 
as the next section will demonstrate, the condition for integration into the 
french mainstream is to assimilate, that is, to become french, which easily 
translates into climbing up to the cultural heights of the french. as Tyler 
stovall and Georges Van den abbeele explain in the introduction to their 
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French Civilization and Its Discontents (2003), “no proponents of these mis-
sions of french civilization ever expected that cultural exchange to be in 
any way bidirectional. france’s ‘missions,’ forged by the Jacobin heritage 
of the Revolution, have seemingly always understood its ‘universalism’ to 
be coterminous with the assimilation of specifically french identity and its 
republican values” (stovall and abbeele 2003: 4). for the french, their mis-
sion civilisatrice was to make the world under their rule more french. only 
then could they be admitted as equals. The problem, since the very begin-
ning of french colonialism, was and continued to be that some people and 
groups were deemed unassimilable. The same authors just quoted explain: 
“in practice, though, especially that concretized under colonial rule, limits 
were drawn with some folks considered worthy of being civilized while oth-
ers were termed ‘unassimilable’ and doomed to never-ending barbarism” 
(stovall and abbeele 2003: 5).
Under colonial rule, this distinction translated into a classification of 
natives into “indigène” and “assimilé,” with different institutions and treat-
ments for each. for Gary Wilder (2005), such a bifurcated system bore 
several inherent contradictions, namely, “socioeconomic individualism 
without juridico-political individuality, social development without civil 
society, citizenship without culture, nationality without citizenship” (Wilder 
2005: 5). after decolonization, and with the onset of migration from the 
former colonies to france, this distinction carried over to a classification 
of first- and second-class citizens. in today’s reality, as pap ndiaye (2008) 
explains, racism comes in many forms, and even if the cruder form of bio-
logically determined racism was dismantled after the second World War, it 
has survived in the form of a discrete, yet very real colonizing mission and a 
very dominant paternalism (ndiaye 2008: 428).
liberalism, as coined by the french Revolution, thus bears an inherent 
contradiction. on one hand, it declares itself “universal” while really only 
reflecting a particular french-european experience, which becomes evident 
in its differentiated evaluation of different civilizations, where their own is 
“naturally” the one superior to all the others, which hence need to be “civi-
lized” (chakrabarty 2000). on the other hand, it does not even live up to 
the very mission it declares, as it rejects some groups and cultures as outright 
“unassimilable,” hence justifying their exclusion from a regime of french 
rights. Both these strategies reveal the deep bias and the inherent contradic-
tions of the kind of european liberalism emerging during the eighteenth 
century in europe. Uday singh Mehta (1999) has highlighted this contra-
diction for the British case when explaining that liberalism and empire were 
indeed linked. according to Mehta,
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The historian in James Mill, the legislator in Bentham, the educator in Macau-
lay, and the apostle of progress and individuality in J.s. Mill, all, i believe, 
fail in the challenge posed by the unfamiliar; because when faced with it they 
do no more than “repeat,” presume on, and assert (this where power becomes 
relevant) the familiar structures of the generalities that inform the reasonable, 
the useful, the knowledgeable, and the progressive. These generalities consti-
tute the ground of a cosmopolitanism because in a single glance and without 
having experienced any of it, they make it possible to compare and classify the 
world. But that glance is braided with the urge to dominate the world, because 
the language of those comparisons is not neutral and cannot avoid notions of 
superiority and inferiority, backward and progressive, and higher and lower. 
(Mehta 1999: 20)
similar exercises to deconstruct the great european thinkers of liberalism 
and enlightenment, such as hegel and Kant, render similar results, revealing 
deep eurocentric bias (Dussel 1993). however, Mehta (1999) concludes, 
and i agree with this assessment, that
[The] point is not that the existence of the empire and the political thought 
or even more specifically the liberal thought that emerged concurrently with it 
were obviously in contradiction. That claim is neither obvious, nor, i believe, 
ultimately true. in any case the language of contradictions is too precise an 
instrument to say anything of interest about generalities that range across cen-
turies and involve the complicated intersections of ideas and practices, not to 
mention the different logics of domestic and international imperatives. More-
over, contradictions, if they do exist, do not close the space on the complexities 
that emerge from the extended link between liberalism and empire. They should 
be taken as an invitation to that space. (Mehta 1999: 7)
This space between liberalism and empire (or even the one between 
republicanism and racism) indeed constitutes the most fruitful unit of 
analysis for a critical examination of democracy and citizenship, because it 
reveals the profound bias of the european tradition and the mutually con-
stitutive relationship of citizenship and exclusion. as Dipesh chakrabarty 
has argued with Ranajit Guha, “The european bourgeoisie  .  .  . made its 
own interests look and feel like the interests of all” (chakrabarty 2000: 15). 
The implications of such a politics are far-reaching and are only beginning 
to be unveiled. They force us to take a closer look at history, as well as to 
reexamine our own disciplines and the ways we approach reality (Rodriguez, 
Boatcă, and costa 2010; Boatcă 2010; lander 2002; Mignolo 2008).
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conTeMpoRaRy fRance: hoW To  
Be MoRe eqUal Than oTheRs
in contemporary france, assimilation still provides the only way to find 
acceptance among white, mainstream frenchmen and their polity. assimi-
lation, however, is not easily achieved, even if most immigrants seek it. on 
one hand, nonwhite skin color resists easy assimilation; on the other, reli-
gious beliefs and the symbols they come with seem too costly to simply give 
up in order to find acceptance. The result among all those who seek integra-
tion, acceptance, and even assimilation, but have not been able to achieve 
any of them, is often one of frustration and resignation. among the youth, 
especially those born in france, this frustration has led to protests of differ-
ent forms—some nonviolent, others less so. however, french official ways 
are apparently stubborn. in february 2004, the french parliament outlawed 
the use of religious symbols in public schools, forcing Muslim girls to unveil 
themselves. after the breakout of minority youth riots in early november 
2005, prime Minister Villepin asserted: “france is not a country like others. 
it will never accept that citizens live separately, with different opportunities 
and with unequal futures.”1
The way the french state seeks to ensure equal opportunities is guided 
by its commitment to the republican ideas of citoyenneté and intégration, 
which point to assimilation as the only way to integrate immigrants and 
nontraditional citizens into the nation. The core of this philosophy is to 
not recognize differences among french citizens, and to apply color-blind 
public policies to ensure equal opportunity.
however, the assertion of the french prime minister was in stark con-
trast to a french reality that has been depicted by many as increasingly 
separate, where people of different ethnic backgrounds encounter very dif-
ferent opportunities and face highly disparate futures.2 france has become 
a showcase and example for a more dominant european policy of not rec-
ognizing ethnic groups and minorities, and focusing on assimilation as 
the main, and indeed only way to integrate immigrants. officially, once a 
citizen, the french state does not take into account any group-specific char-
acteristics that de facto set the citizenry apart, such as ethnicity, religion, 
or gender. The french state therefore insists on a form of radical individu-
alism that is anchored in political liberalism and classical republicanism. 
This model is dominant all over continental europe, and the importance 
of understanding the french way of officially denying the very existence of 
minorities, therefore, extrapolates beyond the borders of the fifth Repub-
lic, where it originated.
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in real life, the distinction of insider/outsider that regulates national 
belonging and the distribution of rights is negotiated through the con-
struction of a racialized conception of community. nationalist political 
groups rediscover and disseminate a myth of “purity,” detecting “foreign” 
elements that “contaminate” the national body. Thus, whereas french 
political elites insist on not officially recognizing any minorities within 
the national body, cultural, ethnic, and religious differences are routinely 
recognized in everyday interactions, and they are extremely consequential.
The french citizenry is in itself biologically, culturally, religiously, and 
ethnically heterogeneous and has indeed always been so. This implies that 
nonwhites are not necessarily foreigners and immigrants. To present and 
frame them as such is at the very core of the problem—or more precisely, it 
constitutes them as a problem. This framing is, however, very prevalent in 
france as elsewhere in europe. in a very telling interview broadcast in octo-
ber 2005 on prime-time french TV, hélène carrère d’encausse, a french 
historian and distinguished member of the académie française, when asked 
about how to understand the riots of black youth in french banlieues, stated: 
“i am not surprised at all: how could young Blacks, coming directly from 
their african village, adapt to the french way of life?” (Millot 2005).
There is, however, no reason to believe that the black youth who took 
the streets in france in 2005 and thereafter were foreigners—let alone 
immigrants. To the contrary, there is every reason to believe that instead, 
the situation of the two boys electrocuted while running from the police 
after playing soccer on october 7, 2005, was typical: both Bouna and zyed 
were born in france. Generally, it takes a long history of broken prom-
ises, frustrated hope, failed help, and discouraging experience in one’s own 
country—not the country of others—to produce the kind of protests the 
world has been witnessing in france (Keaton 2009). however, the exact 
backgrounds of french minorities are not known, because official popula-
tion surveys do not account for them, following the french tradition so well 
established in such places as syria and lebanon. The only data available 
come from nongovernmental organizations and are thus limited in their 
degree of representativeness. They are still informative.
in a survey conducted in 2007 by sofres, “the most renowned and larg-
est market-research firm in france” (Tin 2008: 36), a total of 3.86 percent 
of adults interviewed self-declared “black.” of those, 56 percent declared 
that they had experienced racism in their everyday lives.3 Research has fur-
ther demonstrated that young blacks (classified in the available surveys as 
second-generation Maghrebins and sub-saharan africans) are 2.5 times as 
likely to be unemployed than their white counterparts, which means that 
France | 93
their unemployment rates hover around 20 percent! although nonwhites 
also drop out of school more often than whites, their difficulties in finding 
jobs remain, even when compared to whites with the same qualifications 
(silberman, alba, and fournier 2007).
similarly, such authors as philippe Bernard (2004) and sylvie zappi 
(2004) have demonstrated that nonwhite french graduates from french elite 
universities were 25 percent less likely to find jobs in the private sector com-
pared to their white colleagues with the same qualifications, and that france 
has never appointed a black ambassador to one of its 156 embassies—even 
though there are plenty of well-prepared black diplomacy graduates.
hence, in the words of pap ndiaye (2008), being black in france is an 
“objective social handicap” (ndiaye 2008: 430), and the de facto effect of 
discriminatory practices is one of racialization. according to ndiaye (2008), 
“There therefore exists a black minority in france insofar as there is a group 
of people considered black and united by this very experience, which con-
stitutes a tenuous, yet indisputable link. This link is not necessarily the 
foundation of a racialized identity, but it recognizes the shared destiny of 
being considered black, no matter the subtle diversity of the chosen identi-
ties” (ndiaye 2008: 65, my translation). patrick lozès, former president 
of the french Representative council of Black associations, an umbrella 
organization for black associations in france (Le Cran), and candidate for 
the 2012 french presidency, confirmed this assessment. in his experience, 
“Blacks in france are not full citizens . . . they are invisible ‘glass citizens,’ 
because not even their numbers are fully known.”4 The research conducted 
by Le Cran showed that 81 percent of blacks in france were indeed french 
citizens; the widespread perception, however, is that most blacks in france 
are foreigners. “They cannot go back anywhere—their country is here” (pat-
rick lozès, interview June 20, 2011).
The racist and exclusionary practices responsible for this situation are 
not hard to decipher as anxious responses of traditional, white residents 
towards a changing environment, fanned by nativist political elites that 
have much to gain from blaming immigrants and nonwhites for complex 
socioeconomic problems (Giry 2006). indeed, as Vincent Geisser has dem-
onstrated in the case of Muslims, “islamophobia in france, unlike elsewhere 
in europe, is largely an intellectual phenomenon driven by elites, and it 
stems less from insecurity than from racialist ideology” (quoted in Giry 2006: 
92). The public debates about the accusation of Vincent Geisser, a french 
researcher accused in 2009 by the “defense security officer” of the national 
center for scientific Research (cnrs) for holding “too favorable opinions 
of Muslims” further testified to the active involvement of political elites in 
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the framing of nonwhites as non-belonging foreigners and intruders who 
do not deserve the same treatment and rights as traditional white citizens. 
however, the black presence in france started in the eighteenth century, the 
great century of the slave trade. By royal decree, once in france, slaves had 
to be liberated and instructed in a craft. already in the seventeenth century, 
there was thus a bifurcated treatment of blacks. Whereas those residing in 
the colonies fell under the 1685 code noir, those brought to and residing 
in mainland france had access to certain rights and privileges, and slavery 
was thus actively fought in mainland france. free blacks did fall under some 
restrictions, such as the ban to marry, in order to avoid the proliferation of 
mixed races. “in December of 1738, a royal decree limits the stay of slaves 
to the learning of a craft and a maximum time of three years” (ndiaye 2008: 
134, my translation). as early as 1770, some 5,000 blacks resided in france, 
out of a total population of 20 million (ndiaye 2008: 134f ).
hence, as pap ndiaye (2008) has argued, “paris has been a black cap-
ital, where africans, caribbeans, Guyanese, and african americans have 
mingled since the 1920s and where an encounter between the universally 
humane and the particular black has been practiced, with all its tensions and 
contradictions, and at times its tears” (ndiaye 2008: 427f, my translation). 
The depiction of nonwhites as intruders and immigrants is thus not correct, 
and instead of describing a reality, rather provides a framework that permits 
the allocation of blame. “foreigners” and “immigrants” are held responsible 
for most of the contemporary problems france faces, even though the great 
majority of them are indeed french citizens, so that this blame can easily 
be translated into blaming nonwhites and non-christians (patrick lozès, 
interview June 20, 2011).
however, as noted above, white french citizens effectively benefit 
from the exclusion of nonwhites—especially in the job market, where 
high unemployment also affects them. in such crucial institutions as the 
national assembly, the diplomatic corps, the army, or even in local govern-
ment bodies, black citizens are either severely underrepresented or entirely 
absent (lozès, interview 2011). housing is another central area where 
discrimination is widely practiced, negatively affecting nonwhite citizens 
while positively furthering the chances of white citizens in such competi-
tive housing markets as those in paris. “some blacks simply cannot find 
apartments and are thus forced to live permanently in hostels, where they 
are exposed to all kinds of dangers, or they are forced to live in apartments 
that pose risks to their health, due to contaminated walls and pipes” (lozès, 
interview 2011).
according to patrick lozès, to achieve justice, the crafting of public 
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policies that ensure equity is crucial, because “it is all about power, and 
nobody wants to share power” (lozès, interview 2011).
Given the evidence of discrimination and unequal treatment affecting 
the french citizenry, depending on their skin color and religion, how can 
we explain that the french state insists on not providing statistics that 
capture these inequalities? established practices around the job market 
provide a first clue: it is a common practice in france, as well as elsewhere 
in europe, that curricula vitae need to contain information about the age 
of the applicant, as well as a photo. The black french citizens i inter-
viewed in 2007 all had experienced similar situations when applying for a 
job. Their candidacy advanced up to the moment when it became obvious 
that they were black.
The statement of one black female interviewee, age twenty-eight, hold-
ing a university degree, born in france and a french citizen, was typical. 
she explains (after my question regarding situations where racism is most 
influential): “at work, especially when you apply for a job. at job inter-
views, i would always be asked where i was from. i am french, but to them, 
it doesn’t appear that way.”5
on average, the black french citizens i interviewed in 2007, all of 
whom held university degrees and were french citizens, took about three 
years to finally find a job. in most cases, they found jobs that did not 
meet their expectations—a finding confirmed by more systematic research 
(simon 2003).
The french state thus demands, or at least tolerates the fact that job 
applicants need to give evidence of their skin color when applying for jobs, 
fully aware that this will significantly impact their chances to find a job. in 
other words, french political elites and the state they command are aware 
that traditional white french citizens routinely discriminate against non-
whites and non-christians, a conclusion that is further evidenced by the 
long history of half-hearted and thus ineffective measures taken by the 
french government to at least formally address this issue (Kiwan 2007). But 
those same elites avoid taking any concrete and effective action to coun-
teract this situation with reference to the ideals of universalism, laicism, 
and republicanism, although all of these ideals were formulated precisely 
to ensure equality, brotherhood, and liberty. so why have political elites in 
france not acted more decisively to ensure the quality of their democracy 
and the upholding of the high principles it represents? The most plausible 
answer, it appears, is that they do not want to. The conclusion reached by 
louis-Georges Tin, black activist and founder of Le Cran, seems the most 
plausible:
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i must note that the fierce adversaries of communities, as a matter of fact, 
were not against communities as such; they were against some communities: 
arab-Muslims, Jews, and homosexuals.  .  .  . no one criticizes the sixteenth 
arrondissement in paris, a bourgeois community which also has its particular 
habits, mores, and customs. no one would dream of criticizing the traditional 
communities, professional communities, and the catholic communities. (Tin 
2008: 38)
prohibiting the excluded from using cultural, ethnic, and religious cri-
teria to address inequalities, while at the same time allowing employers 
to use ethnic criteria in their hiring practices, reveals the deep bias with 
which political elites address this issue. french political elites know about 
the discriminatory practices that victimize a part of the french citizenry, yet 
they do not act decisively to resolve them. instead, they hold onto a mere 
rhetoric of universalism, even though the aim of universalism is to ensure 
equal rights for all. french citizenship has, as a consequence of persistent 
discrimination, become racialized and divided. Whereas traditional, white 
citizens insist on their citizenship rights, thus treating them as assets and 
entitlements, ethnicized nontraditional citizens have become second-class 
citizens, who are not allowed to experience the full extent of the role of 
being a citizen. To them, citizenship is not a set of entitlements, but has 
remained an unfulfilled promise.
it is not surprising that people seek to defend privilege, especially 
if unmerited, when it promises to secure concrete and very important 
advantages—for example, in a very competitive job market. Under such 
conditions, whiteness serves as an important capital, bestowing extra sym-
bolic capital onto its bearer (Reiter 2010). it is, however, the responsibility 
of political elites and state apparatuses to check these tendencies and enact 
policies that aim at ensuring equal opportunities. That is the core of the 
universalist idea. instead, french political elites are assisting white citizens 
to defend their privileges, thus revealing profound double standards. if the 
french state were indeed so sternly opposed to any form of particularism, 
then the ethnic marking of applicants on their curricula should be illegal, 
especially considering its highly consequential effects on (universalist) equal 
opportunities. Racist bias in hiring would also have to be addressed in other 
ways in order to ensure equal chances—for example, by enacting quotas. 
furthermore, if state elites were really committed to achieving universal 
equality, they would not rob those negatively affected by discriminatory 
practices of the means to address them. They would allow a diagnosis of the 
current situation of the french citizenry that takes into account inequalities, 
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in the form of color-conscious censuses. french political elites, however, 
have not acted decisively to effectively counteract the racist practices of 
traditional, white citizens. This reluctance can only be explained by remem-
bering the benefits that political elites and their electorate reap from the 
current situation: it provides the white majority with a competitive advan-
tage in the job market, and it allows state elites to escape scrutiny and shields 
them from being held responsible for the wide array of social problems fac-
ing french society by blaming “others.”
as such, the french case highlights the structural impediments and 
perverse incentives created and maintained under majority rule whenever 
political cleavages reflect ethnic differences. Under such conditions, white 
majorities have no incentives to extend substantive citizenship to nonwhite 
minorities, as access to substantive citizenship is perceived by these majori-
ties as a zero-sum game, where extending access implies losing privileges that 
are perceived not as rights, but as entitlements. political elites, in turn, have 
no incentives to truly represent the interests of minorities, even less so when 
the representation of their interests is perceived as hurting the interests of 
the majority, whose votes they need, after all. More than in racial hatred, 
many of the problems around successful integration of minorities in france 
are thus rooted in the asset character of substantive citizenship, which pro-
vides structural incentives for the political mobilization of majorities against 
structural minorities.6 This phenomenon is made worse by the impossibil-
ity of rendering ethnicity and religion politically unproblematic by simply 
ignoring them, as they tend not to be ignored in everyday interactions.
Under such conditions, black scholar-activist pap ndiaye (2008) 
expresses sadness in the face of so many dreams and hopes crushed. seeking 
to capture the aspirations of black french formal citizens, ndiaye explains, 
“We want to be at the same time black and french, without being consid-
ered suspicious, strange, or merely tolerated as a temporary problem waiting 
to be assimilated away. We want to be invisible in our social lives so that the 
distortions and mishaps that affect us as blacks are effectively reduced. But 
we want to be visible when it comes to our black cultural identities, our pre-
cious and unique contributions to the french society and culture” (ndiaye 
2008: 426, my translation).
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conclUsion: The DiscRiMinaToRy 
DiMensions of ciVic BonDs
The case of france allows us to discern several causally relevant mechanisms 
producing exclusion and second-class citizenship. The analysis of france 
demonstrates that racism can survive and indeed articulate itself with civ-
icness. The french system is such that it first encourages non-french to 
become french—only to classify some people and groups as unassimilable. 
The frustration that such a system produces among those so classified can 
hardly be overstated—and the vehemence of youth protests held by minori-
ties since the beginning of the 2000s gives ample evidence of this frustration. 
it is not just unfair, but wickedly racist to first declare that all can become 
french—except you.
practicing this sort of schizophrenic classifying of human beings and 
groups, while at the same time ensuring that they have no means of classify-
ing themselves (which is achieved by not providing any official numbers on 
the situation of minorities), the french state reveals the deep contradictions 
of its liberal, republican foundation. in fact, the republican ideal of self-
governance, as expressed so radically by Rousseau, never meant to include 
others besides white european males. Worse, it used nonwhites to construct 
the very position from which it proclaimed its own superiority. By doing 
so, it also evidenced the hollowness of the classical Western liberal tradition 
on which this discourse ultimately rested. To govern oneself as a collec-
tive, individuals had to be rational and autonomous—but according to the 
thinkers developing this idea, not all men were. Women certainly were not, 
and neither were all those whose poverty or divergent societal and develop-
mental models pushed them down the civilizational ladder, according to 
the monodimensional evaluation model of the european classifiers. in fact, 
white european males found only themselves worthy of self-governance and 
democracy. The rest of the world—black, brown, or yellow as classified dur-
ing colonial times—they found lacking, and at best able to learn Western 
ways after long and arduous work and training. some, especially africans, 
were deemed unassimilable. To say so was necessary, because how else to 
enslave, dominate, and control them, treating them as tools, things, and 
machines—radically dehumanizing them? What was called “universalism” 
thus reveals in the treatment of nonwhites and non-christians its profound 
particularism and bias. The high talk of liberalism, republicanism, equality, 
brotherhood, and justice was nothing more than that: talk.
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Chapter 6
The postcolonial Within
Portugal, White and European
It is part of the organic essence of the Portuguese Nation to carry out 
the historical function of colonizing and owning overseas dominions 
and civilizing indigenous populations.
—aRTicle 2 of The CoLoNIAL ACT , 
DecRee no. 18.570, 8 JUly 1930
in this chapter, i analyze portugal’s negotiations around 
the issues of citizenship, belonging, and rights. portugal, again, is a very tell-
ing and crucial case. it represents several empirical/historical phenomena. 
for one thing, as a european Union member, portugal is a typical european 
case. Given portugal’s fairly recent admission to the eU and its position 
at the margin, geographically as well as in terms of importance and influ-
ence, an analysis of portugal allows us to untwine the rather complex issues 
involved in joining the “fortress europe” (Gordon 1982). But portugal as a 
case has more to offer. Due to its long colonial history as the first european 
power to set out to conquer the rest of the world, and the last european 
country to let go of its former colonies (in 1974), portugal is a showcase of 
the colonial entanglements that characterize other european former colo-
nial powers as well. portugal is typical in its “french” approach (described 
above) of focusing solely on assimilation as the sine qua non condition 
for the integration of nonwhite and non-christian others, and thus repre-
sents a broader european integration regime. What stands out in portugal, 
however, is the very clear way in which the state is involved in forming, 
enforcing, regulating, and policing this regime. it is precisely this strong and 
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clearly observable state involvement in the ways of portuguese belonging 
and not-belonging that provides one of the strongest rationales for includ-
ing portugal in this study. To be certain, all states are directly involved in 
the ways that issues of citizenship, belonging, foreigners, immigrants, and 
integration are framed and discussed in their respective societies. in portu-
gal, however, this involvement is more clearly observable than elsewhere. 
here, not only is one able to observe and analyze the direct involvement 
of the state in the framing of a common sense of who is rightly portuguese 
and who is not—but also one can observe how other elite-dominated cen-
tral state institutions, particularly universities, are recruited in this effort. 
portuguese universities, i shall demonstrate in this chapter, have become 
accomplices in the process of framing nonwhite portuguese citizens as for-
eigners and immigrants.
The Re-enGineeRinG of naTional BelonGinG
portugal has a long history as a nation-state, reaching all the way back to 
1249. national unity and the early creation of a nation-state, which allowed 
for the systematic collection of taxes and extraction of profit, allowed the 
portuguese crown to invest in overseas adventures before any other euro-
pean nation had the means to do so. portugal ventured to, and conquered, 
parts of africa as early as the early fifteenth century, successfully taking 
north african ports, such as ceuta, in 1415. sponsored by henry the navi-
gator, portugal, a small country with barely one million inhabitants, became 
the biggest trans-maritime empire of the world, with possessions in africa, 
india, china, the pacific, and, after 1500, the americas.
Much has been said and written about the portuguese propensity to 
mingle and mix with native populations, contributing to a vast mixed popu-
lation wherever they went. for the current purpose, this is not a relevant 
discussion. however, it is relevant to note that the portuguese male con-
querors lacked the numbers to effectively populate those regions they had 
conquered, thus resorting to the production of mixed offspring as a means 
to guarantee control of the vast empire. This was achieved by making their 
mixed offspring the overseers and indirect rulers over natives. portugal thus 
created its own form of indirect rule—one relying on the politics of demo-
graphics. it also used colonized people from one place to control colonized 
people from another, typically in such a way as to use lighter-skinned peo-
ple to control darker-skinned groups, hence creating a sophisticated, and 
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wicked, scheme of colorism throughout its empire. indians from Goa were 
thus used to control Mozambicans; cape Verdeans became indirect rulers 
over angolans, the people of Guinea-Bissau, and the people of são Tomé 
and principe (leonard 2000).
The portuguese empire lasted longer than any other modern european 
empire—from the mid-fifteenth century all the way to 1974, when the 
empire finally crumbled from within. During the last years of portuguese 
colonialism, the portuguese regime under salazar and caetano resorted 
to very consequential strategies in order to keep the empire intact. They 
extended portuguese nationalism to include the colonies, thus boldly 
declaring that portugal had no colonies. instead, they argued, such places as 
angola and cape Verde were one with portugal.
such strategic maneuvering, of course, came with a price. Until 1961, 
the price consisted of offering portuguese passports to all those who worked 
for the portuguese colonial state, as well as all those who could pass the 
“civilizational” test as spelled out by the indigenato legal code, which regu-
lated who was to be considered civilized and who remained barbaric. By 
adopting the customs of the colonizers, some natives could thus gain access 
to the right of portuguese citizenship. lastly, all those fighting and willing 
to die for the portuguese motherland during the long wars of independence 
were also given, as reward, the privilege of portuguese citizenship.
after independence for most (not all) portuguese colonies finally arrived, 
many of those attached to the portuguese state in one way or another moved 
to portugal, either because they had no other choice, or because they hoped 
to cash in on the benefits that lifelong sacrifice for portugal had earned them. 
With them came some 800,000 “returners”—that is, africans who had held 
onto their privileged status of being colonizers while living, often for genera-
tions, in the colonies. Their passports were written on their skins, as their 
whiteness legitimized them as being “truly” portuguese.
faced with such a large legacy of some five hundred years of colonizing 
the world and declaring that all of it was, in fact, part of portugal, the coun-
try had to rethink what it meant to be portuguese. This necessity became 
even more urgent when the country applied for membership in the euro-
pean Union, in the early 1980s. To join europe with such an expansive 
notion of who one was, and thus who could also benefit from european 
membership was impossible and would have made portuguese membership 
impossible. after all, it would have meant opening the gates of europe to 
parts of africa and asia.
Whereas from the european perspective, portuguese admission was a 
question of cutting back the contours of who counted as “portuguese,” for 
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the portuguese themselves, there was even more at stake. experts as they 
were on measuring and judging the level of civilizational progress that would 
make one deserving of the rights and privileges of exclusive membership, 
they now had to pass the civilizational tests for being considered truly euro-
pean and thus worthy to join such an elite club as the one in which france, 
england, and Germany were important members. all of a sudden, the long 
history of mixedness, of exposure and openness to africa that had produced 
in the portuguese the supposed hybridity that made them the champions 
of cordial race relations—this legacy now cast a dark shadow over their own 
situation. in the eyes of many european observers, but even more so in their 
own eyes, they were indeed not really white, not really pure, european, and 
civilized. To some of their former colonies—particularly Brazil, which had 
gained independence much earlier—they were even “funny,” entertaining, 
backward oddities; the poor cousins who lived in a backward peasant coun-
try, small and unimportant, speaking with an anachronistic accent.
for the portuguese elites—political, intellectual, and economic—in a 
country where there was much overlap among those categories, the nation 
thus had to be purified and purged of its hybridity and mixedness; sanitized 
and transformed into a modern, white, civilized, and thus truly european 
country (fikes 2009). starting in the 1980s, portugal thus became a show-
case of national re-engineering and an example of how to redefine and 
remold a whole country. nowhere else, to my knowledge, can this process 
be observed in more detail and clarity than in portugal, thus making it an 
ideal case for such a foucauldian analysis.
nonWhiTes inTo foReiGneRs
portuguese society is increasingly heterogeneous—although there are no 
data on how heterogeneous its population truly is, as the portuguese state 
follows the french model of not differentiating among its citizens. how-
ever, cities such as lisbon count on a significant population of nonwhite 
citizens who go to school with, and compete for jobs against, the dominant 
white population. after examining the role of state elites in the creation 
and maintenance of a racist common sense that leads to racialized concep-
tions of first- and second-class citizenship, the case of portugal permits us 
to shed light on the implication of academia in the maintenance of a racist 
and exclusionary common sense, which frames nonwhites as foreigners and 
immigrants while deciding upon who “fits in” based on ethnic background. 
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i shall present two arguments to elucidate this phenomenon: first, the fact 
that there are almost no studies on blacks in portugal, despite their visibility 
in cities like lisbon and porto; and second, the fact that some immigrants 
are much more welcome and taken care of than others, namely, those labeled 
“home-comers” (retornados), an attribute with strong racial undertones.
When searching for books and articles about blacks in portugal, or on 
the situation of minorities in that country, one is hard pressed, as there 
are almost none.1 instead, it is very common to read that “portugal is a 
fundamentally homogeneous country in terms of ethnicity and language, 
and also as regards religious faith” (freire 2007: 208). This contradicts all 
empirical experience when in lisbon, and we do know from research that 
“legally settled foreigners represent around 5 percent of the resident popu-
lation” (Marques, Valente Rosa, and Martins 2007: 1149). furthermore, 
research on education, such as that undertaken by Marques, Rosa, and Mar-
tins (2007), who in 2004 conducted a case study in the poor municipality 
of oeiras, Greater lisbon, allows us to grasp the degree of heterogeneity 
that characterizes contemporary lisbon society. Marques et al. find that 
among their sample of oeiras students age fourteen to twenty-four, “44.3 
per cent [were] . . . children of immigrants” (Marques, Valente Rosa, and 
Martins 2007: 1156). at the same time, articles and books about immi-
grants abound, thus creating the false impression that portugal has indeed 
an immigration problem, but not a problem of ensuring equal opportuni-
ties for its diverse citizenry.
The question arises: what kind of scholarly blindness has allowed social 
scientists to state that portugal is a fundamentally homogeneous country? it 
appears that the lack of statistics on the presence and situation of minorities 
among the portuguese citizenry has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. By 
focusing academic research on foreigners and immigrants while at the same 
time not producing any information on the mere number of minorities, let 
alone their socioeconomic situation, portuguese scholars help perpetuate 
a common sense that says, “portuguese citizens are white; nonwhites are 
foreigners and immigrants.” similar to the french case, the interest behind 
such maneuvering is quite evident: real problems remain unexamined and 
important questions unaddressed; political elites escape scrutiny by shifting 
the blame onto others, which allows them to continue in their malpractices; 
whites, perceived as “normal citizens,” benefit from the bedeviling of non-
whites and reap tangible benefits.
in the case of portugal, where funding for scholarly work in the social 
sciences is scarce, and almost 100 percent of funding for scientific research 
generally comes directly from different state agencies or from the state-owned 
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foundation for science and Technology (fct), it becomes clear that intel-
lectual elites depend on state elites for the funding of their research projects.2 
The fact that there are so few studies on ethnic minorities, especially blacks, in 
portugal thus cannot be interpreted as a coincidence. To the contrary, the only 
two possible explanations for this lack are that (a) the state does not fund such 
studies, or (b) that portuguese researchers do not propose any research proj-
ects about portuguese ethnic diversity in relation to equal opportunities and 
the question of justice. Both possibilities seem plausible; however, the inher-
ent conservatism and inertia of scientific research programs, favoring research 
projects that are within already established paradigms, clearly play a role. This 
scientific conservatism complicates the emergence of new research projects 
that are unconnected to already established truths and the methods, units of 
analysis, and research questions associated with them (popper 2002; Kuhn 
1996). hence, even if state agencies are involved in consolidating a racialized 
common sense, scholars share in the responsibility of perpetuating the invis-
ibility of ethnic minorities in portuguese society, which in turn contributes to 
perpetuating their situation of exclusion and second-class citizenship status.
according to the extremely scarce information available, second-
generation immigrants (a doubtful denomination in itself ) fare much worse 
in school compared to their white counterparts. Marques et al. (2007) find 
that “africans have gained the status of the most ‘visible minority.’ sur-
veys show that they are more prone to be perceived as immigrants than any 
other category. . . . They are still the least welcome in close family relations” 
(Marques et al. 2007: 1149). These researchers find that “nearly three quar-
ters of students with cape Verdean ancestry experienced grade blockage 
at least once” (Marques et al. 2007: 1160). in other words, 75 percent of 
students with a cape Verdean background, age fourteen to twenty-four, 
attending school in oeiras, greater lisbon, have repeated at least once before 
they graduate from high school!
These researchers state that “in oeiras we found that around a third of 
the portuguese students have to repeat a school year at least once, compared 
to 41 per cent for native-born children of immigrant parentage and 51 
per cent for the foreign-born” (Marques et al. 2007: 1158). There are also 
extreme differences among “native-born children of immigrant parentage” 
and those born to traditional portuguese residents with regard to dropping 
out, despite the fact that the majority of portuguese students (77 percent, 
according to Marques et al.) aspire to attend university. hortas (2008) con-
firms these findings, at least indirectly, when she states that “When we look 
at immigrant dropout/failure, we see that the rates are triple the norm in 
primary school, and double for the other cycles” (hortas 2008: 423).
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The use of such extremely cumbersome designations as “native-born 
children of immigrant parentage” hints at the difficulties that portuguese 
scholars face when discussing this issue. When reading through the avail-
able educational statistics and the research conducted in this field, it 
appears that what schoolchildren who face above-average dropout and rep-
etition rates indeed share is not their legal status, but the color of their skin. 
They are all nonwhite, and even though portuguese is their first language, 
they perform significantly worse than their white portuguese colleagues 
and white eU immigrants.3 To put this clearly: white foreigners whose first 
language is not portuguese by far outperform black portuguese students 
whose first language is portuguese.
The relative absence of studies about the socioeconomic situation of 
portuguese minorities, especially blacks, and the cumbersome treatment 
and reluctance with which they are treated, if at all, together with the high 
profile of studies that focus on immigrants—all help consolidate the already 
widespread common sense that transforms black portuguese citizens into 
foreigners. The statement of an interviewee illustrates this state of affairs:
i am a portuguese citizen but at the same time i am not a portuguese citizen. i 
have all the rights, but at the same time, i have none. i have even represented 
portugal at international events, while i was a student. But because of my color, 
i am not treated as a citizen. i constantly experience discrimination at all levels: 
social, cultural, economic. . . . i compete in the job market against portuguese 
classmates that had worse grades, but they get the job.4
Who counts as a national and who does not thus has severe consequences 
on opportunities in france as well as in portugal—no matter what the citi-
zenship status. “nationals are white,” says the common sense—a common 
sense that obfuscates all the inequalities and injustices to which nonwhite 
citizens are routinely exposed, while at the same time securing privileges to 
white citizens, and relieving political elites of their responsibilities to ensure 
justice and equality among their citizenry—the cornerstones of democracy.
Ties To The MoTheRlanD: of 
ReMiTTances anD ReTURneRs
a final piece of empirical evidence of the construction of extremely biased 
racial regimes in portugal is provided by the curious case of the so-called 
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“home-comers” (retornados)—white african immigrants who settled in por-
tugal mostly between 1974 and 1975. When portugal’s african colonies 
achieved independence in 1974, many white colonizers ran the risk of los-
ing their privileges and maybe even their properties and lives, and some 
800,000 decided to move to portugal. These white home-comers encoun-
tered such a willing and open portugal that the whole experience has been 
widely praised as a “great success story” of integration (e.g., by Rui pena 
pires 2003). The willingness of the portuguese society and state to accom-
modate these immigrants went so far as to alter a long-established legal 
tradition, namely, the naturalization law, which in 1981 was changed from 
jus solis to jus sanguini to accommodate the returning colonizers now left 
without a home. since the changes of 1981, a child born to a portuguese 
parent automatically becomes a portuguese citizen, provided the parent was 
born in portugal or in a territory administered by the Portuguese state.5
since 1981, portugal thus has extended citizenship to those able to claim 
portuguese ancestry, while at the same time complicating the integration of 
all those who lack it. Through this maneuver, returners were not considered 
immigrants (pinheiro 2008: 66). The success of this reintegration, accord-
ing to pinheiro, who quotes retornado researcher pena pires, one of the most 
respected scholars in this field, was due to the fact that “this biographical 
particularity of this community is not visible in portuguese society” (pin-
heiro 2008: 66). Read: they were white. pinheiro continues: “With the 
retornados also came approximately 28,000 africans, both refugees from 
the civil wars in angola and Mozambique and working immigrants from 
all former colonies. Unlike the retornados, this african community had no 
special connection to portugal or portuguese nationality since they came 
from independent states” (pinheiro 2008: 67)—no connection other than 
having worked for the portuguese colonial empire and, as a consequence of 
betting on the wrong side, having lost a home in the newly independent 
african states, one might add. indeed, a significant number of this early 
group of africans in most likelihood held portuguese passports because they 
had worked on the side of the colonizers, helping to control and admin-
ister the “natives,” a fact that can easily be verified by interviewing this 
population. They just did not blend into a predominantly white society 
as easily, due to their own “biographical particularity.” in fact, as Marques 
et al. (2007), explain, some of these “returners” have lived in africa for 
generations. The maintenance of cultural ties to the colonial motherland 
has proven extremely consequential to them, so that in contemporary por-
tugal the divisions created under colonial rule—namely, between colonial 
subjects and colonizers—still plague intra- and interethnic relations (Reiter 
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2008). it also seems legitimate to deduce that the dual labor market that 
affects the chances of african migrants and their descendants, diagnosed 
by eaton (2001), can in part be explained by the relation of different 
african-descendant groups to the portuguese colonial state. in an interview 
conducted in 2003, the president of the lisbon-based cape Verdean asso-
ciation, Ms. alestina Tolentino, explained:
after independence, many cape Verdeans settled in portugal. They were cape 
Verdean nationals, but they had worked for the portuguese state in cape Verde. 
as such, they had acquired certain rights, pensions, social security, and such, 
which they had because they were portuguese citizens. so when all these return-
ers arrived in portugal after independence, among them were many cape 
Verdeans. They were highly qualified because they had worked for the portu-
guese colonial apparatus. . . . The face of colonialism for many angolans and 
Mozambicans was not portuguese, but cape Verdean.6
Most returners moved to portugal because of the links they had forged 
during colonial times, when they had a direct connection to the colonizing 
state apparatus. once in portugal, they could count on pensions and social 
security schemes. They felt like, and most of them also officially were, por-
tuguese citizens, and all those who were not would become so after 1981. if 
they were cape Verdean nationals, they would still fit the racial regime that 
was created during colonial times and then employed to construct social 
hierarchies in portugal, as most cape Verdeans are easily distinguishable 
from angolans and Mozambicans by their lighter skin color.
as Reiter (2008) explains:
Under the indigenous law code that regulated life in most of the portuguese 
world until 1961, some natives could become portuguese citizens if they passed 
the “civilization-test,” consisting of demonstrating their degree of assimilation 
to european values and manners. The indigenous code of 1954 regulated the 
stages that led from being “indigenous” to becoming “civilized,” making the 
achievement of european manners and customs the benchmark for gaining 
access to portuguese citizenship rights. assimilated portuguese citizens had to 
demonstrate that they had left their “native savagery” behind. successful assimi-
lation had to be proven through portuguese language skills, clothing style, food 
habits, and other western civilized manners. (Reiter 2008: 403)
after 1974, portuguese state elites thus took care of their own, and by 
doing so made sure uncivilized “others” could not slip in. however, the 
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maintenance of bonds to individuals and groups with connections to the 
motherland is not an uncomplicated matter—especially not for portugal, 
a country that had long claimed to be intimately close to their colonial 
subjects. portuguese settlements in Brazil, angola, Mozambique, Guinea-
Bissau, Goa, Macao, south africa, and cape Verde reach back to the 
sixteenth century. portuguese presence never effectively ended with inde-
pendence, so that most of the former colonies still have a sizable portuguese 
population. however, by the late 1990s, the economic boom that was 
caused by joining the eU and receiving millions of eU structural funds to 
improve infrastructure started to slow down, and unemployment started to 
rise. During that time, the first studies about remittances emerged. from 
the late 1990s onward, the amount of remittances to portugal had declined 
steadily, down from accounting for 3 percent in 1990, to 2.5 percent of 
portugal’s Gnp by the end of the decade.7
While colonial ties seemed to demand taking care of all those who 
had helped sustain the colonial apparatus by facilitating their integration 
into the portuguese state, by the late 1990s it became clear that portugal 
could not welcome all those communities that upheld their portuguese 
nationality. Under these new economic circumstances, and equipped with 
hard evidence about the magnitude and importance of remittances for the 
portuguese economy, portuguese political elites shifted gear. They realized 
that it was no longer desirable to “bring home” all the former coloniz-
ers, or those who had passed the “civilization test” and could count on 
national solidarity based on their white skin or their white customs. While 
it still seemed important to keep the bonds that united these exile com-
munities to the motherland, the sine qua non condition to ensure that 
remittances continued to flow “home,” it seemed also important to ensure 
that these exiles stayed where they were, thus not further burdening the 
portuguese labor market.
political elites found the solution to these new challenges of the late 
1990s in the camões institute. since 2000, new camões cultural cen-
ters were established in paris and in poitiers (france), Dakar (senegal), 
Windhoek (namibia), Dili (east Timor), hamburg (Germany), stock-
holm (sweden), Vienna (austria), and in the headquarters of the african 
Union in addis ababa (ethiopia), and of the economic community of 
West african states in abuja (nigeria). portuguese language centers were 
opened in canchungo, ongoré, Mansoa, Bafatá, Gabú, Buba, catió, Bol-
ama, Bubaque, and quinhamel, all in Guinea-Bissau, to spread fluency in 
portuguese as the official language in the country. Taken together, since 
1998, the portuguese state has opened nineteen language centers and is 
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now present in twenty cities of different countries. according to Jorge Mal-
heiros (2002), “portugal’s Ministry of foreign affairs has registered and 
attempts to maintain ties with nearly 4.3 million portuguese and people 
with portuguese ancestry living abroad.”8 in 2007, the camões institute, 
together with the lisbon-based instituto superior de ciências do Trabal-
hoe empresa (iscte) determined that the portuguese language contributed 
to 17 percent of the portuguese GDp.9
portuguese political elites have thus found a way to categorize their 
citizens into those who can live in portugal and those who are more func-
tional if and when they stay abroad but send their money home to their 
families. not all passport holders are also welcome in the motherland—as 
the situation of all those who hold passports but are treated as foreign-
ers demonstrates. conversely, others have been received with open arms, 
and laws have been changed to accommodate them. The racial project 
that informs this sorting out of people and groups into desirable and less-
desirable ones is hard to overlook. yet most portuguese scholars do just 
that—be it because they cannot find funding for projects that would raise 
these issues, or because they are too caught up in a hegemonic common 
sense that has long accepted that nonwhites are not portuguese and thus 
cannot count on the solidarity of the national community. By doing so, 
portuguese academia gets implicated with the reproduction of a racial-
ized common sense that legitimizes the maintenance of a racialized social 
order, dividing the portuguese citizenry into first- and second-class citi-
zens. Whereas the white (biologically or culturally defined) first-class 
citizens can count on citizenship rights as entitlements, second-class citi-
zens have not been allowed to live the roles of citizens. The asset character 
of citizenship becomes evident, as all those benefiting from such a system 
have no reason to change it—and instead have every reason to hold the 
“others” out.
conclUsion
an ethnically defined nationalism has become the norm in Western europe. 
although its emergence can be explained by the late state formation of some 
eU member states, such as Germany (hobsbawm 2003), other states, such 
as france or portugal, have only recently shifted away from (in the case of 
portugal) or restricted the reach of (in the case of france) the jus solis rules 
that have long been a cornerstone of their democracies. The contemporary 
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strength of ethnic nationalism must thus be seen as the result of deliberate 
political action that is aimed at redrawing the rules and borders of belonging.
ethnic nationalism, however, not only perpetuates the exclusion of non-
whites by defining them as not belonging to the national community; it 
also stands in the way of achieving truly universal citizenship and democ-
racy with strong civic, political, and social components. a complication 
that adds to this problem is caused by the almost exclusive focus on citi-
zenship rights—to the detriment of citizenship duties and responsibilities. 
ethnically defined nationalism, coupled with a widely held belief that citi-
zenship is a matter of rights without responsibilities and duties, has created 
a situation where ethnic white europeans arrogantly insist on their “rights” 
as citizens, thus representing them as entitlements, while conveniently over-
looking their responsibilities towards their fellow citizens. instead, minority 
citizens get routinely blamed for all economic, social, and political problems 
that many european countries have experienced over the last decades.
The lack of a focus on civic solidarity and a civically defined membership 
is also at the core, i would contend, of the oftentimes awkward difficulties 
many european states and societies have when dealing with antidemocratic 
elements in their midst. instead of focusing on antidemocratic agents as 
the prime culprits of terror and insecurity, blame is commonly shifted away 
from civic and political matters towards cultural and ethnic ones—thus reli-
gions, cultures, and ethnic groups are unduly blamed for violent acts and 
“tendencies,” and stereotypes about “others” are further perpetuated.
To make matters worse, several european states do not provide census data 
on the ethnic backgrounds of their citizens, justifying such a policy with refer-
ence to the principle of universal citizenship. Minority citizens thus have no 
way of knowing their numbers, situations, and the degree to which they have a 
shared destiny. By most accounts, having access to these numbers could prove 
explosive and is thus avoided by status quo oriented political elites. parallel to 
not providing census information on european minorities, several european 
states actively fund a plethora of studies that focus exclusively on immigrants, 
thus anchoring public attention and discourse firmly on issues of foreigners 
and their problems of attaining legality and achieving integration. academia 
has become implicated in the dissemination of a framework that almost auto-
matically transforms all nonwhites into foreigners and immigrants. There is 
a clear lack of studies on an increasingly diverse european citizenry and the 
difficulties of nonwhite citizens in finding acceptance, equal opportunities, 
and equal treatment by the state and other, white, citizens. They have become 
second-class citizens who are not allowed to experience the full extent of the 
social role that comes with the status of being a citizen.
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Broadly accepted racist practices support the discrimination of non-
white european citizens and expose them to discriminatory practices. The 
unchallenged reproduction of discriminatory practices and policies provides 
evidence for the high degree to which such discrimination has been normal-
ized. extremely unjust racial regimes are thus being constructed, and their 
victims are robbed of the tools to face them effectively.
The influence of european racial regimes becomes even more evident 
when considering how some migrants, namely ethnic whites, have been 
able to successfully escape the status of victims. post-1974 white african 
immigrants to portugal have successfully claimed the status of “returners” 
(retornados), which has allowed them to successfully settle in portugal, even 
though some of them were born in africa to families that had lived in africa 
for several generations. in 1981 the portuguese national assembly effec-
tively passed a law restricting portuguese citizenship to those of portuguese 
descent—thereby shifting citizenship criteria from jus solis to jus sanguinis 
in order to accommodate white “returners” and facilitate their integration. 
But what, if not ethnicity, makes one a “returner”?
ethnic nationalism, coupled with inherent problems of majority rule, 
are thus at the core of many problems of contemporary european states and 
societies. instead of blaming immigrants, eU member states ought to make 
democracy the eU’s foundational element, and membership dependent on 
the willingness to actively support and defend democracy, which would 
imply a stronger focus on citizenship responsibilities. But instead of focus-
ing on democracy and its requirements, political elites have successfully 
shifted the focus onto migrants and foreigners and made them the culprits 
of most of the social problems european societies face today. such a focus 
allows those same elites to avoid being blamed for the problems that they 
are ultimately responsible for. scholars, who in their studies focus exces-
sively on immigrants and foreigners, further contribute to a hegemonic 
common sense that transforms nonwhites into foreigners and intruders. 
in doing so, they support political elites in their maneuvering and provide 
them with legitimacy.
if anything, social scientists should produce more studies on failing and 
unresponsive states, inefficient bureaucracies, and inadequate democratic 
institutions. They should also unveil more of the injustices and problems 
that a significant part of the european citizenry routinely faces. if they 
would do so, we might have a chance to improve current situations and 
work towards more just and inclusive democracies, which might also prove 
more economically efficient—at least if we believe the nobel prize– winning 
economist amartya sen (2000).
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Chapter 7
Brazil
Experts in Exclusion
After the uprising of 17 June the secretary of the Writers’ union 
distributed pamphlets on Stalinallee, which stated that the people 
had forfeited the trust of the government and could only win it 
back by doubling their work effort. Wouldn’t it be simpler if the 
government dissolved the people and elected another?
—BeRTholD BRechT, JUne 1953
This chapter focuses on yet another illustrative case: Bra-
zil. as i have done before, i present each case to highlight one particular 
aspect of the dialectics of citizenship. in this chapter, the main focus is “how 
exclusion works.” i have chosen Brazil as an example to explain how exclu-
sion works not because Brazil is peculiar in this respect. To the contrary, 
Brazil is typical. The ways in which exclusion is produced and reproduced 
there are repeated elsewhere in the same, or very similar, ways. Thus, Bra-
zil is a “case” introduced to unveil and highlight the causal mechanisms 
that typically are put to work by those who seek to defend their own privi-
leges by excluding, stigmatizing, and discriminating against others. My own 
familiarity with Brazil and Brazilian portuguese allows me to take a closer 
look at and a deeper examination of how exclusion works. The Brazilian 
case allows us to explore the microdynamics of how the reproduction and 
defense of privilege produces exclusion. it also allows us to take a closer look 
at the interpersonal and intergroup level of this dynamic—without, how-
ever, claiming that the interpersonal level is the only one of relevance when 
analyzing the dialectics of inclusion and exclusion. The Brazilian case, to the 
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contrary, is intended to add texture and complexity to the manifold ways in 
which inclusion and exclusion constitute each other.
Why Brazil? one could ask. Brazil fulfills the conditions of a typical 
case because of the richness and clarity of the causal mechanisms used in 
this process. Brazilians are indeed “experts in exclusion” and as such, they 
provide a very clear and textured image of how exclusion works at the 
interpersonal and intergroup level. Given that individual and group inter-
actions become institutionalized and shape social structures, the way in 
which Brazilians exclude also allows us to see how Brazilian social struc-
tures have been constructed around this exclusion. To be sure, implicit in 
this exploratory analysis of Brazil is that we can learn something about how 
exclusion works in general.
of central importance in the process of exclusion and discrimination—
that is, of withholding full access to the rights citizenship promises—some 
factors stand out as particularly relevant—namely, racism, the importance of 
linguistic codes, and the strategic use of formalistic protocols for exclusion. 
The end result of these different ways to exclude, which are in reality not 
separable, is a phenomenon i have called “the formal versus the informal.” 
formality in language, in general habitus, and in the structuring of institu-
tions conditions access to the spheres of power and money, as this chapter will 
show. By doing so, it excludes all those who are stuck in their own informality, 
mostly due to their lack of formal education, from full citizenship.
This finding also provides the caveat of this analysis. This way of repro-
ducing privilege works best where parts of the population are rather less 
educated, or differently educated, than those that control the spheres of 
power and money. While diverse educational backgrounds are the most 
common ground upon which such a way to exclude works, the presence of 
different language codes, where one stands out as the “high” variety and oth-
ers are thus declared “low” or “vulgar,” provides another typical background 
for this type of exclusion. Brazil, thus, represents a typical case for how 
exclusion works in colonized societies.
WhiTeness as capiTal
a recent poll on Bolsa Família recipients, conducted by the Rio de Janeiro– 
based laboratory for economic, historical, social and statistical analyses 
of Race Relations (laeser), found that of the 10.2 million families (18 per-
cent of all households) in this income transfer program aimed at Brazil’s 
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most destitute families, 66.4 percent were afro-Brazilians (the chief of the 
household self-classified as either preto or pardo) and 26.8  percent self-
declared “white.” nationwide, almost one-fourth of afro-Brazilian families 
were enrolled in this program. afro-Brazilians thus continue to occupy the 
lowest ranks of Brazilian social hierarchies.
in general, when comparing such highly consequential indicators as 
years of schooling, the latest data confirms a long-lasting trend: namely, 
that where in 1988, afro-Brazilians (pretos and pardos) had completed on 
average 3.6 school years, whites had completed 5.2 years. Twenty years later 
(in 2008), both groups had improved, but the gap separating whites from 
blacks had grown; in 2008, afro-Brazilians had completed on average 6.5 
years of schooling, while whites had finished 8.3 years. The educational 
gap separating white from black Brazilians thus has actually grown from 
1.6 years in 1988 to 1.8 years in 2008. similarly, the proportion of afro-
Brazilians in the “poverty” category has remained double that for whites.
The meaning of “being white,” however, is anything but clear in a 
country like Brazil, where whiteness is not a biological reality, but is used as 
a symbolic indicator of civilizational potential. Jeffrey lesser (1999) dem-
onstrated that what it meant to be “white” shifted in Brazil between 1850 
and 1950, but whiteness remained a relevant and consequential category 
that continued to allow for the self-identification with a group. To this day, 
it signifies superiority and well-deserved privilege. During the nineteenth 
century, Brazilian elites openly discussed and compared the different 
degrees of whiteness of such potential immigrants as arabs, Japanese, and 
southern europeans, associating whiteness with aptitude—especially for 
their potential to whiten the highly mixed Brazilians. inspired by the racial 
science and ideology of the time, the declared goal of Brazilian elites was to 
attract white ingredients that would further lighten the racial mixture that 
made up the Brazilian population, thus allowing it to become “civilized.” 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whiteness thus 
was constructed as a form of capital, strongly associated with merit and 
progressive, developmental potential.
french sociologist pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) Theory of Distinction allows 
for conceptualizing whiteness as a symbolic capital that structures social 
hierarchies. according to Bourdieu, “The volume and composition of capi-
tal give specific form and value to the determinations which the other factors 
(age, sex, place of residence etc.) impose on practices. sexual properties are 
as inseparable from class practices as the yellowness of a lemon is from its 
acidity: a class is defined in an essential respect by the place and value it 
gives to the sexes and to their socially constituted dispositions” (Bourdieu 
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1984: 107). The same can be said of ethnic properties. Whiteness, con-
ceived in this way, constitutes a capital in addition to the other capitals, 
namely, financial, social, and cultural. The relative presence or absence of 
these capitals determine the social place an individual occupies in a society, 
where much of the outcome is determined by the successful performance of 
that which is perceived as typical “white” behavior. This performance is par-
ticularly important in societies without a rigid color line, where belonging 
to one status group or another has to be constantly negotiated and upheld. 
it is in this sense that whiteness constitutes a “racial capital”—one that sig-
nals the presence of other capitals, even though they might not be present. 
Blackness, at the same time, signifies the absence of other capitals. Both 
whiteness and blackness thus overdetermine (Reiter 2009; harris 1993).
as a result, the strategic use of whiteness as a symbolic capital in Brazil 
is tied to a broader strategy to defend historically inherited privileges asso-
ciated with status—including the status of being a citizen invested with 
specific rights and privileges. hence, one of the main mechanisms by which 
the effectiveness of citizenship is denied is racism. for many minorities, rac-
ism translates into second-class citizenship, as it undermines trust in public 
institutions and exposes some to the discriminatory practices of their fellow 
citizens. Whiteness tends to become normalized, thus made both the norm 
and normal in a process that produces a racialization of nonwhites, who 
in this process are transformed into “others.” successfully claiming to be 
white, in all those societies structured by european colonialism, functions 
as a symbolic capital that marks one’s belonging to the group of the histori-
cally privileged—those who have rights and can give favors. it also fulfills 
important gate-keeping functions, because it eases the sorting out of those 
who “deserve” privileges from those who do not (quijano 2008; Telles and 
flores, forthcoming). The process through which this structuring of social 
hierarchies works separates people into different status groups, with all those 
who are able to successfully claim whiteness adding a very powerful and 
highly consequential symbolic capital to their account.
The result of upholding whiteness as a criterion for privilege and using 
it as a demarcation to separate first- from second-class citizens provides a 
formidable barrier to achieving general, substantive citizenship. it has the 
potential to place nonwhite formal citizens outside the realm of effective 
citizenship—at least in those societal spheres that are firmly controlled 
by those able to claim whiteness. Given Brazil’s colonial past, the societal 
spheres where whiteness carries the highest value tend to be those where 
money and power are brokered.
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pRoTocols
in July 2008, i interviewed a group of black women organized as a local ngo 
in the Brazilian city of são luis. Their organization is dedicated to assisting 
the poor inhabitants of this city of about one million in their quest to receive 
federal housing benefits and qualify for federally funded low-income hous-
ing loans. concretely, they help those who qualify apply for state-backed 
mortgages, given to them by a state-controlled bank, the caixa economica 
federal. The very existence of such an ngo points to the difficulties ordi-
nary citizens often encounter when dealing with the public realm. During 
the interview, as they were telling me about their very frequent dealings 
with both bank managers and state officials, after about thirty minutes of 
engaged talk, i ended up asking directly about my main interest: how are 
you received and treated by these representatives of power and money—
given that you are female, black, and poor? at that point, their statements 
became more vivid, and the main spokeswoman explained:
it takes us one entire year to fill out all the forms required by the caixa eco-
nomica. if we go to the municipal secretary of city management and ask for a 
meeting with the secretary, the person at the entrance gives us a very hard time 
and schedules a meeting in two months. . . . We feel discrimination every day. 
our biggest challenge is to overcome that. The prejudice is very strong. The 
bureaucratic hurdles are very great and we always have to quebrar protocolos.1
This statement is typical and hints at two often-cited problems: first, 
the extremely complicated procedures and forms applicants have to fill out 
when they want to apply for a state program. in fact, formal application 
requirements can be so burdensome and require such sophisticated knowl-
edge and formal writing skills that ordinary people are effectively barred 
from having access. Those who still want to apply have to recruit specialists 
in the form of lawyers—or, if they are lucky, local nonprofit organizations 
that assist them in the application process, as is the case here. offering a 
low-income housing loan program, but then designing the required paper-
work in such a way that most low-income people cannot fill out the forms, 
casts severe doubt on the seriousness and commitment of the federal bank 
that has developed these procedures and made them a requirement. offer-
ing a federal housing program for the historically excluded, but then barring 
their access through complicated procedures and forms that fulfill gate-
keeping functions that keep the truly needy out certainly creates a feeling of 
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alienation among all those who qualify for this program but are unable to 
fill out the necessary forms.
The second important piece of empirical information coming out of the 
above statement is the experience of discrimination and racism related by 
the informant. Their skin color, gender, and other physical characteristics 
mark them in the eyes of biased interlocutors as poor and uneducated. in 
a bank, this biased assessment quickly translates into a perception of not 
being a valuable client, but rather a needy and bothersome petitioner—and 
thus, in the eyes of bank personnel, not worth their while. The same logic 
applies in a government environment, where black females are routinely 
perceived as poor and thus unimportant power brokers who possess noth-
ing of value to offer. in other words, they are prejudged for being black and 
poor, as in the eyes of the observer, these two characteristics “naturally” go 
together. as this prejudgment potentially bars their access to the formally 
established channels of interaction with banks and political office holders, 
the interviewees resort to a strategy of “quebrar protocolos”—which trans-
lates into breaking protocols.
What are those protocols? in this concrete case, the interviewees would 
have to stand in line, fill out forms, make appointments, come back for 
more appointments, stand in line again, fill out more forms—in short, the 
access to the decision-making spheres would be so burdensome and lengthy, 
and the final success so uncertain, that many applicants would desist from 
pursuing their goals. elisa Reis (1990), who analyzed 27,367 petition let-
ters sent to the Brazilian minister of De-bureaucratization between 1980 
and 1982, offers some further insight into this reality. Reis, for example, 
describes a widow who in her letter to the minister complains that she has 
to go repeatedly to the physician to get a certificate that states that she is 
still alive and thus eligible to receive her pension (Reis 1990: 165). another 
letter analyzed by Reis states,
in six months, i went seven times to the office of the iRs (“Delegacia da 
Receita”) to get information about my income declaration. in order to get a 
personal loan, i had to go to this same federal office 36 times in seven months. 
(quoted in Reis 1990: 166, my translation)
another example:
i have already gathered 425 documents in response to the demands of the fed-
eral government in order to prove that i have dealt correctly with all the fiscal 
requirements of my small firm. (quoted in Reis 1990: 166, my translation)
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and finally:
i spent 12 hours waiting in line, under heavy rain, in order to get the money 
that i so desperately need, but to no avail. Why have workers to be treated so 
inhumanly? (quoted in Reis 1990: 166, my translation)
Why indeed? all these examples express a very typical situation that 
can easily and readily be observed by anyone expecting any type of service 
in Brazil, public or private—even though the overall quality of services has 
improved since the 1980s. The writer of these lines can amply testify to 
waiting hours in line to resolve such simple issues as making a deposit into 
one’s own bank account or withdrawing money from it, as well as to wait-
ing for hours in the antechamber of some local civil “servant” before he or 
she finally grants “an audience.”2 it appears that the Brazilian state, as well 
as some service-related businesses have wrapped themselves in a shell of for-
malities and procedural protocols that have the effect of keeping ordinary 
citizens out—or forcing them through an almost ritualistic procedure of 
self-humiliation when seeking to reach those institutions and people that 
supposedly work for them. This strategy of bureaucratic isolation works 
through several mechanisms. it makes use of complicated procedures to 
make access more difficult, especially for all those unable to maneuver their 
way through these hurdles because of their lack of formal training, or sim-
ply because they are unwilling or unable to tolerate the humiliation that 
often seems an integral part of the procedure (again: the author has himself 
pondered several times about how much humiliation and mistreatment he 
was willing to accept in order to receive something from a civil servant or 
someone else thinking of him- or herself as important).
This form of excessive state autonomy and office abuse has deep histori-
cal roots in Brazil. according to florestan fernandes (2006), during the 
early twentieth century, when the sons of plantation owners moved to the 
cities, they brought with them their aristocratic demeanor, which led to a 
“bureaucratization of patrimonial domination” (fernandes 2006: 116, my 
translation). Raymundo faoro ([1957] 2001), who has produced the most 
detailed explanation for this isolation of the state from people, argues that 
“The stand (or status group), serving as the administrative rank for the 
exercise of dominion, configures a minority government. few rule, control 
and spread their patterns of conduct to the many. The leading group does 
not exercise power by delegation or inspired by the trust that the people, 
as a global entity, irradiate. it is a sovereignty that encysts itself, impenetra-
ble and superior, a restricted stratum, ignorant of the dogma of majority 
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rule.” (faoro 2001: 108, my translation) according to faoro, the patri-
mony of the king was gradually shifted over to the state and administered 
by an increasingly bureaucratic status group. Thus, explains faoro, hold-
ing a state position, instead of representing a calling to serve the people, 
“transforms the holder into an authoritative figure. it gives him the mark 
of nobility” (faoro 2001: 197, my translation). in sum, the way a public 
official envisions his or her governmental position is not one of “represent-
ing” or even “serving the public.” Government officials not only perceive 
themselves often as disconnected from “the people,” they feel superior to 
them, distinguished by the position they hold and by the honorific treat-
ment it bestows on them.
This way of relating to the public is, however, not restricted to the state. 
as mentioned above, similar behavioral patterns can be found in banks or 
other situations where ordinary people need to interact with those who are 
higher up in the societal hierarchy. in a deeply divided and highly racial-
ized society, such as Brazil’s, it becomes clear that the abuse of power by 
state officials, the rich, or all those in situations of power is not random, 
but rather part of a general pattern of social interaction between different 
status groups. it is the way in which the members of formal or official 
society, who see themselves as the legitimate inheritors of the country as it 
was handed down from portugal, relate to all those of the informal sector 
of society, which in a country like Brazil constitute some 40 percent of the 
population.
The lanGUaGe of exclUsion
The use of protocols to defend status privilege is operationalized in daily 
encounters between the members of formal and informal Brazil and serves 
an important gate-keeping function, where the performance and display of 
formality in language, conduct, and general habitus play important roles 
(Bourdieu 1987, 2003). one of the central mechanisms for enacting pro-
tocols is through the strategic use of language, or more precisely: linguistic 
codes. in the following, i will thus take a closer look at Brazilian portuguese 
language codes and how they are used to uphold privilege and first-class 
citizenship by demarcating the speaker from all those thus transformed into 
second-class citizens. Brazil, again, is an ideal case for this inquiry because 
of its highly divided society, especially along educational lines. in a coun-
try where access to formal education is highly restricted, the use of formal 
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education to defend privilege becomes a very central tool. To be sure, in 
2009, the average years of schooling had reached 7.5 years—up from under 
5 years only recently. however, according to the Brazilian institute of Geog-
raphy and statistics (ibge), in 2009, some 25 percent of adults (older than 
fifteen) self-declaring either preto or pardo were functionally illiterate,3 as 
were 15 percent of whites. at the same time, in 2009 only 10 percent of 
Brazilians between twenty-five and thirty-four years had a university degree 
(8 percent in the age bracket fifty-five to sixty-four; ibge), thus allowing 
those with diplomas to reap very tangible advantages from their elevated 
educational levels. This situation is made worse by the low quality of Bra-
zilian public basic education, which, while it seeks to educate the great 
majority of Brazilians (85  percent), also stigmatizes them and often bars 
their access to institutions of higher education (Reiter 2010, 2009).
formality in language in such a context becomes a way to constitute 
privilege and demarcate the outer boundaries of this privilege through the 
use of formal language code. Brazilian portuguese language and habitus 
thus are full of gate-keeping utterances and conducts. This starts with the 
naming of average people as gentinha, povão, Zé Ninguem, Pé de Chinelo, 
and others. all these terms refer to what would be called “people” in en-
glish. on the other hand, those classified in such a way smartly refer to 
those dominating them as barão—that is, barons—at least in the regional 
context that is informing this study, namely the northeast of Brazil. The 
use of the term “baron” clearly indicates the strategies used by the histori-
cally included to defend their privilege—namely, by giving themselves an 
aristocratic air in both demeanor and language. Before going into some 
more concrete examples that show how this works in everyday encounters, 
i want to lay out some of the theoretical underpinnings upon which the 
empirical analysis can be conducted.
language not only represents difference, privilege, and distinction—it 
also creates and sustains them. John B. Thompson, who wrote the editor’s 
introduction to pierre Bourdieu’s Language and Symbolic Power (2003), 
explains, “The more linguistic capital that speakers possess, the more they 
are able to exploit the system of differences to their advantage and thereby 
secure a profit of distinction. for the forms of expression which are the most 
unequally distributed, both in the sense that conditions for the acquisition 
of the capacity to produce them are restricted and in the sense that the 
expressions themselves are relatively rare on the markets where they appear” 
(Thompson 2003: 19).
pierre Bourdieu indeed offers an analytical framework that allows us to 
analyze language in its relation to power. Bourdieu argues that, in general, 
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“the social uses of language owe their specifically social value to the fact that 
they tend to be organized in systems of differences  .  .  . which reproduce, 
in the symbolic order of differential deviations, the system of social differ-
ence” (Bourdieu 2003: 54). To Bourdieu, language is but one manifestation, 
as well as a tool to negotiate difference in daily interactions. he explains, 
“linguistic exchange . . . is also an economic exchange which is established 
within a particular symbolic relation of power between a producer, endowed 
with a certain linguistic capital, and a consumer (or a market), and which is 
capable of producing a certain material or symbolic profit. in other words, 
utterances are not only (save in exceptional circumstances) signs to be under-
stood and deciphered; they are also signs of wealth, intended to be evaluated 
and appreciated, and signs of authority, intended to be believed and obeyed” 
(Bourdieu 2003: 66). next to financial capital, Bourdieu demonstrates that 
other capitals are equally functional in structuring social space. next to 
social and cultural capital, Bourdieu argues for considering “linguistic capi-
tal, producing a profit of distinction” (Bourdieu 2003: 55).
for Bourdieu, then, language reflects and enacts social hierarchy, and 
for him, “the whole social structure is present in each interaction” (Bour-
dieu 2003: 67). once this basic insight is understood, it can be applied to 
the analysis of more specific constellations—for example, to what is often 
called the “high,” or official, variety of a language. Bourdieu explains, for 
example, that “all linguistic practices are measured against the legitimate 
practices, i.e. the practices of those who are dominant” (Bourdieu 2003: 
53). he also explains the effects that the use of different language codes has 
on the speaker: “speakers lacking the legitimate competence are de facto 
excluded from the social domains in which this competence is required, 
or are condemned to silence” (Bourdieu 2003: 55). When examining the 
genealogy of this high language, Bourdieu finds that “the official language 
is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses. it is in 
the process of state formation that the conditions are created for the con-
stitution of a unified linguistic market, dominated by the official language” 
(Bourdieu 2003: 45).
from there, Bourdieu is also able to shed light on the opposite end of 
the language continuum. When writing about “popular language,” Bour-
dieu finds that “reduced to the status of quaint or vulgar jargons, in either 
case unsuitable for formal occasions, popular uses of the official language 
undergo a systematic devaluation” (Bourdieu 2003: 54). seen through this 
prism, such power-constituting speech acts as condescendence reveal their 
social function: “The strategy of condescension consists in deriving profit 
from the objective relation of power between the languages that confront 
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one another in practice . . . in the very act of symbolically negating that rela-
tion, namely, the hierarchy of the languages and of those who speak them” 
(Bourdieu 2003: 68). Just like any other market, the laws of scarcity also 
apply to the linguistic market: “The more formal the market is, the more 
practically congruent with the norms of the legitimate language, the more it 
is dominated by the dominant, i.e. by the holders of the legitimate compe-
tence, authorized to speak with authority” (Bourdieu 2003: 69).
The effects of linguistic capital are manifold, especially in the field of 
domination: “The reality of linguistic legitimacy consists precisely in the 
fact that dominated individuals are always under the potential jurisdiction of 
formal law, even when they spend all their lives, like the thief described by 
Weber, beyond its reach, so that when placed in a formal situation they are 
doomed to silence or to the broken discourse which linguistic investigation 
often reports” (Bourdieu 2003: 71f ). Dominant language does more than 
control those unable to speak or write it. it silences. “The constraints exer-
cised by the market via the anticipation of possible profit naturally take the 
form of an anticipated censorship, of a self-censorship which determines not 
only the manner of saying, that is, the choice of language-’code switching’ 
in situations of bilingualism—or ‘level’ of language, but also what it will 
be possible or not to say” (Bourdieu 2003: 77). This happens, according to 
Bourdieu, because “the sense of the value of one’s own linguistic products 
is a fundamental dimension of the sense of knowing the place which one 
occupies in the social space. one’s original relation with different markets 
and the experience of the sanctions applied to one’s own body, are doubtless 
some of the mediations which help to constitute that sense of one’s own 
social worth which governs the practical relation to different markets (shy-
ness, confidence, etc.) and, more generally, one’s whole physical posture in 
the social world” (Bourdieu 2003: 82).
according to the italian anthropological linguist Maurizzio Gnerre 
(1991), who wrote about this phenomenon in Brazil, “The official language 
is a communicative system that is accessible only to a reduced part of the 
members of a community; it is a system associated with a cultural patri-
mony presented as a body of values, fixed by written language” (Gnerre 
1991: 6, my translation). This is certainly the case in Brazil, where over 
20 percent of the population is classified as functionally illiterate, which 
means they have no access, let alone dominion, of such elaborate, formal 
language codes. Gnerre finds that “citizens, even if declared equal before 
the law, are in reality discriminated against even on the basis of the very code 
in which the law was written. The majority of the citizens does not have 
access to this code, or, in some cases, has limited access” (Gnerre 1991: 10). 
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The same author also explains that “The separation between the ‘cultured’ 
or ‘official’ variety and the others is profound due to different reasons: the 
cultured variety is associated with the written variety . . . and it is associated 
to the grammatical tradition; it is inventoried in the dictionaries and it is the 
bearer of legitimate cultural tradition and national identity” (Gnerre 1991: 
11). Gnerre leaves no doubt about the function of elaborate language code 
usage—a function that can be traced back to the sixteenth century and that 
still today serves the purpose of constituting power.
as Benedict anderson (2006) has described, and Martin luther demon-
strated much earlier in practice, any communication—written or oral—done 
in an exclusive language code such as latin or grammatically correct euro-
pean portuguese serves the purpose of restricting the circle of participants to 
a minimum; and it is this restricted circle of the educated, or initiated, few 
who tend to use their privileged access not only to dominate and control the 
majority, but also to renew their own source of legitimacy with reference to 
access to privileged knowledge. The circular logic becomes evident: the pow-
erful define an exclusive language and codify it; then they use it to wield their 
power; and finally, they bolster their power through linguistic exclusivity. as 
Gnerre highlights, “language constitutes the most powerful barbed wire to 
block access to power” (Gnerre 1991: 22).
in a Brazilian context, the language of the initiated, the high, sophis-
ticated written portuguese is the portuguese that was codified in coimbra 
and has its portuguese purity upheld by the academia Brasileira de letras, 
the Brazilian academy of literature. it is a portuguese that excludes all those 
who are functionally illiterate or otherwise stuck in their own informality. 
This become particularly relevant in context where the formally educated 
control and regulate access to spheres of power, such as state agencies and 
banks. in these environments, formal language and sophisticated procedural 
protocols serve as very effective means to keep all informal elements out. 
informality, in this Brazilian context, refers to all those not able to dominate 
and manipulate elaborate codes, thus marking them as potentially unedu-
cated and poor.
in 2009, some 21.7 percent of Brazilians fifteen years and older were 
classified as functionally illiterate (defined by unesco as the percentage of 
the population aged fifteen or over with less than four years of study).4 
a 2007 World Bank study found that Brazil’s first-grade repetition rate is 
28 percent, among the highest in the world. it also stated that “according 
to the international pisa tests, approximately half of Brazilian 15-year-olds 
have difficulty reading or cannot read at all; and about three-fourths cannot 
manage basic mathematical operations.”5 according to Ulyssea and szerman 
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(2006) some 35 percent of Brazilians are active in the informal sector, which 
provides a low estimate of all those effectively excluded from the spheres of 
society reserved for the formal or official society, thus suggesting a strong 
overlap of economic informality, illiteracy, poverty, and blackness. indeed, 
the divisions of Brazilian society run deep and can be traced back to colonial 
times. from the beginning of the colony, privileged Brazilians were part 
of what franklin Knight (1990) has called the “official society”—a term 
he employs to describe that part of plantation societies that had access to 
the formal and literate world. The majority of a plantation society, accord-
ing to Knight, was informal. They emerged unplanned, as an unintended 
side effect of slavery and indentured labor. The portuguese crown, as well 
as the independent Brazilian government, for a long time had no real plan 
for these groups. They were simply seen as a problem and finally became 
“the social problem” under Getúlio Vargas, under whose presidency the first 
social programs were enacted targeting these groups who were poor, increas-
ingly urban, functionally or altogether illiterate, and nonwhite. Those social 
groups that were perceived as problematic under Vargas have indeed never 
been able to successfully challenge, let alone reverse, the social hierarchies 
that projected them to the bottom. even after democratization and broad 
political inclusion, in 1988, the system of values and norms upon which 
social hierarchies is constructed survived, having led some to refer to Brazil as 
the “unrevolutionary society” (Mander 1969). indeed, with few exceptions, 
many poor, black, and indigenous Brazilians are still excluded from being 
considered equal members, and their access to full citizenship is barred. The 
mechanisms for keeping them out, however, have changed over time.
Brazil has a long history of applying criteria to separate the formal from 
the informal society, and then using this separation to justify privilege and 
citizenship for one group, and exclusion and second-class citizenship for the 
other. as James holston (2008) has shown recently, the Brazilian electoral 
law of 1881 introduced direct, voluntary elections, but as it did so, it also 
established both literacy and proof-of-income requirements, with the result 
that Brazil witnessed a decline of voters to 2 percent of adults, or 1 percent of 
the total population (holston 2008: 102). holston also shows that in Brazil, 
illiteracy restrictions were maintained until 1985, and even the new 1988 
constitution, with 50 percent illiterate in 1950 and 25 percent in 1980, has 
led him to conclude that “Regardless of political regime—under monarchy, 
democracy, and dictatorship—the few ruled” (holston 2008: 103).
even though this scenario changed completely in 1988, when the fran-
chise was extended to include illiterates and the voting age was lowered 
to sixteen, in contemporary Brazil one of the clearest legacies of colonial 
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domination is the existence of different portuguese language codes—apart 
from the different local dialects. one is the official language, which fol-
lows a portuguese grammar and demands a sophisticated use of pronouns 
and articles. The other one is the Brazilian-spoken portuguese broadly 
used by the “popular classes.” in this variety, there are no pronouns and 
attached articles, no dei-lhe or even dar-lhe-ei. instead, there is dei para 
ele/ela and vou dar para ele/ela. formal Brazilian portuguese grows out of 
portuguese from portugal and thus carries with it grammatical forms that 
are not used in Brazilian colloquial language. Brazilian elites have thus 
long used elaborate languages codes to set themselves apart, especially in 
written portuguese. This was noted as early as in the 1940s, for example, 
by claude levi-strauss, when he was in são paulo helping to establish the 
University of são paulo. here is a quote about his students: “learning was 
something for which they had neither the taste nor the method; yet they 
felt bound to include in their essays, no matter what their nominal subject 
might be, a survey of human evolution from the anthropoid apes to the 
present day. quotations from plato, aristotle and auguste comte would 
be followed by a peroration paraphrased from some egregious hack—the 
obscurer the better, for their purpose” (quoted in Mander 1969: 289). 
Their purpose was, of course, to achieve distinction and to set themselves 
apart from ordinary Brazilians.
The coDifieD lanGUaGe of The laW
a very consequential domain where this distinction between the formal and 
the informal has a structuring force is the law. as Gnerre (1991) explains, 
“To compose a document of any judicial value it is not only necessary to 
know a language and be able to write intelligible phrases, but one must 
also be familiar with a whole complex and archaic phraseology” (Gnerre 
1991: 22). This is indeed the language used in judicial documents, and the 
testimony from the above interviewees hints at this difficulty. if it takes one 
year to fill out an application for a social housing program, it is safe to say 
that this is not an unintended side effect, but rather a functional ingredient 
of the application process. The same logic applies to Brazil’s legal codes in 
general: written by erudite lawyers and humanistic scholars, they are not 
written for the informal sector of Brazil’s society. instead, they serve the 
function of establishing prestige by placing them at the cultural height of 
the colonizing nation and other nations commonly perceived as civilized 
Brazil | 127
and cultured. after all, as Gnerre explains, “The central function of all 
special languages is social: they have a real communicative value, but they 
exclude the people who belong to linguistic out-groups and, at the same 
time, they fulfill the function of reaffirming the identity of the members of 
the in-group” (Gnerre 1991: 23).
To illustrate this phenomenon, i am reproducing a passage from an arti-
cle i wrote together with a Brazilian federal judge, in 2007, about precisely 
the exclusion that the use of sophisticated language codes creates:
To penetrate the spheres of power, Brazilian citizens have to imitate the 
habitus of the powerful. Recently, Brazil initiated a movement, led by the 
association of Brazilian Magistrates (amb), aimed at convincing its members 
to change its language. our preliminary observations, as participants in this 
effort, lead us to a pessimistic diagnosis of this initiative, given that the dis-
cussions in this respect already started without focus, which demonstrates 
the degree of alienation of these attempts, endogenous to the baccalaurean 
problematic, as it confounds language with stylized profile and forgets the 
buffonian warning that “le style est l’homme même,” while at the same time 
going against the terminological specialization—from which we get the so-
called “technolets”—that every scientific-technical knowledge must have. 
in reality, this topic has a profoundness that is not perceivable with such 
superficiality: throughout its historical development, the baccalaurean juridi-
cal language has remained encapsulated the same way as the knowledge that 
it transmits, neglecting that “la liberdad del lenguaje es libertad histórica, 
libertad del hombre como ser histórico.” Without facing the social reality 
to which theoretically it should dedicate itself, this instrumental phraseol-
ogy, even if in fact less invaded by literary affections of doubtable gusto, has 
remained in a somewhat social schizophrenic state in a time when belletristic 
has lost its influence in the formation of contemporary baccalaureates. (cas-
tro Jr. and Reiter 2007: 96, my translation)6
it is hard to overstate the comic effect that this appeal for the use of a 
simple language made by a Brazilian federal judge produces. however, it 
illustrates just how difficult it is for those who are members of such an elite 
group as Brazilian federal judges to make a genuine connection to ordinary 
citizens. apparently against their overt intention, their language continues 
to exclude by virtue of its elevated code. another example of the exclusion-
ary effect of language is this excerpt from the Brazilian Diario oficial, that 
is, the official newspaper of the federal government to inform its citizens of 
what it has decided.
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Ministry of Justice
national council for the Rights of children and adolescents
act of the seventy-seventh ordinary assembly, held on february 14 of 2001
at nine hours and forty minutes of the fourteenth of february of two thousand 
and one, the seventy-seventh ordinary assembly of the national council for the 
rights of children and adolescents (conada), presided over by its president, 
cláudio augusto Vieira da silva, (foundation fe e alegria do Brasil). present 
are . . . We take notice of the justified absence of . . . We have called on the pres-
ence of nonprofit councilors . . . , as well as civil society deputy councilors . . .
The president opened the session, offering his welcome to all and thanking 
them for their participation in this first assembly of the new millennium. he then 
submitted the minutes to the plenary. They were approved, with exception of item 
eight of the second day, shifting it to the fourth item of the first day. for the item 
“General topics,” the scheduling of executive assemblies were solicited; discussion 
of the Direct action of Unconstitutionality of articles two hundred and fifty-four 
and two hundred and fifty-five of the law for the child and the adolescent (esta-
tuto da criança e do adolescente), proposed by the Brazilian Workers party – ptb 
– with the participation of conanda in the committee of supervision of the 
social policies for public safety. The other items remained unaltered. continu-
ing, the president proposed changes in the composition of the existing Thematic 
commissions and Working Groups, justifying that such a change would not hurt 
the internal Regimentation of the council. he informed that the commissions 
would bring the thematic angles (éixos temáticos) together, as they would function 
as follows: 1) commission of articulation—would have as a thematic angle the 
state, Municipal, and capital councils and the Title councils; 2) commission 
for Budgeting and finance—would have as a thematic angle the socio-educational 
measures; 3) commission for public policies—would have the fourth national 
conference as a thematic angle; 4) commission of communication—the actions 
of this commission would be developed in partnership with andi and be restricted 
to the necessary proceedings in order to develop a communication policy together 
with andi: The proposal was debated and approved by all. next, the assembly 
moved to the composition of members, which was constituted as follows: . . . The 
Technical commissions met during the period of the morning and beginning 
of the afternoon in order to deal with specific issues of their area of action, to 
update the pending items of the previous assemblies and to elaborate an action 
plan and the goals for the exercise of two and one.
(excerpt from Diario oficial da união, no. 67-e, 5ª feira, 
april 5, 2001, page 2, sect. 1, my translation)7
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What is it that they actually did and decided? it is indeed difficult to tell. 
Where in the first example, it was the use of elaborate language code that 
excludes, the second example constitutes a typical example of the exaggerated 
formalism and “protocolism” that characterizes Brazilian public politics—and 
thus provides a typical example of how formalism and protocolism exclude all 
those not prepared and trained in the skills of deciphering, let alone actively 
engaging in, elaborate and overly formalistic language games. even if this type 
of exclusion is far from unique to Brazil, in the case of Brazil, the end results 
of both types of exclusion are that ordinary, informal citizens are routinely 
excluded from accessing the public sphere. The Brazilian public sphere—that 
is, the space where citizens and the government can connect and interact, 
where citizen voices and concerns can crystallize and solidify and ideally influ-
ence the government, holding it accountable and responsive—this public 
sphere is as divided as the rest of Brazil, as the inequalities that character-
ize and indeed structure broader Brazilian society spill over into the public 
sphere, dividing it into a plethora of different public spheres. Whereas those 
public spheres operating at the bottom of social hierarchies tend to be open 
and inclusive, even if homogeneous, those connected to the spheres of power 
and money tend to be dominated by individuals who are able to use their 
symbolic capitals strategically and in their own favor. The language and con-
duct of these public spheres is anything but public; it is official and erudite, 
formalistic and full of protocols. as such, it fulfills a gate-keeping function, 
excluding all those unable to participate in this erudite language game while 
at the same constituting privilege for all those who can.
The elite domination of some public spheres and the political realm per 
se finds reflection in the astonishing support that average Brazilians have 
given to those public representatives who stand up, or even just for, the 
informal sector of Brazilian society—that sector that cannot read the Diario 
oficial or the complicated acts and decrees produced by Brazilian lawyers 
and judges. The election of lula da silva must certainly be understood in 
this light—as the election of someone “like us”—with only four years of for-
mal education, who started to work at age twelve as a shoe shiner. The more 
recent election of Tiririca to serve as federal deputy provides yet another 
example of the same phenomenon. in the 2010 national elections, Tiririca 
received 1.3 million votes—more than any other candidate. Tiririca briefly 
faced a challenge for being considered illiterate, but ultimately passed this 
hurdle. in his campaign, he stated, for example:
Vote for Tiririca, it can’t get any worse than it already is! (Vote no Tiririca, pior 
do que tá não fica!)
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hi folks, i am here to ask for your vote, because i want to be a federal repre-
sentative, so i can help the most “needy,” including my family. so my number is 
2222. if you won’t vote for me, i will dieeeeee! (oi gente, estou aqui para pedir 
seu voto porque eu quero ser deputado federal, para ajudar os mais necessitado, 
inclusive a minha família. portanto meu número é 2222. se vocês não votarem, 
eu vou morreeer!)
hi, i am Tiririca, from TV. i am a candidate for federal representative. 
What does a federal representative do? actually, i don’t know, but if you vote for 
me, i will tell you. (oi, eu sou o Tiririca da televisão. sou candidato a deputado 
federal. o que é que faz um deputado federal? na realidade eu não sei, mas vote 
em mim, que te conto.)
clearly, the greatest appeal of Tiririca was his informality, expressed in 
his very rudimentary portuguese, full of semantic and grammatical “errors.” 
This is yet another “man of the people” who does not represent traditional 
economic and educational elites and is himself not part of the traditional 
political elites—and is thus able to cater to all those who seek a more genu-
ine representation. if self-rule and direct rule are impossible, then having a 
closer, more direct representation seems the second-best option for many 
who feel misrepresented, cheated, or not represented at all by political elites.8 
seen under this light, the election of Tiririca in 2010, and also the election 
of lula to the presidency in 2002 and 2009, are calls for a more direct and 
immediate participation in politics, uttered by people who feel and know 
that they are excluded from it. if they cannot participate themselves directly, 
the next best thing is to elect a representative who is “one of us.”
conclUsion: The foRMal aGainsT The infoRMal
“Domination is the requisite for exploitation,” writes anibal quijano (2008: 
220). indeed, as the Brazilian case demonstrates, domination is an intricate, 
multidimensional, strategic game that makes use of different capitals—
material, symbolic, and linguistic—in order to uphold and actively defend 
privilege and regulate access to the spheres where power, money, and 
influence are brokered. people who do not look or talk “right”—that is, 
people unable to reproduce elaborate language codes, as well as women and 
nonwhites—are kept outside. exclusion and a transformation of citizen-
ship into a set of entitlements—accessible only to those with money, power, 
or access to other sorts of symbolic capitals—have alienated the common 
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people from democracy in Brazil and elsewhere. The Brazilian case allows 
for an unveiling of some of the specific mechanisms at work that produce 
this alienation. exclusion, the use of complicated and neocolonial proto-
cols, the use of elevated language codes, a legal tradition that is based on 
colonial traditions that do not reflect the lifeworlds of ordinary people, and 
finally a transformation of democracy and citizenship from a regime where 
rulers and ruled strongly overlapped into a system where citizenship is a 
mere legal right—all these factors reinforce each other and alienate ordinary 
citizens from politics, the public sphere, the state, and government. The 
fault lines of these divisions have developed out of colonial scripts, where 
former colonizers have first become official citizens and later constituted 
the formal society, whereas the formerly colonized have remained informal 
and as such remain excluded from the official world (Mignolo 2008). and 
just as alexis de Tocqueville (2003) argued in the early nineteenth century, 
democracy relies on the kind of social glue that associational life provides. 
if significant segments of a democratic citizenry feel alienated from politics, 
this glue is drying up and society falls apart into at least two disconnected 
groups: the included and the excluded, where the included have a tendency 
to perceive their own privileges as commodified entitlements, whereas the 
excluded have lost their stake in the polity.
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colombia
When Law and Reality Clash
These are difficulties the man from the country has not expected; the Law, 
he thinks, should surely be accessible at all times and to everyone, but as he 
now takes a closer look at the doorkeeper in his fur coat, with his big sharp 
nose and long, thin, black Tartar beard, he decides that it is better to wait 
until he gets permission to enter. The doorkeeper gives him a stool and lets 
him sit down at one side of the door. There he sits for days and years.
—fRanz KafKa, BEFoRE ThE LAW , 1915
in 1991, the colombian state declared itself a multiethnic 
and pluricultural nation. The new constitution also included article 55, 
an affirmative action law for ethnic minorities. law 70 of 1993, known as 
the law of the Black communities, soon followed, giving afro-colombian 
communities in the pacific coastal areas the right to collectively own and 
control their ancestral lands.1
The new national legislation made it easier to enhance the relationship 
between afro-colombian organizations and the state. for most afro-
colombian leaders, their historical claims for recognition as a marginalized 
minority group were officially validated when the state gave them the right 
to collectively negotiate their demands. The official recognition of their eth-
nic identity as a distinct minority group gave the afro-colombian advocates 
an unparalleled opportunity to approach state and international organiza-
tions. in 2000, after four years of debate, law 649 was passed, providing 
that afro-colombians have the right to elect two congressmen as an ethnic 
group. Moreover, colombia signed the international labor organization 
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(ilo) convention on indigenous and Tribal communities,2 as well as the 
international convention on the elimination of all forms of Racial Dis-
crimination of the United nations.3
The legal recognition of afro-colombians and their rights as an eth-
nic group is the outcome of grass-roots organizing at the local, national, 
and international levels. indeed, afro-colombians and their supporters 
have created such organizations as the afro-colombian national confer-
ence, the national association of afro-colombians Displaced by Violence 
(afrodes), the national association of afro-colombian Mayors (amu-
nafro), the Washington, D.c.– based afro-latino Development alliance, 
the Black community process (pcn), and the afroamerica xxi-colombia 
to advance their collective interests.
however, despite all these efforts and the legal successes that afro-
colombian organizing has achieved through the years, most analysts find 
that the political and economic situation of afro-colombians, as well as their 
overall well-being and safety, has not improved significantly, even though 
overall violence in the country has ebbed (Urrea and Viafara 2006). accord-
ing to the 2005 census, the infant mortality rate among afro-descendants 
remains nearly twice as high as that of the rest of the population (48.1 
compared to 26.9 per 1,000 live births). in chocó, home to 44.1 percent 
of the total afro-colombian population, infant mortality rates have reached 
77.5 per 1,000.4 hence, the infant mortality rate in chocó is comparable to 
that of the Republic of congo, ethiopia, and Mauritania (observatory on 
Racial Discrimination 2008). how can this be explained? in other words: 
why has the livelihood of afro-colombians not improved despite the rati-
fication and enactment of a whole series of progressive and protective laws? 
concretely, the research question driving this project is this: in 1991, afro-
colombians were recognized as a minority group and given collective rights. 
however, according to most analysts, these new rights have not translated 
into improved living conditions. Why?
To address this question, this chapter focuses on three causal factors 
that together provide a plausible answer to the question. i argue that, first, 
changed legal frameworks do not automatically change social realities; they 
only provide possibilities for change. factual social change depends on the 
social power to bring it about, where different social groups assert different 
influences to bring about change, where change is mediated by the state and 
the state’s own power. To put this into a schematic framework: pro-change 
forces face anti-change forces, where both seek to influence the state and 
are in turn influenced by it, taking advantage of the political opportunity 
structures that the state provides them (Tarrow 1994). effective change thus 
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depends on the relative power positions of pro-change forces, anti-change 
forces, and the relative autonomy (or lack thereof ) of the state. Weak states 
that lack autonomy will be unable to change social realities, as they lack the 
resources to actually produce the kind of reality that the law depicts. fur-
thermore, weak states are weak because they lack legitimacy and thus cannot 
count on the compliance of their citizens, thus making it costly to enforce 
the rule of law and order (Bendix 1969; Mockus 2009).
secondly, this general tendency is sharpened when the law does not grow 
out of social reality, but represents an unachieved ideal, expressing what 
ought to be, rather than what actually is. such conditions of “legal idealism” 
(Moreno 1969) are worsened in extremely divided societies where lawmak-
ers are not familiar with, and ultimately not interested in, the realities of 
the majority, let alone the reality of excluded and marginalized groups. This 
problem is made more acute due to the fact that citizenship in contempo-
rary democracies inherited not just codification from Rome; according to 
John pocock (1995), it was also during the Roman empire that citizenship 
was forever transformed into a legal principle, thus losing its original Greek 
political content. Under such circumstances, existing legal frameworks can 
easily serve as tokens for substantial change, given that one of the central, 
and most consequential, places of exclusion in highly divided societies is the 
exclusion from the judiciary. as James holston and Teresa caldeira (1998) 
have demonstrated for Brazil, the poor and excluded simply do not have 
access to the court system, while inclusion is constituted and defined by just 
this access. These authors write that “The civil component of citizenship 
remains impaired as citizens suffer systematic violations of their rights. in 
such uncivil democracies, violence, injustice, and impunity are the norms” 
(in agüero and stark 1998: 263).
in colombia, as elsewhere in the region, access to the courts has 
remained a privilege of the few. once new laws are created, political elites 
can then retreat without being accused of not acting on behalf of the poor 
and excluded. The law, under such circumstances, has become a toothless 
scapegoat, replacing political action for change.5
finally, overcoming persistent social forces aimed at reproducing the 
privilege of some by perpetuating the exclusion of others takes more than 
altering a law, or even a constitution. Racism, especially in societies that 
are officially colorblind and raceless, is a practice that easily escapes rigid 
legal frameworks, as it operates in gray zones of legality, structuring people’s 
lives and the outlook one group has towards another (Wade 2005). none 
of these practices and the values associated with them can be eliminated by 
legal decree alone.
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in this chapter, then, i discuss these three themes one after the other 
by applying them to the case of colombia and the specific situation of 
the colombian pacific coast, home of a predominantly afro-colombian 
population. colombia, and its pacific rim in particular, thus present a 
demonstrative case that allows one to discern and describe the causal mech-
anisms at work with exceptional clarity. as such, colombia represents a 
typical scenario, and understanding colombia promises to shed light on 
other cases that present similar conditions for the independent variables 
at work here—namely, weak states, postcolonial legal frameworks, and 
ingrained racist practices in everyday interactions. To properly situate these 
approaches, i will begin with a short theory discussion of the works of Jür-
gen habermas and nancy fraser.
sTUcK BeTWeen facTs anD noRMs
Jürgen habermas’s most significant contribution to contemporary demo-
cratic theory is his elaboration of a utopian model of democratic legitimacy, 
based on deliberate public consent and his grounding of morals and 
legal frameworks in democratic, rational communication. Distinguishing 
between lifeworld and system, habermas finds that capitalism and the state 
exert control over citizens. civil society, on the other hand, offers the possi-
bility for free and uncoerced communication—thus making it the place par 
excellence for the renewal of democratic legitimacy. Writing in the enlight-
enment tradition, habermas takes on Max Weber’s pessimistic critique of 
modernity and points to the positive and universalistic dimension of reason-
able argumentation as a way out of Weber’s inevitable “iron cage.” in his 
vision, any mutually binding rule must be based on the agreement of all the 
potentially affected. habermas does not argue that civil society or the public 
sphere have ever come close to this ideal. instead, his Theory of Communica-
tive Action explains what a democratic civil society and a democratic public 
sphere should look like, and what they can accomplish.
With regard to legal frameworks, habermas (1998) argues that “the 
de facto validity of legal norms is determined by the degree to which such 
norms are acted on or implemented, and thus by the extent to which one 
can actually expect the addressees to accept them” (habermas 1998: 30). 
in his 1998 book Between Facts and Norms, habermas thus extends his 
work on democratic communication to the genesis of laws. Without engag-
ing in some of the controversial discussions about the difference between 
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legal language and common language (abad i ninet and Monserrat Molas 
2009), habermas’s work still provides a useful framework for not only ana-
lyzing the difference, or gap, between legal norms and everyday facts; it also 
points out how to potentially bridge this gap. concretely, habermas offers a 
vision of how laws ought to emerge in democratic societies, namely, as insti-
tutionalized norms that have been created by democratic discourse. This 
discourse must be inclusive and follow democratic principles—and as such, 
as argued above, it can best happen in diverse public spheres or in different 
associations that then together provide foci of democratic rationality, able to 
spread and disseminate democratic norms and values. Democratic laws, to 
put it bluntly, must emerge from below and should not be imposed on the 
people from above by elites.
another helpful theorist able to advance this discussion is nancy fraser. 
fraser (1998) has shown that contemporary injustices are rooted in a lack 
of recognition and a lack of economic distribution, where both mechanisms 
reinforce each other, but have distinguishable causes and results. although 
economic inequality results in the stigmatization of the poor, fraser argues 
that this stigmatization is not the cause of their poverty. lack of recognition, 
on the contrary, expressed as cultural domination and racialized and gen-
dered oppression, is a cause of injustice that persists even when economic 
equality is achieved. The recognition of the different causes of inequality 
brings fraser to distinguish between different strategies to overcome them, 
as one strategy cannot address the different causes of oppression.
fraser points at capitalism as the cause of economic inequality and 
socialization into fixed models of gendered and racialized identities as the 
root of cultural oppression. she finds that changing the causes behind these 
inequalities requires the radical deconstruction of “traditional” identities. 
The utopia of a radical deconstruction of traditional identities with fixed 
roles that ultimately deny change and learning brings fraser close to the 
habermasean project of the reasonable and democratic discussion about 
norms and rules involving all those potentially affected by a law. such a 
nonauthoritarian defining of rules has been wrongly accused of being uni-
versalistic (e.g., by fraser herself and iris Marion young [1990]). To the 
contrary, as a careful reading of the Theory of Communicative Action and 
Between Facts and Norms shows, habermas argues that any group of peo-
ple have to decide discursively what norms they accept for them. similar to 
fraser’s notion of deconstructing traditional identities, habermas’s commu-
nicative action (similar to popper’s writing on the open society) provides for 
a theory of tentative and relativistic definition of democratically legitimated 
laws cum social norms.
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fraser (1998) has also pointed to the shortcomings of habermas’s work. 
according to her, instead of one dominant public sphere, we must rather 
think of several concurrent public spheres. furthermore, instead of haber-
mas’s focus on consent, fraser points to the inherent conflict within each 
public sphere and between one another. civil society, under such a light, is 
a sphere where structural inequalities are played out. however, even bearing 
this critique in mind, civil societies and public spheres remain the central 
places bearing the potential to initiate struggles for justice and consolidate 
new norms and laws. civil societies and public spheres, after all, bear the 
potential for freedom from control and coercion, as well as the possibility 
of a collective and discursive deconstruction of inequalities that have sedi-
mented in our lifeworlds. Reified structural inequalities have a tendency to 
become “normalized,” which refers to their perception as being “normal,” 
“unproblematic,” and “natural.” as such, they easily escape scrutiny and 
become institutionalized mechanisms of understanding and making sense 
out of the world.
This debate points to the need for active public participation, and 
encompassing and inclusive public discourses leading eventually into a 
gradual solidification and institutionalization, thus becoming law. in this 
view, which is indebted to emile Durkheim, laws are institutionalized 
traditions. They are democratic if and when all those sectors of society liv-
ing under the law have had an opportunity in the formative phase of the 
law, by participating in the discourse that produced a widely accepted and 
hence legitimized common sense and a practice that is reflective of this 
common sense.
hence, habermas and fraser leave us with an analytical framework that 
allows us to assess and judge the legitimacy of laws, as well as the prob-
lems arising when laws do not reflect social realities. applied to the case 
of colombia, it quickly becomes clear that one of the main problems with 
the new legal frameworks created in 1991 and thereafter is rooted in a lack 
of popular involvement in the process of their emergence—this, i argue, 
despite the constituent assembly held in 1991 that drafted the new constitu-
tion. To use a somewhat exaggerated language, this chapter argues that the 
new colombian constitution did not really emerge from below, despite the 
constituent assembly, because important sectors of the population, such as 
afro-colombians, did not participate.
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laW anD RealiTy in laTin aMeRica anD coloMBia
colombia, just like the rest of latin america, firmly stands in a Roman legal 
tradition and adopted the napoleonic civil code as the base for organiz-
ing civil, commercial, and penal law. for francisco Moreno, this means 
that “The acceptance of Roman law and its implicit philosophical bases 
determined the direction of spanish political thought and institutional 
development. The idealism and universalism which had found judicial and 
political expression in the Ius honorarium, Ius Naturale, and Ius gentium 
became an integral part of the spanish way of thinking” (Moreno 1969: 4). 
Moreno further explains that
law was for the Romans, above everything else, a moral interpretation of life—
an effort to define those ethical goals that the political community should strive 
to attain. The works of cicero, seneca, and the later Roman lawyers suggest 
examples of this interpretation of the legal function. law became an attempt, 
based upon abstract ethical reasoning, to determine how people ought to 
behave. (Moreno 1969: 7)
it is this tradition that to this day determines the outlook on laws in the 
latin world. Under this tradition, laws do not reflect reality as it is—they 
rather represent how the social world should be ordered. in colonial contexts, 
this tradition takes on yet another, complicating aspect, as it raises the ques-
tion of who it is that “imagines” the social order of a country in such a way.
as we have argued elsewhere,
latin america . . . inherited a tradition of code law rooted in the legal practices 
of the Roman empire and spread across the globe by spanish and portuguese 
colonizers, which is deeply marked by legal idealism. legal idealism charac-
terizes a system where laws are created and codified by elites, who take little 
interest and are indeed unfamiliar with the reality of the majority. Under such 
circumstances, legal codes do not necessarily articulate the consolidated prac-
tices and norms of “the people.” Rather, they represent the definition how a 
society ought to organize according to societal elites; and they thus contain an 
inherent paternalistic and antidemocratic trait of elite-tutelage. (nef and Reiter 
2009: 43f )
in the case of colombia, the answer to this question was clear before 
1991, as the previous constitution was enacted in 1886 and thus firmly 
represented the imaginary and legal cunning of the country’s europhile 
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elite. explains lynch: “once the codification movement did take hold in 
the 1850’s, it was still isolated from the realities of colombian life. . . . it 
was enacted with little or no debate even though it was based on a span-
ish code of 1829 drafted for a very different social and economic context” 
(lynch 1981: 31). lynch further finds that “This isolation of the codifica-
tion movement is another example of the tendency to import european 
political and legal forms in an effort to pattern the formal character of the 
colombian state after the european metropolis” (lynch 1981: 32).
according to Robert Means, “a certain degree of isolation is a natural 
part of codification in the civilian tradition because of the relative autonomy 
of that tradition’s intellectual structure. But the disparity in development 
between colombia and even relatively under-developed european coun-
tries like spain magnified the isolation in two ways. The first concerned the 
number of persons for whom the code had any relevance. . . . The second 
concerned the proportion of the new code that was relevant to anyone” 
(Means 1973: 22f ).
This legal tradition continued to influence the ways legal frameworks 
developed all the way into the twenty-first century. During the early twen-
tieth century, according to lynch, “the dominant trend in the legal order 
remain[ed] the continuation of the codification process. new codes were 
enacted to facilitate the expansion of private corporations and, more recently, 
to increase government control over the use of corporate capital” (lynch 
1981: 33). During the 1960s, finally, the colombian state reformed several 
of its legal codes, giving more power to the executive (lynch 1981: 34).
in general, colombia, just like the rest of latin america, confronts a 
situation where the law stands in isolation, or even in opposition, to reality. 
according to one analyst, “The typical problem of the ‘peripheral moder-
nity’ in regard to the allopoiesis of law amounts to the weakness, irrelevance 
as well as the absence of the constitution as a structural coupling of politics 
and law, a mechanism that makes a legal solution of the self-reference prob-
lem of the legal system possible. The political takes precedence over the legal 
so that one can hardly speak of operative autonomy or functional differen-
tiation of both systems” (neves 2001: 260). The same author, who is a legal 
scholar specializing in latin american legal traditions and philosophy, con-
cludes his diagnosis of contemporary constitutionality in the region thus: 
“There is a scandalous divergence between the constitutional model based 
on democratic principles and rule of law, on the one hand, and political and 
legal practice, on the other hand” (neves 2001: 260).
in the case of colombia, with the expansion of executive power came 
the growth of clientelism. according to lynch, “The most important trend 
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in the political sphere has been the increase in government planning and the 
use of regulatory law to control the economy. at the close of the nineteenth 
century, the government had become a caretaker state primarily concerned 
with maintaining order and enforcing a set of rules designed to facilitate 
private economic agreements. The two major parties competed for control 
over the public bureaucracy as a source for jobs, money, and status. The 
party in power used the public treasury to reward its faithful with jobs and 
manipulated the capital investment of government funds to their advan-
tage” (lynch 1981: 35f ).
clientelism is alive and well in colombia, as agudelo (2002) has 
recently demonstrated. according to agudelo, after 1988, when may-
ors started to be elected directly, the system of “a vote for a favor” grew. 
explains agudelo: “now that the population had a much more direct 
mechanism to approach a politician in the midst of their great needs for 
services and employment, the interchange of votes for tangible material 
benefits accelerated” (agudelo 2002: 178). The question then is: how 
much of a break does the new constitution of 1991 represent? The very 
procedure that produced this new constitution is suggestive. The con-
stituent assembly came together in february 1991 and after five months 
of deliberation produced the new constitution, which became effective 
in July of that same year. The population elected seventy delegates to the 
assembly. in addition, and in order to seal the peace agreement with dif-
ferent armed forces, four delegates of previous guerilla movements also 
participated in this process, although without the right to vote on the final 
draft. however, the different factions of the until-then very loosely orga-
nized colombian Black power movement were unable to overcome their 
internal divisions and settle on one candidate to represent their interests 
in the assembly (agudelo 2002: 182). an indigenous leader (francisco 
Rojas) represented the interests of the black community, raising this issue 
on the last day of the meeting.
however, even if the Black power movement had been able to be more 
present in this process, the outcome, i suspect, would not have been much 
different. This can be seen when comparing the colombian case to other, 
similar processes in the region. in Brazil, for example, even though popular 
segments participated in the drafting of the 1988 constitution, popular par-
ticipation did not bring the law closer to reality. if anything, some elements 
of the 1988 constitution are even more utopian, leading Roberto campos 
to the conclusion that “The constitution of 1988 promised us a swedish 
social security with Mozambican resources” (Revista Veja, october 8, 2008, 
my translation).
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Despite the polemic tone of this statement, made by a right-wing 
economist and politician, the problem he points out is very real. social 
inequality, after all, cannot be legislated away, especially when mechanisms 
and resources able to actually bring such a desired new reality about do 
not accompany the new legal frameworks. it is thus not surprising that the 
anything-but-right-wing colombian writer Gabriel García Márquez reaches 
a verdict about the relation between law and reality in colombia similar to 
the one voiced by campos in and on Brazil. says Márquez: “i believe that 
we are acting, thinking, conceiving and trying to go on making not a real 
country, but one of paper. The constitution, the laws  .  .  . everything in 
colombia is magnificent, everything on paper. it has no connection with 
reality” (quoted in pearce 1990: 11).
The colombian constituent assembly, as well as the ones in Brazil and 
other latin american countries that have recently enacted new constitutions 
(such as Bolivia and ecuador) thus all followed the french revolutionary 
model by focusing on changing legal frameworks in order to overcome 
deep-seated political and social problems. Doing so, they attempted, in the 
words of Moreno, to “legislate problems out of existence” (Moreno 1969: 9) 
without being able to establish, let alone guarantee, the necessary enforce-
ment mechanisms that could actually bring about these realities and bridge 
the gap between legal normativity and social reality—or facticity, in the 
words of habermas.
such laws do provide political opportunities (Tarrow 1994) for histori-
cally marginalized populations to organize and mobilize—a phenomenon 
we have been able to witness amply, as the new legal frameworks did indeed 
lead to increased levels of black and indigenous contentious organizing, and 
even to the emergence of new leadership among this segment of colombian 
society. however, the same is true for the historically dominant segments 
of colombian society. To them, the new constitution and law 70 also pro-
vided ample political opportunities.
By passing beautiful laws and signing international conventions that are 
then either not enforced, or actively violated, the colombian government is 
able to garner international legitimacy and thus substitute it for democratic 
internal legitimacy. The structural problems of this country—elite domina-
tion and concentration of landownership—have not been addressed and 
remain in place. The legalization of the political aspects of citizenship in a 
world where access to the law is a privilege of the few means that traditional, 
conservative political and economic elites have not much to fear from an 
independent judiciary, because they know that the poor have no access to 
the law so that they can actually make it work for them. There are very few 
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lawsuits brought forward by historically excluded groups—and even fewer 
lawsuits won. Where people and groups pressure the government to enforce 
the law, they are intimidated and their lives are threatened by the executive 
arm of the elites—the paramilitary groups—as in the case of the current 
president of the association of Displaced afro-colombians, afrodes, whose 
life has been threatened several times since she started advocating for the 
fulfillment of the human rights anchored in the colombian constitution.
instead of political power, afro-colombians now have laws like law 70, 
but they do not find much support to actually enforce it, as both the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government remain under firm elite control 
and are opposed to changing the status quo. colombian citizenship has thus 
become even more legalized and less political.6 effective citizenship in such 
a system critically depends on access to the legal system—“the right to sue 
and be sued,” according to pocock. This right, however, is distributed very 
unequally in colombia, as elsewhere in the region, where access to the legal 
system has remained an elite privilege. castoriadis’s words come to mind: 
“The ‘executive’ power does not execute anything; it decides and governs. it 
is bailiffs and secretaries who ‘execute.’ The ‘executive’ power is in reality the 
governmental power; it makes decisions that are predetermined by no law. 
it does not ‘apply’ the law; it acts within the framework of the laws, which 
is something else entirely. its decisions are, in the major cases, discretionary 
and without remedy” (castoriadis 1990: 214f ).
The missing element in afro-colombian empowerment is the political. 
Because of their political weakness, afro-colombians pose no real threat 
to the interests of traditional elites, who firmly control the executive and 
legislative branches of government—and have been able to use the indepen-
dence of the judiciary in their own favor. Wherever afro-colombians have 
challenged their exclusion from the political, then traditional elites, who 
control not only the government but also the state and the very definition 
of what “political” means and who has legitimate access to this realm, have 
struck back violently in order to uphold the system. The effects of the politi-
cal weakness of afro-colombians are made worse by the relative weakness 
of the colombian state—an argument that requires some further scrutiny.
WhaT is a WeaK sTaTe?
once such a new legal framework is created, the inevitable question 
becomes: what is done for this law to become reality? colombia’s state has 
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historically been too weak to even fulfill the minimum requirements that 
give states their very definition, namely, the control of violence in a ter-
ritory. several nonstate actors, mostly guerilla movements, have long and 
successfully disputed control over several parts of the colombian territory. 
With the proposal of the plan colombia by president pastrana in 1998, and 
the significant financial support received from the United states with its 
advent, the colombian state was able to significantly strengthen the execu-
tive branch of the state, together with the military. however, the very strong 
military bias of this support has led not to an equal strengthening of the 
colombian state, but to a one-sided growth of the military and the execu-
tive branch of government. strengthening the law-enforcement and military 
capacity without strengthening the legislative and judicial components of 
the colombian state has done nothing and maybe even contributed to a 
further erosion of the legitimacy of the colombian state. a strong state, 
as hillel and vom hau (2008) have recently argued, cannot be reduced to 
the power of the executive or the military. We know at least since the work 
of Max Weber’s Economy and Society, first published in the 1920s, that for 
government to work successfully it needs to rely on the willing compli-
ance of the citizenry. Reinhard Bendix, who followed Weber’s analysis while 
examining changing social orders and how they relate to nation-building 
and citizenship (Bendix 1969), has thus argued that “While governments 
vary greatly with regard to the subordination they demand and the rights 
they acknowledge, the term ‘political community’ may be applied wherever 
the relations between rulers and ruled involve shared understandings con-
cerning this exchange and hence are based in some measure on agreement” 
(Bendix 1969: 23). Bendix has summed up this insight by stating that “Ulti-
mately, it is a question of ‘good will’ whether the laws and regulations of 
political authority are implemented effectively by the officials and sustained 
by public compliance and initiative” (Bendix 1969: 23).
in short, and following both Weber and Bendix, it becomes clear that 
“effective authority thus depends upon cumulative, individual acts of com-
pliance or confidence” (Bendix 1969: 24). This argument receives much 
empirical support from the experience of the successful city government of 
the colombian capital, Bogotá, under the mayor antanus Mockus (Janu-
ary 2001 to December 2003). as Mockus (2009) explains, it was through 
instilling in the population a sense of admiration for the law coupled with 
a fear of legal sanction, together with the establishment and dissemination 
of moral codes of conduct and the creation of a social environment of social 
trust and control, that the city of Bogotá was able to successfully combat the 
then-rampant crime, disregard for the law, and general disregard of anything 
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relating to the government and public life. By focusing on legal norms, 
moral norms, and social norms, the Mockus administration was able to 
significantly reduce homicide rates from a peak in 1992 of 80 homicides 
per 100,000 inhabitants in the city of Bogotá to 23 per 100,000 in 2004 
(Mockus 2009: 143). Due to increased voluntary compliance with traffic 
regulations, Bogotá also experienced a reduction of deaths in traffic acci-
dents, which went down from some 24 per 100,000 during the 1990s to 8.6 
in 2003 (Mockus 2009: 145).
in general, however, the colombian state has not made the kinds of 
investments in citizen trust and voluntary compliance that Mockus initi-
ated in Bogotá in 2001. To the contrary, the widespread sentiment among 
colombians towards government is one of well-founded distrust, which 
then produces a pattern of seeking to replace the logic of the public with 
the private logic of personal dependence. as Brazilian anthropologist 
Roberto da Matta (1987 has explained, where the state is not trusted, peo-
ple end up betting on personal-trust relationships, which then leads into 
systems of patrons and clients—the proverbial clientelism. even though 
da Matta writes about Brazil, his analysis equally applies to other latin 
american countries that have inherited iberian legal traditions and associ-
ated behavioral codes. Da Matta explains how for most Brazilians, the very 
notion of the state and the law it represents implies something negative. he 
quotes a popular Brazilian proverb that says, “for my friends, everything; 
for my enemies, the law!” (da Matta 1987: 319). furthermore, da Matta 
finds in an empirical study among Rio de Janeiro residents that to most, 
following the law is considered a stupid thing to do. indeed, most people 
interviewed by da Matta considered those obeying the law idiots (da Matta 
1987: 318). The general point that da Matta makes is that being a citizen 
is a social role that not only needs to be learned, but also oftentimes holds 
negative connotations—at least among the Rio de Janeiro inhabitants he 
interviewed during the late 1980s. Da Matta comes to the conclusion that 
“citizenship as a social role is not experienced in this manner in daily life. 
in effect, the word ‘citizen’ is always used in negative situations in Brazil 
to demarcate the position of someone who is at a disadvantage or inferior” 
(da Matta 1987: 317).
it is this negative association with rules, laws, and being a citizen in 
general that antanus Mockus sought to change while serving as mayor in 
Bogotá. The colombian state is thus weak not only because it lacks resources 
and capabilities; it is weak because its citizens do not have enough trust in its 
functioning to voluntarily comply with the existing laws and regulations. a 
weak bond exists between the state and its citizens—something that should 
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not surprise anybody aware of a history of elitism and corruption that has 
long defined the colombian government. in colombia, this situation is 
worsened by its history of elite pacts, known as the “national front,” which 
secured power to the two predominant parties for decades, blocking the 
access of popular interests to the state apparatus. Where states are controlled 
by elites, and citizens feel that the state is not truly theirs, alienation and lack 
of compliance are inevitable.
furthermore, the weak colombian state also lacks autonomy from 
societal elites—so that social hierarchies spill over into the political realm 
and transform the state into an instrument of societal elites. in colombia, 
traditional elites have had such a firm grip on the state that oppositional 
groups were pushed into illegality, thus forming guerilla movements. as 
a result, colombians are confronted with strong elites, able to control 
the state apparatus and use it in their own interest; a weak bond between 
the state and its citizens, thus leading to reluctant voluntary compliance; 
and—in the case of afro-colombians—a social group that is unable to 
garner enough political power to oppose the hegemonic societal forces that 
control the colombian state.
Under such conditions, crafting new, beautiful laws becomes just 
another superficial state maneuver with little or no real consequence. To 
make matters worse, a history of at times camouflaged racist practices has 
further weakened the bond between citizens and the colombian state. it has 
also produced a social reality, or fact of extremely unequal lives in colom-
bia, keeping afro-colombians and indigenous people at the very bottom 
of social, economic, and political hierarchies. The colombian way of racial 
exclusion thus deserves some further scrutiny.
RacisM in a DeRacializeD socieTy
as i have argued above, the final factor impeding substantial positive 
changes for the black community living in the colombian pacific coast 
is the prevalence of discriminatory practices, or simply “racism.” Racism 
in a formally and officially raceless society takes on a particular form that 
warrants more detailed explanation. colombia has only recently, and only 
formally, admitted to its multicultural population, but such an admission 
is a small step towards actually acting on behalf of historically excluded 
groups. for most of its history, colombian elites have fought to suppress 
their own native and african populations in an effort to wipe them out of 
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collective imageries by making them invisible (friedemann 1984). This 
effort goes back to the very beginning of independent colombia as the 
declaration of independence also proclaimed de jure equality of all citizens. 
De jure equality, however, did not translate into de facto equality, and slav-
ery remained legal until 1851. after independence, the predominant way 
to “deal” with the black and indigenous populations of latin america was 
by constructing and disseminating the myth of racial democracy, which 
allowed elites to block the formation of racially based associations that 
could potentially formulate group-specific grievances. Marixa lasso (2007) 
shows how the first two decades of independence were crucial for the con-
struction of this myth, and how at the end of the successful construction 
and dissemination of the myth, and by linking it to patriotism, “the explicit 
expression of racial grievances became a mark of unpatriotic divisiveness” 
(lasso 2007: 13). Because of its relevance, i will take a closer look at this 
symbolic construction of racial democracy in colombia.
proposing—or “imagining,” in the words of Benedict anderson 
(2006)—the myth of racial democracy provided latin american elites with 
a powerful way to escape the racial determinism that dominated Western 
intellectual circles during the early nineteenth century (skidmore 1993). 
according to anderson, “it is imagined as a community, because, regard-
less of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the 
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (anderson 
2006: 7). similar to the passing of laws that do not entail real change in 
the 1990s, proposing a way to think of and represent the nation as a com-
munity of equals was a way to block the de facto formation of political 
cleavages able to press for real change in the early eighteen hundreds. This 
strategy offered the additional advantage that it allowed latin american 
elites to escape a racial determinism that implicated them vis-à-vis their 
north american and european models. as nancy stepan explains, “To a 
large extent the educated classes of latin america shared the misgivings of 
the europeans. They wished to be white and feared they were not” (stepan 
1991: 45). White immigration and whitening became the two tools of latin 
american elites everywhere to achieve the kind of modernity that they knew 
of—one that was european and white. in colombia, as lasso shows, “in 
the early decades of the nineteenth century, the newly independent spanish 
american countries decreed racial equality among free men and constructed 
powerful nationalist notions that linked racial harmony and equality to 
national identity” (lasso 2007: 34).
During the years of struggle for independence, colombian elites 
needed afro-colombians in order to gain numerical strength during the 
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independence negotiations in cadiz, and then to fight back the spanish 
colonizers—yet they also feared the afro-colombians’ upward mobility, and 
the threat to white privilege that such mobility implied. instead of offering 
real political and economic change, which would have meant sharing some 
of the very tangible benefits that their status secured them, colombian elites 
offered de jure equality—as early as in the first constitution of colombia, 
ratified in the newly independent cartagena, then an independent republic 
(Muñera 2008). “The 1812 constitution eliminated legal color distinc-
tions; guaranteed suffrage to all free men but vagrants and servants; and, 
although it did not abolish slavery, outlawed the slave trade. in addition, 
pardos of modest origin became members of the constitutional assembly, 
the war council, and the parliament” (lasso 2007: 78).
however, after using the black masses for political support, and to justify 
splitting from “despotic spain” in the name of liberty, creole elites feared 
losing control over those masses and gradually grew afraid of nonwhite 
political participation. creole elites struggling to maintain control after 
1812 invoked fears of a new haiti and a race war, which ultimately led to 
the expulsion of black republicans from the cartagena congress. once afro-
cartageneros had fulfilled their political function, white creoles initiated 
a process of gradually marginalizing them from the collective memory by 
stressing white creole heroism and denying black participation. for lasso, 
“creole patriotic history thus made raucous bandits of afro-colombian 
patriots” (lasso, 2007: 86).
This new framing associated lower-class participation with disorder. 
When spain again became a threat, and while creole elites again had to call 
on black military participation, cartagena race relations entered a second 
phase. as lasso explains, “By the time the independence struggles were over 
[1824], several pardos had become officers—even generals—in the patriot 
army. The question now was what role these men would play in the new 
republic” (lasso 2007: 90).
The answer to this question became clear when white elites voiced their 
concerns about a “pardocracy” and associated the voicing of racial grievances 
with the fear of an impending race war and the potential dawn of another 
haitian Revolution. as lasso explains, rumors of race war emerged whenever 
blacks seemed to threaten white privilege by ascending to powerful posi-
tions (lasso 2007: 138). The invocation of the race-war rhetoric thus served 
to block black social mobility, and openly addressing the topics of racial 
inequality and racism had dire consequences for the accusers. lasso finally 
explains that “once they had been declared unnecessary, racial grievances 
became dangerous attempts to disrupt public order” (lasso 2007: 143).
Colombia | 149
it appears that whereas in 1812 cartagena the call of the day was for 
“one people, one nation,” in 1991 it was the official recognition of multicul-
turalism that allowed traditional political elites to defend their entrenched 
positions of privilege by invoking and codifying paradise, while perpetuat-
ing hell (Wade 2001 and 2005).
in 2005, fourteen years after colombia became officially multicultural, 
the infant mortality rate among afro-descendants remained almost twice 
as high as that of the rest of population: 48.1 percent and 26.9 percent per 
1,000 live births respectively. life expectancy for afro-colombians in that 
year was 66.4 years, while for the rest of the population it was 72.8 years. 
Despite the laws and legal codes passed in 1991 and the following years, 
reality for the poor and excluded continues to look anything but bright. 
structural racism has cast such a strong shadow on afro-colombians that 
even in the chocó department, progressive forces have not been able to win 
political power—even though there are significant community structures, 
such as the community umbrella organization Cocomácia, representing 
124 consejos comunitarios in the Medio atrato region, and a supra-umbrella 
organization called Foro Solidaridad Chocó, which represents 64 community 
umbrella organizations and covers the entire chocó department. Racism in 
colombia thus has undermined the political power and autonomy of afro-
colombians, who have not been able to forge enough group solidarity to 
win political control even where they are the absolute majority.
it becomes clear that racism cannot be overcome by legal frameworks 
alone. concrete measures must be taken that actually address the economic 
and political positions of nonwhites in racial hierarchies. This is a far cry 
from what colombian political elites have done over the past years.
conclUsion
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that by adopting a new constitution 
and signing several international agreements on the situation of black and 
indigenous people, colombian elites have been able to address the problems 
of racism, violence, exclusion, and displacement vis-à-vis the international 
community, thus gaining in legitimacy and securing international support 
and continued aid. Upon taking a closer look, however, it appears that those 
elites have done what they have always done in the past: they have pro-
claimed change without providing the means for this change to actually 
become a reality. for all those at the bottom of social and racial hierarchies, 
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not much has changed in their situations of marginality—only that now 
the elite-dominated state has shielded itself from any criticism from below. 
afro-colombians continue to live in Mozambique, but now under a swed-
ish constitution—to use the metaphor of Roberto campos (quotes above). 
To explain this, i have highlighted three causal mechanisms—namely, the 
weakness of the colombian state, the legal tradition of colombia, and the 
persistence of racist practices and a racist common sense. The term “weak-
ness” actually stands for more than one phenomenon in that it indicates a 
lack of state autonomy, a weak connection between state and citizens, and 
finally a lack of state capabilities. all three are relevant here. The tradition of 
legal idealism, in turn, is not something that characterizes colombia alone; 
colombia is but one of many countries that follow this tradition, which 
influences how citizens and political elites envision social change. While 
it is certainly true that because of law 70, afro-colombians have become 
recognized political actors, the whole definition of what counts as political, 
and how citizenship is operated changed precisely when these new legal 
frameworks became available. in a very similar fashion to the cases already 
analyzed, colombia also provides evidence for the tradeoffs between the 
strength of rights and their exclusivity: once some groups claimed access to 
the political, thus challenging the traditional divisions of power that pushed 
them into the realm of civil society, they were confronted with new strategies 
designed to block their access and the effectiveness of their claim-making.
finally, the engrained practice of racism also characterizes other coun-
tries beyond colombia and has actually been described in more detail for 
such countries as Mexico and Brazil. Together, these three composite, and 
hence rather complex, causal variables produce the outcome we can readily 
observe, namely, that social reality for afro-colombians has not changed 
significantly despite changed legal frameworks.
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conclusion
Learning from Exploratory Research
The empirical cases explored above, analyzed under the frame-
work of what they can each tell us about the different aspects and 
dimensions and the internal contradictions, or dialectics, of citizenship, 
have fleshed out several insights that allow me to summarize some “lessons 
learned” in this chapter.
DialecTics
The first insight is about dialectics. so far, thinking about inherent con-
tradictions and unresolved tensions of citizenship has proven fruitful. not 
just because such a way of thinking is inherently dynamic and allows us 
to focus on processes rather than stasis. Given that the social world is in 
constant flux, such a way of thinking about it promises to produce fruitful 
research questions, designs, and hypotheses to be explored and tested. con-
trast and comparison is indeed the main way in which we are able to create 
hierarchies and value, so that dialectics is not just a way of thinking, but 
also appears to have an ontological status, as our efforts to categorize, sort, 
order, and finally hierarchize end up reflecting back on the world, structur-
ing it. any good social science, i am tempted to say, needs to be dialectical 
to some extent and focus not only on the relationship between structure 
and agency, but also the relationship between form and content. When it 
comes to social hierarchies, forms become contents. contradictions are an 
integral part of social reality, and we should not, as social scientists, try to 
explain them away in our quest for patterns, regularities, and parsimony. 
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instead, social-science analysis should focus directly on the nodes and break-
ing points where contradictions are manifested. Those places tend to be the 
most revealing and telling, and an analysis of those crucial cases promises to 
shed light on much more than the case analyzed. only dynamic historical 
models about reality can capture this phenomenon.
ciTizenship DialecTics
citizenship, wherever and whenever one looks, has borne inherent con-
tradictions. By providing rights, it has denied them to others—either 
excluding them altogether, or making them second-class citizens. as the 
analysis of ancient athens shows, this is not a phenomenon caused by capi-
talism. instead, it seems rooted in the very human strife for distinction and 
privilege, which uses whatever capital it has to its advantage: financial and 
symbolic. Money and power are thus put in play not against, but with—
and to strengthen—the effectiveness of other capitals: social, cultural, and 
racial. in all of this, whiteness is a formidable symbolic capital—even in 
those places where it does not exist as a phenotype. african and indian 
elites still seek to produce and justify their privileges with reference to 
proximity to whiteness, europeanness, or the other derivates that contain 
and transport the same values, such as liberalism, progress, or civilizational 
advance. as we have also seen in the chapter on athenian democracy, it was 
once believed that it is the proper task of politics to find ways to neutral-
ize and counterbalance the inherent and apparently very “natural” human 
tendency to strive for privilege.
When thinking about citizenship, one is thus well advised to think 
about its inherent contradictions—even more so if one seeks to not just 
think about, but analyze citizenship. When doing so, one should always 
remember that “citizenship” is but a word and a category—and that the 
realities it represents are complicated, multifaceted, entangled, and disor-
derly in the extreme. our theorizing and analyzing can only shed light on 
very limited aspects of this always-changing reality—but in doing so in a 
structured way, we can make better sense of reality and discern better what 
causal mechanisms are potentially at work, so that we can avoid some of the 
obvious pitfalls and instead strengthen the promising potential of a reality 
we constantly reproduce and reshape in our social interactions.
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exploRaToRy, inDUcTiVe  
ReseaRch in The social sciences
This book has also demonstrated, i hope, what exploratory social-science 
research can accomplish and under what conditions. as i have explained at 
the beginning of this book, pure “discovery” is impossible to us, because as 
human beings, we share the cultural frameworks, or lifeworlds, of those we 
seek to analyze. We should not pretend otherwise, and instead should be as 
honest and transparent as possible about our own situatedness, social place, 
and limitation. This, i realize, is much to ask from most “professors”—but 
it is the only way to actually produce objective knowledge.
exploratory research still needs to start from a hypothesis, and from 
there expand the researcher’s understanding of all the factors that influ-
ence and produce the hypothesized outcome. Research must thus aim at 
closing the hermeneutic circle. To do so, a clearly formulated starting posi-
tion is needed. in this respect, much can be learned from “taking popper 
seriously”—but it also becomes clear that popper’s high standards are not 
suitable for the social sciences. There are not paradigms and there never will 
be, as the social world is one of constant change, constituted by meaningful 
social interaction that requires constant interpretation to reach even par-
tial understanding. Thus we operate one level below popper’s high ground, 
and on that level induction is not only possible, but plausible and desir-
able. What we should aim for, then, is structured, self-aware, self-critical, 
and self-conscious anticipation, which is followed by testing for plausibility, 
illustration, and exemplification.
it is in this sense that the cases presented above do not constitute a compar-
ative case study, or an attempt to confirm a hypothesis through a most-similar 
case study. i do not want to argue here that such a thing is impossible. To the 
contrary, as the excellent work of such scholars as John Gerring (2007) and 
alexander George and andrew Bennett (2005) has recently demonstrated, 
such an endeavor is possible and indeed very promising.
exploratory research, in contrast, uses cases to demonstrate the useful-
ness of a previously formulated model. it then proceeds by applying this 
model in such a way as to produce as much insight into a given case as 
possible. hence, it does not compare cases, but rather explores each one 
of them to the maximum. The rationale for case selection accordingly is 
one of choosing the most telling or richest cases—that is, cases where the 
causal mechanisms previously stipulated are manifested in the clearest way. 
This can mean that the causal mechanisms under scrutiny have produced 
the strongest impact; but it can also mean that they are easiest to describe 
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and hence very illustrative. exploratory research thus looks for telling, rich, 
and illustrative cases in such a way that each case reveals as much as pos-
sible about a causal mechanism that has been previously formulated in an 
explicit model or theory, and has led to the formulation of clear and precise 
hypotheses. i hope that this book has demonstrated the potential of such 
an approach.
Beyond the epistemological and methodological insights that this book 
has sought to present, the empirical cases discussed in each chapter all have 
produced important insight into the dynamics and dialectics of citizenship 
in its articulation with democracy, exclusion, inclusion, and such related 
social phenomena as the racialization of some groups in this process. in the 
remainder of this chapter, i will bring the different insights together, thus 
providing for an overview of the factual “contribution” of this book about 
the dialectics of citizenship.
colonial enTanGleMenTs
The cases of france and portugal clearly demonstrate that the same mech-
anisms described and analyzed for Brazil and colombia also structure 
citizenship elsewhere. france and portugal stand at the other side of the 
colonial entanglement they created. There, too, some citizens are deemed 
less worthy than others, and the mechanisms by which this exclusion is pro-
duced are very similar to those applied in their former colonies.
from portugal, we can learn how the colonial legacies produced during 
five hundred years of colonial enterprise have started to cast a shadow on 
postcolonial portugal. portuguese colonizers sought to secure their privi-
leges through the power of the colonial empire they represented, and by 
making strategic use of their skin color to justify their privileges as colo-
nizers. after independence, the former colonizers brought this knowledge 
of how to secure their privileges back to portugal, where they were able 
to get the state behind their cause. White african immigrants were rec-
ognized as “returners” and treated differently from black “immigrants.” 
The complacence, and indeed collaboration that the portuguese state has 
shown these returners gives important lessons about state roles, and how 
some groups are able to use the state against others. The resulting framing 
of nonwhite citizens as foreigners and immigrants also shows the role that 
other elites—particularly academic—can play in this process. By changing 
its naturalization laws, portugal indeed joined the european mainstream of 
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replacing ius solis principles to regulate citizenship with the now dominant 
ius sanguini principle, which regulates rightful belonging by descent.
portugal thus provides important insights into the intersections of citi-
zenship with nationality, and it sheds light on how both of these ordering 
principles were created, reformulated, and changed by state elites in order to 
accommodate postcolonial realities.
similar lessons can be learned from the french case, where states are 
equally dominated by traditional elites who seek to defend the interests of 
their traditional, majoritarian electorate by not providing any means for 
second-class citizens to mobilize, organize, and formulate grievances. in this, 
the french case is paradigmatic, providing the blueprint for other european 
states and governments. however, france is such a rich case that it is able to 
also shed much light on the whole liberal tradition it represents.
liBeRalisM DisManTleD
The french case indeed shows that the liberal tradition, together with the 
universalist ideals such a focus on individual rights necessarily entails—all 
of which this country so proudly claims for itself—was indeed hollow and 
exclusionary from the very beginning. colonials, women, the poor, and the 
educated were never included in this vision of “all men being equal.” The 
attitudes against africans and their descendants provide one of those pivotal 
nodes of analysis that tell us much about the general workings, depths, and 
breadth of such lofty ideals. in practice, all nonwhites were relegated to the 
realm of non-men, thus nonhumans.
There is no clearer place to observe this than in the french colonies. 
There, french liberalism revealed its own inherent contradictions. and while 
i am aware that it is “unfair” and not “scientifically” sound to apply con-
temporary criteria of justice to the analysis of times way past, the absolute 
negation of nonwhites by european thinkers and statesmen clearly dem-
onstrates how exactly europe achieved its worldwide supremacy—namely, 
by embracing and disseminating the myth of their own, racial, superiority. 
That this enterprise was so successful attests to the power and vehemence of 
the european war and colonizing machine, as well as to the attractiveness 
and fatality of the capitalist market system it brought with it and symbol-
ized. it is fair to say that no corner of this world was left untouched by 
it, so that racialized social hierarchies transported, sold, and disseminated 
under the mantle of liberalism, universalism, and progress are now present 
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everywhere—even if, in their local declinations, finding expression in differ-
ent local schemes of hierarchizing positionalities.
laW anD RealiTy
several authors have highlighted the extreme distance separating law from 
reality in such countries as Brazil. such seminal authors as Raymundo faoro 
(2001) and florestan fernandes (2006) have long explained to us that in 
Brazil, joining the ranks of the legal profession served first and foremost 
the purpose of distinguishing oneself by becoming an urban aristocrat—
especially during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. francisco 
José Moreno (1969) has argued that latin america inherited from its moth-
erlands a tradition of legal idealism that found expression in the codification 
of idealized norms. The essence of this legal tradition resides in the fact 
that law does not reflect social reality, but an ideal type to which society 
should aspire. for Moreno (1969), “The lack of correlation between what 
ought to be and what is, as reflected in the social and psychological patterns 
of the Roman-spanish tradition, was transferred to the colonies” (Moreno 
1969: 12). furthermore, according to the same author, “The concern with 
the abstract concept of justice rather than with the preservation of tradi-
tions as sources of law was in castile, as it was in Rome, a demonstration 
of ineffective community integration. a society in which customs can be 
legally superseded by abstract intellectual ideas is one in which past collec-
tive experiences are not usually looked upon as a source of identification and 
security. such a pattern of legal organization is indicative of a low degree of 
social cohesiveness. adherence to ideal formulas is used as an artificial way 
of providing the social unity and identification that the institutions of the 
community do not supply” (Moreno 1969: 11).
in the Brazilian case, we can discern a similar pattern to the one dis-
cussed by Moreno. The authors of the Brazilian legal codes are those 
same “men of letters” that Kirkendall (2002) described when discussing 
nineteenth-century elites as “classmates.” such letrados as clovis Bevilaqua 
(who composed the old Brazilian civil code), francisco cavalcanti pontes 
de Miranda, J. x. carvalho de Mendonça, orlando Gomes, and Miguel 
Reale were Brazilian men of letters par excellence. a jurist, writer, historian, 
and philosopher, Bevilaqua was the cofounder of a literary journal and was 
a member of the french academy in his home state of ceará. even though 
Bevilaqua’s civil code, regulating private and commercial life since 1916, was 
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finally replaced by a new civil code in 2003, this new code still represents an 
ideal, imagined and then codified by men of letters. it is not the outgrowth 
of the historical experience of the Brazilian people—a people who in 2010 
still have on average seven years of formal education. it does not reflect the 
traditions and habitus of “Brazilians.” The same is true for other legal codes, 
such as the penal code and the constitution—even though the constitution 
of 1988 for the first time integrated the voice of Brazil’s civil society.
in a widely described process of the constituinte, Brazilian citizens 
were able to present amendments to the constitution, as long as they had 
gathered 30,000 signatures that were then endorsed by three civil-society 
organizations. This participative process produced a total of 122 popular 
amendments and led to a constitution that codified many of the popu-
lar demands of the time (such as regular salary increases). however, even 
though popular segments participated in the drafting of the 1988 con-
stitution, popular participation did not bring the law closer to reality. if 
anything, some elements of the 1988 constitution are even more utopian, 
leading Roberto campos to the conclusion that “The constitution of 1988 
promised us a swedish social security with Mozambican resources” (Revista 
Veja, october 8, 2008, my translation).
at the heart of this problem is a Roman-iberian legal tradition where the 
few educated legal specialists commit to writing their version of what Bra-
zilian reality should look like. Given the extreme inequalities characterizing 
Brazil and the very deep alienation of its elites from the average Brazilian 
people, whose realities they often ignore and sometimes despise, Brazil-
ian law has remained the law of the educated europhile elites—educated 
typically in law schools where not the law, but elitist behavior and attitude 
provided the core of their learning (Kirkendall 2002).
indeed, a Brazilian federal judge has a starting salary of some 20,000 
Brazilian Reais per month—compared to the 2010 minimum salary of 510 
Reais and an average per capita income of 668 Reais (instituto Brasileiro 
2010). antonio carlos Wolkmer (2003), not without revealing his own 
entanglements with erudite, euro-descendant language codes, thus argues 
that “clearly, it is in the mercantilist, absolutist, and counter-reformist por-
tuguese social formation that we can find, even if remotely, the primary 
factors that produced a political-judicial tradition that is individualistic, 
erudite, and legalistic. We can thus verify that the imposition and the favor-
ing of the prepositions of a foreign law not only discriminated against a 
great part of the native population, it also ignored the customary practices 
of an autochthon law, widely practiced in innumerous indigenous and black 
slave communities” (Wolkmer 2003: 137, my translation). The same author 
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comes to the conclusion that “The structural constitution of this judicial 
culture helped produce, on one hand, the practice of the ‘favor,’ the clien-
telism, nepotism, and cooptation; on the other, it introduced a legality that 
is undeniably formalistic, rhetorical, eclectic, and ornamental” (Wolkmer 
2003: 138, my translation).
as the case of colombia has demonstrated, the gap separating law from 
reality is caused by several factors, legal traditions being just one of them. 
Governments that are dominated by traditional elites, and states not auton-
omous enough from elite interests and interference probably constitute the 
core of this problem. however, colombia also shows that traditional elite 
interests can be sidestepped, even if not ignored. constituent movements 
and assemblies were able to produce new legal frameworks that in part aim 
directly at elite interests and cause them much discomfort. and even if the 
legalization of the political dimensions of citizenship has created much 
alienation, colombia also shows that the judicial branch can be a strong 
ally of social movements and popular demands for justice. The legalization 
of citizenship, however, provides a formidable obstacle to closing the gap 
between law and reality, because at the end, this gap is just a manifestation 
of the much wider gap that tends to separate “the people” from the govern-
ment and the state.
The coMMoDificaTion of ciTizenship
as we have seen throughout this book, the meaning of citizenship has 
greatly changed over time. according to John pocock (1995), in Rome, 
“citizenship has become a legal status, carrying with it rights to certain 
things—perhaps possessions, perhaps immunities, perhaps expectations—
available in many kinds and degrees, available or unavailable to many kinds 
of persons for many kinds of reasons” (pocock, in Beiner 1995: 36). it no 
longer meant what it had in athens, where “citizenship is not just a means 
to being free; it is the way of being free itself ” (pocock 1995: 32). Thus it 
appears that citizenship lost its muscle when it was extended to a greater 
number of people. for pocock, the legalization of citizenship conducted 
under the guidance of the Roman lawyer Gaius (c.e. 130– 180) was the 
beginning of possessive individualism and the rise of “homo legalis”—a 
person whose rights and political power were defined by the amount of 
assets he commanded. it was also the beginning of stripping citizenship of 
its aspects of obligation and responsibility. The more citizenship came to 
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solely mean access to rights and entitlements, the more it became subject to 
the logic of competitive markets, where most assets are worth more if oth-
ers do not possess them. More than the legalization of citizenship, pocock 
suggests that under Gaius we saw the gradual commodification of citizen-
ship, and its transformation into a possession and a good that only the rich 
and powerful could afford.
pocock’s idea forces us to look all the way back to democratic athens and 
the Roman Republic if we want to capture this legalization of politics. it also 
suggests two important factors that demand attention in this phenomenon. 
first, we need to analyze the question of how politics and social life relate to 
the legal system—that is, what the potential consequences of a legalization 
of the public and political spheres are. second, if indeed Gaius was the one 
to codify Roman law and in its vein commodify citizenship, then we also 
need to consider this process of commodification—when it started, how far 
it stretched, and what impact it had and has on the quality of democracy.
ciTizenship coMMoDifieD
as the analysis of those countries with a colonial past has demonstrated, the 
law and the very constitution of most societies are strongly influenced by 
its deep social divisions. The formal and official members of its society have 
defined how Brazilian and colombian reality should look, and according to 
which principles it should be guided. The informal segments, the histori-
cally excluded, the poor, and the functional or entirely illiterate had no role 
to play in this idealization. They were instead forced to play by the rules put 
in place by the elites—a daunting prospect indeed.
The resulting alienation from democracy should not come as a surprise. 
however, to capture the full picture, one element of this explanation is still 
missing, namely, the commodification of citizenship per se. Many citizens 
are not just excluded economically and culturally and made to obey and live 
under laws that do not reflect their own customs and traditions, they also 
live in a system where political power to participate and contribute to collec-
tive decision making has long been reduced to a set of legal rights. for them, 
just as for most people living in contemporary democracies, citizenship is no 
longer characterized by active participation, but by the right to participate 
through voting and a set of legal protections offered by the constitution. 
citizenship has thus been transformed from its original meaning.
as explained above, the core of athenian democracy thus was that there 
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was no clear division between rulers and ruled. athenian citizens all par-
ticipated in the ruling of their polity. To ensure that this setup remained in 
place, athenians devised several means, such as appointment to office by 
lot. in addition, several institutions were created for the purpose of avoiding 
a concentration of power among state officials. The strong commitment to 
avoid a system where something like a ruling class would emerge becomes 
evident in many of the formulations aristotle uses to describe athenian 
democracy—for example, when he explains that since some people are 
not superior to others, “it is clear that, for a variety of reasons, all must 
share alike in the business of ruling and being ruled by turns” (aristotle, 
1332b12, 1992: 432).
as the chapter on classical citizenship has shown, citizenship in athens, 
rather than being a right, instead focused on responsibilities and duties. This 
was also the case in the Tuscan republics. according to aristotle, “What 
effectively distinguishes the citizen proper from all others is his participa-
tion in giving judgment and in holding office” (aristotle 1992: 169). in his 
famous speech, pericles also emphasizes the duties and responsibilities of 
citizenship. according to Manville (1997), “one of the most telling parts 
of pericles’ speech concerns the relationship between private and public life. 
The two spheres are several times distinguished (37.1– 2; 40.2; 42.3), but a 
central theme of the orations is the athenians’ perception of the interdepen-
dence between the two and the citizen’s willingness to transcend the purely 
personal sphere and involve himself in the matter of the polis.”
hence, in classical times, as well as in the medieval italian city repub-
lics analyzed in chapter 4, citizenship meant a lot to all those who were 
citizens. it made them power holders and rulers of their own destinies, and 
it implied and demanded much more than a codified set of rights. Under 
such circumstances, alienation is virtually impossible, as there is no clear 
separation between those who rule and those who are ruled. not so, of 
course, in Brazil, or any other contemporary democracy where the rulers 
have been able to set themselves apart from those they rule in sophisticated 
ways. Whenever the possibility to access and enter the spheres of power 
become too remote, too unlikely, and when the rulers seem too distant and 
too different—alienation is likely to result.
alienation of the citizenry, or a significant part of it, from the state, the 
bureaucracy, the sphere of politics, and the public sphere are at the heart of 
widespread discontent with democracy and are ultimately also responsible 
for its performance being lacking. if people do not feel invested or part of 
the citizenry, if they feel their opinion and voice is not heard or does not 
count, if they think that the system is not really “theirs” but controlled by 
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elites—then democratic discontent and dysfunction will necessarily result 
(Tocqueville 2003; nef and Reiter 2009).
Two factors seem particularly relevant in explaining political alien-
ation. first, exclusion is at the core of this alienation. The Brazilian case 
has allowed us to deconstruct some of the ways in which exclusion works, 
providing some insights into the linguistic and formalistic mechanisms used 
to secure inclusion by reproducing exclusion. These mechanisms certainly 
do not characterize Brazil alone.
second, the commodification of citizenship has also contributed to a 
sense of alienation from politics and the state, where commodification refers 
to a slow and gradual transformation of citizenship from a regime of rights 
connected to specific responsibilities to a system of rights as entitlements 
that are claimable without any obligations, thus taking on an asset character. 
as assets, rights as entitlements are partly determined by market mecha-
nisms, hence commodified.1
This sense of alienation was furthered by instituting representation as 
the dominant, and indeed hegemonic way that democracies work—both 
today, but also back when representation was first instituted, in Rome. 
from the beginning, it appears that representation was not a need, but a 
tool devised to ensure elite rule, only this time under a democratic disguise. 
There is indeed nothing democratic about the idea of representation and 
elections per se, as castoriadis has convincingly argued:
These “elections” themselves constitute an impressive resurrection of the mys-
tery of the eucharist and the real presence. every four or five years, one sunday 
(Thursday in Great Britain {Tuesday in the United states}, where sundays are 
devoted to other mysteries), the collective will is liquefied or fluidified and then 
gathered, drop by drop, into sacred/profane vases called ballot boxes [urnes], 
and the same evening, by means of a few additional operations, this fluid, 
condensed one hundred thousand times, is decanted [transvasé] into the thence-
forth transubstantiated spirit of a few hundred elected officials. There is no 
philosophy of “representation,” though there is an implicit metaphysics; neither 
is there any sociological analysis. Who represents whom, and how does he rep-
resent her? forgotten without any discussion are the critiques of representative 
democracy begun with Rousseau, considerably broadened since then, and unre-
servedly validated by the most superficial observation of contemporary political 
facts. Wiped out is the alienation of the sovereignty of those who delegate to 
the delegates. such delegation is supposed to be limited in time. But as soon as 
it is instaurated, everything is over. Rousseau was wrong in this regard: the en-
glish are not even “free once every five years.” for, throughout those five years, 
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the alleged choices about what the electors will be called upon to pronounce 
themselves on will have been completely predetermined by what the deputies 
will have done between the two elections. These five-year terms obviously have 
cumulative effects, and the “choice” of the elector finds itself reduced to such 
grandiose dilemmas as françois Mitterrand or Jacques chirac, George herbert 
Walker Bush or Michael Dukakis, Margaret Thatcher or neil Kinnock, and so 
on. and as soon as a small separate political body exists, it cannot help but look 
after its own powers and interests and enter into collusion with the other de 
facto powers that are set up within society, notably economic ones. (castoriadis 
1990: 211ff )
indeed, the study of Rome has shown that the shift towards representa-
tion by societal elites was not a necessary move, but a political maneuver. 
True, ensuring the direct participation of great numbers poses a challenge, 
but this challenge is one of logistics and institutional design and could be 
solved for better or worse—if the political will to ensure self-rule and auton-
omy would have carried the day. it did not. self-rule and autonomy were 
instead stolen away from the people, and it appears that the trickery used to 
achieve this final goal was not obvious to ordinary people.
Representation is what we all ended up with as a political legacy and 
tradition, even if it was contested again and again (e.g., by the medieval bur-
ghers and french-caribbean revolutionaries analyzed in this book, but also 
by all those seeking to establish “Räte Republics” after the first World War).
citizenship was pushed out of the political realm into the legal realm, 
thus transforming it from a right to rule, to a right to sue and be sued. 
This transformation happened early and went hand in hand with the trans-
formation of direct rule into rule by representation. at the end of this 
development stands the situation we know now: ordinary people talk of 
the state, government, and even politics from the outside. They are alien-
ated and no longer feel that they are the state and that the government is 
truly theirs.
This change is not one of quantity, but of quality, as the very character of 
what it means to be a citizen has changed in this transformation. ever since 
this transformation, ordinary people belong to civil society. liberalism, with 
its claim to privacy, only becomes possible once the people have left the 
political realm. This diagnosis is opposite to the one offered by agamben 
(1998), who claims that biopolitics have absorbed humans to the point of 
total control, whereas in ancient Greece, humans were thought of as political 
animals, and zoe was differentiated from bios. from the point of view of state 
power and control, this might be true. however, from the point of view of 
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citizens and their relationship to states, the opposite seems the case: citizens 
gradually lost their belonging to the state and the political realm. politics has 
become an elite business, conducted by specialists. Democracy no longer 
is a system where the people rule themselves. in the midst of this change, 
people’s lives have become fragmented, and more and more emphasis has 
been given to the private realm—the realm of civic organizing, but also the 
realm of consumption, entertainment, and distraction. civic organizing is 
only required once genuine political participation is no longer a possibility 
and ruling has been handed over to elites. civic organizing and the kind of 
associationalism that Tocqueville heralds is indeed a weak and insufficient 
substitute for true political participation and self-rule. The alienation from 
the political also seems to find its reflection in the courageous civic activism 
of many, but also in the tremendous consumerism so prevalent today. Both 
seem motivated by a seeking of meaning, as well as a channeling of creative 
energy—all of which were once integrated into political life.
even the critique that direct democracy seems too time-absorbing and 
burdensome appears in a different light when analyzed under the lens of lost 
self-rule: where participation is meaningless and overshadowed by powerful 
players from government or private business, participation becomes indeed 
tiresome and meaningless. This is the lesson from the participative bud-
geting processes initiated during the mid-eighties in Brazil: only true and 
effective participation can keep people involved.
at the very end, i permit myself to venture into the unknown and 
to formulate some recommendations. The central one certainly is that to 
reinvigorate democracy, citizenship needs to be reinvigorated. To fight 
alienation, ordinary people have to participate again—not just as second-
ary participants, but as central players. politics has to be reconquered. 
Their actions should be guided by such slogans as “We are the state” and 
“We are the government.” This goes far beyond the familiar communitar-
ian claims (sandel 1998), or the substitution of some politicians with “less 
professional” others (as the Tea party movement seems to demand). citi-
zens must not only share in the political responsibilities of self-rule; they 
must be the ones ruling themselves for democracy’s true promise to be real-
ized. contemporary means of communication offer plenty of possibilities 
for making this happen—but against it stand all those who have much to 
lose, and hence do not trust: the people. for “the people” themselves, liv-
ing in such a system would also imply many changes that would certainly 
require some time of adaptation and transition, as we now live on top of a 
huge pile of ideological garbage that we have accumulated ourselves, and 
we have become victims of the life-transforming powers of elite rule. our 
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energies go wasted into mostly meaningless projects of distraction, con-
sumerism, and “civic activism” that ends up frustrating most of us because 
it achieves so little vis-à-vis the powers that control politics. a revolution-
ary step towards self-rule is thus not realistic or even desirable. What needs 
to occur is a gradual increase of active citizenship, of taking on responsibili-
ties at the local level over community lives.
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notes
inTRoDUcTion
 1. This diagnosis runs parallel to the currently fashionable analysis of Giorgio 
agamben (1998), who seeks to show how states exercise total power over 
its citizens—even their very lives. however, my primary focus is not states, 
but citizens, and instead of thinking about the power of states, my questions 
start at an earlier level: how and why did states become so autonomous from 
citizens?
 2. in this effort, i find myself supported by the call of Uday singh Mehta (1999) 
to focus on the “space in-between.” for Mehta, this space is the one that binds 
liberalism and empire tightly together. My own analysis focuses on the pair 
citizenship/exclusion, of which liberalism and empire form but one subgroup.
 3. chapters 5 and 6 grow out of a previously published article called “framing 
non-Whites and producing second-class citizens in france and portugal.”
chapTeR 1. The episTeMoloGy anD MeThoDoloGy 
of exploRaToRy social science ReseaRch: 
cRossinG poppeR WiTh MaRcUse
 1. This is not to say that all reality is socially constructed, as searle himself 
admits. a realist theory of science does not rule out the existence of institu-
tional facts, as Roy Bhaskar (2008), andrew sayer (2010), and Daniel little 
(1998) have amply demonstrated—it only makes claims about the fact that 
reality exists independently from our perception.
 2. Given this impossibility of pure discovery and induction, the attempts for-
mulated by those authors associated with “grounded theory” (Glaser, strauss, 
charmaz, among others) seem naive—even after they have responded to 
some of the critiques raised in this regard (Bryant and charmaz 2010). The 
same is true for those proposing “iterative research frameworks” (e.g., sriv-
astava and hopwood 2009), or even those who have focused on “deviant 
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cases,” but failed to explain and specify how exactly a deviant case leads to the 
formulation of a new theory (George and Bennett 2005).
 3. social scientists face a dilemma that sets us apart from natural science. 
according to Thomas Kuhn (1996), we are in a state of “pre-paradigmatic” 
inquiry, which means that we do not have broadly accepted theories or para-
digms that can be explored to exhaustion. although i disagree with Kuhn’s 
assessment, i reach the same conclusion, namely, that 100 percent reliable 
knowledge is impossible to achieve in the social sciences. in contrast to Kuhn, 
my own assessment rather points to a post-paradigmatic phase—as we already 
know, and have known for a long time, what the important questions in 
the social sciences are and how to ask them. Karl Marx, emile Durkheim, 
Max Weber, ferdinand Toennies, alexis de Tocqueville, among others, have 
already asked most of them—and given quite good answers. To argue that 
we are in a pre-paradigmatic phase in the social sciences implies that a para-
digm is yet to come—which is not only illusionary, but impossible (Jarvie, 
in cohen and Wartofsky 1983). social life is in constant flux, and fixed laws 
will never capture it. Most post-paradigmatic efforts, instead of producing 
frameworks that help to further understand and explain the social world, 
have instead contributed to creating less clarity and more confusion, some of 
which seems self-serving, as many analysts seem to engage in efforts to mys-
tify their analyses and themselves. Many social scientists, instead of putting 
the old questions about power, exploitation, domination, and exclusion to 
work—which would mainly consist of “working”—seem instead engaged in 
efforts of self-promotion by proposing ever more “sophisticated” theoretical 
concepts and models that, if possible, bear their own name and become their 
brand. in this vanity fair, social scientists only serve their own egos and sala-
ries; they also block an honest and collective effort to analyze the world—a 
task that can be done jointly with non-academics if the language of the aca-
demics is not designed to exclude, but instead to involve (feyerabend 2010).
 4. hence, even in exploratory and inductive inquiry, Karl popper’s insights 
apply; namely, that “from a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet jus-
tified in any way—an anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical system, or 
what you will—conclusions are drawn by means of logical deduction. These 
conclusions are then compared with one another and with other relevant 
statements, so as to find what logical relations (such as equivalence, deriv-
ability, compatibility, or incompatibility) exist between them” (popper 2002: 
9). Where exploratory research departs from popper’s approach is in his stark 
formulation of the impossibility of induction, which results from his expect-
ing, or demanding, too much from the statements derived from induction. 
if, however, we depart from a place where certainty is not what we aim for, 
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and if we also admit that paradigms are not what we can reach in the social 
sciences, then induction becomes a disciplined and self-reflexive practice of 
using common sense, where we anticipate in transparent ways and then seek 
to assess the plausibility of the causal connections thus proposed by looking 
for empirical information that supports it.
 5. in fairness, it should be noted that exploratory research cannot avoid the 
risk of personal bias. however, instead of pretending to conduct “objective” 
research able to unveil “universal” patterns, critical and self-reflective explor-
atory research seeks to lay bare the personal bias of the researcher up front, 
thus allowing the reader to consider it. instead of unveiling universal laws, 
such research is also more limited in scope in that it can only reveal what is 
accessible to a given researcher at a given time, under the given circumstances 
and limitations. as such, it is more objective than the research produced by 
all those “playing the God trick” (haraway 1988).
 6. Understanding and explaining the ontological ramifications of dialectics 
exceeds not only the space available, but also my training as a political scientist.
chapTeR 2. concepTUalizinG ciTizenship: 
DisJUncTiVe, DUal, DiViDeD, enTanGleD, oR WhaT?
 1. as argued, e.g., by Mireille Rosello 2001.
 2. it seems important to explain that my own interest in citizenship does 
not take issue with a whole set of arguments about what rights are, and 
if social reality can be influenced by such lofty concepts as citizenship 
rights or social rights. i am skeptical about the potential of laws to produce 
reality, and aware of the pitfalls of legal idealism. citizenship, here, shall 
thus not refer to a set of entitlements of citizens. This book is instead con-
cerned with the quality and the conditionalities that restrict the political, 
civil, and social rights of certain individuals and groups within a citizenry. 
stated more precisely, i want to analyze how societal dynamics affect and 
condition the quality of citizenship. T. h. Marshall’s essay had a narrower 
interest, namely, to analyze the relationship between citizenship and capi-
talism. he was thus able to see that “The components of a civilized and 
cultured life, formerly the monopoly of the few, were brought progressively 
within reach of the many, who were encouraged thereby to stretch out 
their hands towards those that still eluded their grasp. The diminution of 
inequality strengthened the demand for its abolition, at least with regard to 
the essentials of social welfare” (T. h. Marshall 1992: 37).
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 3. The tension between formal rights and actual practice merits a more detailed 
treatment, especially in latin america, where legal idealism is the norm, 
which refers to the fact that legal codes do not necessarily reflect reality, but 
represent an ideal situation. The writing and codification of these legal codes 
has been an elite affair, which raises the question of how much latin ameri-
can elites really know, or want to know, about the realities of the majority in 
the countries they live in. considering latin america’s colonial past, it is not 
a far shot to argue that latin american elites have codified an idealized euro-
pean reality that is entirely out of sync with the actual reality of the country 
in question. see Reiter 2009, chapter 8.
 4. This logic hinges on the almost exclusive treatment of citizenship as a set of 
rights, thus stripped of its original content, which included obligations and 
responsibilities. The history of how citizenship developed from a political 
right to participate in the making of the rules by which one abides, to the 
notion of certain rights and goods that the state has to provide will be part 
of my forthcoming book. John pocock (in Beiner 2007) has already focused 
on this shift from political to legal citizenship that occurred under the late 
Roman Republic.
 5. it is worth noting here that this logic also seems to apply to those societies that 
have created myths of “aryanism,” e.g., india or iran. in both countries, white-
ness is highly valued and constantly negotiated, which means that individuals 
seek to achieve it by engaging in different strategies. These include biological 
elements, such as the very common skin-bleaching, as well as symbolic ones, 
manifested in behavioral codes, language, dress, and general habitus.
 6. it also highlights the importance of black republicans, such as françois-
Dominique Toussaint l’ouverture and Jean-Jacques Dessalines, who fought 
for liberté, égalité, and fraternité against the french army sent to the carib-
bean to restore slavery.
chapTeR 3. classical ciTizenship: 
The poliTical anD The social
 1. My focus on the classical democracies of athens and Rome is not motivated 
by any claims that these democracies were the only ones that existed, or any 
related claims about the supremacy of the Western tradition over others.
 2. There is considerable discussion about what these extra powers were. Rihil 
(1995) considers that “the areopagus was rejecting significant numbers 
of magistrates at their dokimasiai and ephialtes’ reforms sought first and 
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foremost to transfer this power to the candidate’s peers” (Rihil 1995: 87). 
sealey (1964) looks instead to the end of the term, arguing that ephialtes’s 
reforms were essentially concerned with the procedures for calling magistrates 
to account when they left office, making them vulnerable to accusations of 
corruption.
 3. it is important to note the role played by nonstate entities in helping to 
determine citizenship qualifications. lambert’s (1993) work examines this 
aspect and he notes, “in practice the phratry played the major role in con-
trolling the major qualification for citizenship, athenian descent” (lambert 
1993: 49). This was even more the case prior to 508 b.c.e., when the phra-
tries had included all the citizens; in other words, “Those whose names were 
lacking in the phratry rolls lacked ipso facto citizenship” (ferguson 1910: 
259). The ten new tribes created by cleisthenes were intended to challenge 
these nonstate groups.
 4. according to plutarch (1960), solon “permitted only those [xenoi] to be 
made citizens who were permanently exiled [from their home cities] or who 
removed to athens with their entire family to ply a trade. This he did, as we 
are told, not so much to drive away other foreigners, as to invite these par-
ticular ones to athens with the assurance of becoming citizens” (life of solon 
24.2). This is consistent with Manville’s ideas concerning the “usefulness” of 
the citizen body to the polis (Manville 1997: 32).
 5. ostwald (1996) further clarifies that “all citizens are equally ‘privileged’: 
the privilege is a privilege only to the extent that slaves and foreigners are 
excluded” (ostwald 1996: 54f ).
 6. aristocratic cultic associations did not die out, however, but instead took on 
new roles and remained integral to athenian religious and social life for a 
considerable period of time (lambert 1993).
chapTeR 4. MeDieVal eURopean ciTizenship: 
chRisTian RiGhTs anD JeWish DUTies
 1. in 1993, the University of copenhagen– based copenhagen polis centre, 
under Mogens herman hansen, initiated a broad research program called 
poleis and city-states, 600– 323 b.c.e., which is steadily producing more evi-
dence on the history of city-states around the world. The findings already 
produced by this center testify against the assumption that city-states, demo-
cratic and nondemocratic ones, only emerged in the Western world.
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chapTeR 5. fRance: liBeRalisM UnVeileD
 1. quoted from John Thornhill, the Financial Times, november 8, 2005.
 2. e.g., by etienne Balibar (2004).
 3. tns sofres 2007 survey results available online at http://lecran.org/?p=243.
 4. interview conducted on June 20, 2011.
 5. interview conducted on June 20, 2011, Rouen.
 6. as frenchman alexis de Tocqueville had diagnosed already in the 1830s, 
when writing about the structural contradictions inherent in democracies, in 
Democracy in America.
chapTeR 6. The posTcolonial WiThin: 
poRTUGal, WhiTe anD eURopean
 1. a search in what is probably the most prestigious academic social-science 
journal published in portugal, Análise Social, revealed that between 2000 
and 2009 this journal published twenty articles focusing on migration, but 
only one that focuses on ethnic minorities—published in 2005 by fernando 
luís Machado, ana Raquel Matias, and sofia leal, who analyze the effects of 
cultural differences on school performance (Análise Social 40, no. 3 (2005): 
695– 714. notable exceptions to this tendency to render minorities invisible 
practiced by portuguese academia include the work of Teresa fradique, anto-
nio contador, Margarida Marques, and Maria Joao Valente Rosa.
 2. http://alfa.fct.mctes.pt/estatisticas/global.
 3. a fact highlighted by Marques et al. 2007.
 4. interview conducted on June 10, 2003, in lisbon, my translation. The com-
plete quote was printed in Reiter 2009: 409.
 5. aRTiGo 1º (nacionalidade originária). 1—são portugueses de origem: 
os filhos de pai português ou mãe portuguesa nascidos em território por-
tuguês ou sob administração portuguesa, ou no estrangeiro se o progenitor 
português aí se encontrar ao serviço do estado português; b) os filhos de 
pai português ou mãe portuguesa nascidos no estrangeiro se declararem que 
querem ser portugueses ou inscreverem o nascimento no registo civil portu-
guês; c) os indivíduos nascidos em território português filhos de estrangeiros 
que aqui residam habitualmente há, pelo menos, seis anos não estejam ao 
serviço do respectivo estado, se declararem que querem ser portugueses; d) 
os indivíduos nascidos em território português quando não possuam outra 
nacionalidade. 2—presumem-se nascidos em território português ou sob 
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administração portuguesa, salvo prova em contrário, os recém-nascidos exp-
ostos naqueles territórios.
a new law, passed in July 2007, amends the constitution to the extent 
that legal residence of foreigners is regulated through the introduction of a 
legal residence card. This new law does not change the definition of citizen-
ship by descent.
 6. interview conducted on December 6, 2003.
 7. Banco de portugal, “Remittances in the portuguese Balance of payments,” 
luxembourg Group on Remittances, June 26– 27, 2006, available online: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/2006/luxgrp/pdf/italy.pdf.
 8. Mpi: http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?iD=77.
 9. Jornal Publico, January 21, 2009, 11– 12.
chapTeR 7. BRazil: expeRTs in exclUsion
 1. interview conducted in são luis, June 30, 2008.
 2. By presenting these examples, Reis also sheds light on the often-discussed 
phenomenon of clientelism. she explains: “Those who, for example, ask des-
perately for a job have already searched the job market in vain and they do 
not see another alternative but to implore for an intervention of the authori-
ties so that they can exercise their right to make a living through work” (Reis 
1990: 166).
 3. Defined as fifteen years and older with less than four years of schooling.
 4. iBGe, 2008.
 5. World Bank confidential Report no. 40011-BR: Brazil: Knowledge and inno-
vation for competitiveness, available online at: http://www.planejamento.gov 
.br/secretarias/upload/arquivos/seain/conhecimento_inovacao_competiti 
vidade.pdf.
 6. With apologies to my friend, federal Judge João Batista de castro Junior, 
in the original: “para penetrar as esferas de poder, cidadãos brasileiros têm 
que imitar o ‘habitus’ dos poderosos. Recentemente, iniciou-se no Brasil um 
movimento liderado pela associação dos magistrados brasileiros (amb) para 
convencer seus associados da necessidade de mudança na linguagem. nossas 
observações preliminares, como participantes deste esforço, levam-nos a um 
diagnóstico pessimista dessa iniciativa por constatar que as discussões a este 
respeito já começaram desfocadas, o que mostra o grau de alheamento desses 
ensaios endógenos de problematização bacharelesca, pois confunde linguagem 
com perfil estilístico, esquecendo-se da advertência buffoniana de que ‘le style 
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est l’homme même,’ além de ir contra a especialização terminológica—do que 
decorrem os chamados tecnoletos—que todo saber técnico-científico deve ter. 
na verdade, a questão tem uma profundidade não apreensível com essa super-
ficialidade: ao longo de sua evolução histórica, a linguagem do bacharelismo 
jurídico permaneceu ensimesmada tanto quanto o conhecimento que ela 
veicula, negligenciando que ‘la liberdad del lenguaje es libertad histórica, lib-
ertad del hombre como ser histórico.’ sem voltar-se para a própria realidade 
social a que teoricamente deveria dirigir-se, esse instrumental linguageiro, 
embora atualmente menos pervadido de afetações literárias de gosto duvi-
doso, permaneceu com ar de esquizoidia social ainda que o beletrismo tenha 
perdido substância na formação atual dos bacharéis.”
 7. in the original: “Ministério da Justiça, conselho nacional dos direitos da 
criança e do adolescente, ata da septuagésima sétima assembléia ordinária 
realizada em 14 de fevereiro de 2001: Às nove horas e quarenta minutos 
do dia quatorze de fevereiro de dois mil e um, deu-se início a septuagésima 
sétima assembléia ordinária do conselho nacional dos Direitos da criança 
e Do adolescente (conanda), presidida pelo seu presidente cláudio augusto 
Vieira da silva (fundação fe e alegria do brasil). presentes os conselheiros 
titulares Maria izabel da silva (cut); Kênia augusta figueiredo (cfess); José 
fernando da silva (centro de-cultura luiz freire); Rachel niskier sanchez (sbp); 
Valéria Getúlio de Brito (mndh); ozantra ferreira costa (cecria); Guilbert 
ernesto de freitas nobre (ms); olga câmara (mj) (parcialmente); caio luiz 
Davoli Brandão (mp); euridice nóbrega Vidigal (mf) (parcialmente). pre-
sentes também, os conselheiros– governamentais suplentes que assumiram a 
titularidade nesta assembléia; Júlio Boaventura santos Matos (mre); Marilda 
Marfan (mec); eliana cristina crisóstomo (mj) (parcialmente); ivone 
Bezerra-de Mello (mte); clóvis Ubirajara lacorte (casa civil), Registramos 
a ausência justificada dos conselheiros do mpas e da casa civil. por motivo 
de ausência justificada dos conselheiros titulares—da cnbb e da puc/sp, 
foram convocados e estiveram presentes os conselheiros não-governamentais 
que assumiram a titularidade nesta assembléia: olympio de sá sotto Maior 
(abmp) e Marcos antonio paiva-colares (oab). presentes também os consel-
heiros suplentes da sociedade civil silvio alberto Valente soares (abrapia) e 
laura Rosseti (fenasp). por motive de ausência do conselheiro da normando 
Batista santos da abong, o conselheiro silvio Valente da abrapia assumiu a 
titulariedade no segundo dia da asembléia. o presidente abriu os trabalhos 
dando as boas vindas a todos, pela participação da primeira assembléia do 
novo milênio e em seguida submeteu á pauta à plenária, tendo a mesma sido 
aprovada com alteração do item oitavo do segundo dia, transferindo—o para 
o iten quarto do primeiro dia. no item assuntos gerais, foram solicitados o 
Notes | 173
agendamento das assembléias do exercício; discussão sobre a acão Direta de 
inconstitucionalidade dos artigos duzentos e cinqüenta e quatro e duzentos 
e cinqüenta e cinco do estatuto da criança e do adolescente, proposta pelo 
partido Trabalhista Brasileiro—ptb—e participação do conanda no comitê 
de acompanhamento das políticas sociais de ségurança pública. os demais 
itens permaneceram inalterados. prosseguindo, o presidente propôs alterações 
na composição das comissões Temáticos e Grupos de Trabalhos existentes, 
justificando que a referida alteração nao fere o Regimento interno do con-
selho. informou que as comissoes aglutinarao os eixos tematicos, passando a 
funcionar como segue: 1) comissão de articulação—terá como eixo temático 
os conselhos estaduais, Municipais das capitais e conselhos Tutelares; 2) 
comissão de orçamento e finanças—tera como eixo temático as medidas, 
sócio educativas; 3) comissão de políticas públicas—terá como éixo temático 
a quarta conferência nacional; 4) comissão de comunicação—as ações 
desta comissão serão desenvolvidas em parceria—com a andi ficando restrita 
aos encaminhamentos necessários para em conjunto coma a andi desenvolver 
a política de comunicação: a proposta foi debatida e aprovada por todos. 
em seguida, passou-se a composição dos seus integrantes ficando assim con-
stituída:  .  .  . as comissões Temáticas se reuniram no período da manhã e 
início da tarde para tratarem de assuntos especificos de suas áreas de atuação, 
atualização das pendências das assembléias anteriores e elaboração do plano 
de ação e de metas para o exercício de dois e um.”
 8. The appeal of sarah palin in the United states, and also the election of 
Barack obama to the presidency can be explained to a great extent by this 
framework—that is, their appeal to groups of citizens who feel underrep-
resented or not represented, be it youth, in the case of obama, or patriotic 
right-wingers, in the case of palin.
chapTeR 8. coloMBia: When laW anD RealiTy clash
 1. The state, however, did not provide the same right to other afro-colombian 
“ancestral” communities living outside of the pacific coastal areas.
 2. it was integrated into national legislation by law 21 of 1991 (ley 70 de 
1993– Decreto 2248 de 1995).
 3. new york, March 7, 1966, ratified in 2004.
 4. long Term plan for the Black population, afro-colombians, palenque y 
Raizal: proposal y process 2005– 2007, national Department of planning, 
2007.
174 | Notes
 5. i am aware that this is a very general statement, and that law 70 has been 
used to challenge the constitutionality of development projects, land inva-
sions, and even state actions—for example, in the notorious Curvaradó and 
Jiguamiandó cases of october 2009 (Giupponi 2010). however, the number 
of lawsuits brought forward by the colombian populations against abuse and 
violation by the government or private entities is still extremely low if com-
pared to most rich countries. The general inefficiency of the law in upholding 
and defending the interests of the general population was confirmed by the 
colombian ombudsman for the chocó department (Defensor del Pueblo) 
in an interview conducted on March 18, 2011, in quibdó. The fact that 
those who actually seek to use the law for human-rights purposes are rou-
tinely threatened and killed gives further evidence of the general weakness of 
colombian law as a mechanism to uphold justice.
 6. even though law 70 has politicized a whole new group of people, who before 
were at the margin both economically and politically, see oslender 2004.
chapTeR 9. conclUsion: leaRninG 
fRoM exploRaToRy ReseaRch
 1. This is a case where concrete historical changes impact the way reality has to 
be analyzed—in other words, where ontology impacts epistemology. as such, 
it points at the interdependence of ontology and epistemology to the extent 
that empirical changes, such as the changing character of citizenship, trigger 
the application of an analytical framework such as market theory.
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